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Studies examining homicide rates often have two limitations. First, there is a lack of 
rich, dynamic data to account for change, and second, no consideration of formal 
social controls at the neighborhood-level.  To address these limitations, longitudinal 
data from Washington, D.C. was collected at the neighborhood level.  This homicide 
incident and neighborhood demographic data, which span  from 1998-2006, allow for 
a test of two theoretical perspectives within a classical/social control sphere, namely 
social disorganization and deterrence.  This work pses two main questions:   Do 
dynamic structural factors influence homicide rates across neighborhoods?  Does 
aggregate deterrence influence homicide rates across neighborhoods?  Results suggest 
that dynamic structural factors predict homicide rat s better than static factors, though 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“…The undiscovered country… puzzles the will, 
And makes us rather bear those ills we have 
Than fly to others that we know not of…” 
-Hamlet, Act III, Scene I 
Explanations for differences in homicide rates often have two pitfalls: first, a 
lack of rich, dynamic data to explore theoretical predictions; and second, a failure to 
account for formal social controls at the neighborho d-level.  With these in mind, 
detailed, longitudinal data from Washington, D.C. were collected for the time period 
1998-2006. Drawing on two theoretical perspectives within a classical/social control 
sphere, namely social disorganization and deterrence, the collection of new data and 
conceptualization of social control variables allow this work to address two main 
questions:   Do dynamic structural factors influence homicide rates across 
neighborhoods?  Does aggregate deterrence, as captured by homicide clearance, 
influence homicide rates across neighborhoods?   
 This introductory section covers the context, purpose, and justification for the 
study.  To start, a brief discussion of Washington D.C.’s demographic shifts, 
homicide rates, and public focus helps establish context for this current work.  Next, 
the potential utility of exploring dynamic structural factors and formal legal factors is 
reviewed. Missing from many neighborhood-level studies is a measure of formal 
control, and this work will discuss how deterrence th ory can contribute such a 
conceptualization; some researchers have buried deterrence theory without praise, 
though this may be premature given the lack of celerity testing and successes in 




literature, which allows for the approaches proposed by the current study. This 
study’s purpose is to confront an “undiscovered country” of unanswered questions, 
and this introduction will provide an overview of what is known and what remains 
undiscovered.   
Washington, D.C. 
“Washington, D.C. is a city of Southern efficiency and Northern charm.” 
-John F. Kennedy 
“Outside of the killings, D.C. has one of the lowest crime rates in the country.” 
-Marion Barry 
 
 Washington, D.C. is the only city created by a direct mandate within the U.S. 
Constitution and has continued to develop a unique history and context since 1790.  
While Article I called for a federal district, the actual location was determined 
through a compromise between the northern and southern interests after ratification. 
The land was surveyed and city designed for nearly a decade before it became the 
official seat of government in 1800.  Per the District of Columbia Organic Act of 
1801, the federal district was composed of three regions – the area to be used 
expressly by the federal government was known as the City of Washington, with the 
surrounding region on the east of the Potomac River named Washington County and 
the region to the west of the Potomac named Alexandri  County.  Interestingly, two 
cities remained autonomous – both Georgetown and Alexandria had been founded in 
the colonial period and placed inside the boundaries of the new federal district, 
though neither city was incorporated into the District of Columbia.  Both Maryland 
and Virginia ceded territory for the federal distric , but the aforementioned act of 




yielded counties; in other words, Maryland laws were nforced in Washington 
County and Virginia laws in Alexandria County.  Virginia was granted the power to 
incorporate Alexandria County and the City of Alexandria into their state from the 
federal district in 1846, and in 1871 Congress passed a law incorporating the cities of 
Washington, Georgetown, and Washington County into the current geography known 
as “Washington, D.C.”1 During this period, the District was allowed its own 
government and laws for the first time; additionally, a governor was established as the 
head of government and was to be appointed directly by the U.S. President.  
However, all laws were still reversible by the Congress, and after corruption scandals 
arose regarding the first D.C. governor, Congress r-established direct rule over the 
region.  This lasted until 1973, when Congress passed legislation reverting to the 
1871 law in many ways, though a notable difference is that in the 1973 version, the 
head of government for D.C. was a democratically-elect d mayor.   
 Demographically, the District has seen numerous shifts which have 
contributed to its unique context, both in overall population and among the black 
population specifically.  The District of Columbia grew nine-fold from its founding 
through 1860, with an original population of over 8,000 to over 75,000 in 1860.  The 
percentage of black residents was never lower than 19% according to census records 
during that period.  While slavery was recognized within the District until 1862, the 
                                                
1 According to the District of Columbia Organic Act of 1871, the three incorporated regions would 
have their charters revoked and be re-chartered as a single District of Columbia; however, the law 
expressly states that the region known as the city of Washington would continue “to be known as the 
city of Washington” – this is the root of the moniker Washington, D.C., though notably, the law also 
dictates the city of Georgetown to be known as the city of Georgetown in the same fashion.  So to 





black populations from 1830-1860 were majority free p ople – according to the 1850 
and 1860 censuses, well over 70% of the District’s black population were free.   
Over the next century, the District experienced more changes in population.  
The overall population continued to grow until reaching its peak in 1950 with over 
800,000 residents – the most dramatic growth in population corresponded with a 36% 
increase in total residents between 1930 and 1940 linked to New Deal government-
growth, though large increases are also seen corresp nding to the two World Wars.  
The black population rose after the Civil War to abut one-third of the total District 
population, but then dropped to near one-quarter by the 1920 census.  After 
migrations of black populations seen throughout the country following the two World 
Wars, Washington, D.C. became one the first major cities with a black population 
majority; in 1960, nearly 54% of the population in Washington were black, which 
itself was a dramatic increase from the 1950 level of 35%.  
As the overall population of Washington, D.C. decreased from 1960-1980, the 
black population remained greater than 70%.  D.C. continued to lose population in the 
1990 and 2000 censuses, though the percentage of blacks also declined into the 60s 
and then 50s.  While the District has gained population since 2000, the black 
population continues to drop as a percentage.  As of the 2010 Census, the black 
population is down to 50.7%.  Some of this change has been due to increases in the 
white population – in 1950, whites made up nearly 65% of D.C. residents, but this 
figure dropped to a low of about 27% in 1980; since then, the white population has 




 When the District of Columbia is included in aggregate crime studies, it is 
often an outlier in the data (Ousey & Augustine, 2001; Velez, Krivo, & Peterson, 
2003).  Examinations of aggregate homicide trends found Washington, D.C. often 
considerably higher than other jurisdictions, though few explanations are given 
beyond alluding to the city’s reputation as being a very violent place, thus providing 
at best a tautological reasoning for homicide in the District.2  Crime, and particularly 
homicide, in Washington, D.C. has garnered national media interest throughout the 
years.  While there is always an inherent interest in the social condition of a nation’s 
capital city, the crime spikes of the mid-1980s brought an intense focus onto the 
District.  With a drug market so extensive that it prompted a drug-buy for a 1989 
Oval Office speech highlighting the crack epidemic, and with the substantial violence 
associated with crack during this period, Washingto, D.C. became known for a time 
as both the political and murder capital of the United States.   
While many of these factors have clearly changed for the better (see footnote 
2), the state of crime and homicide in D.C. has been a recurring focus during 
discussions and recent challenges to the District’s gun control law.  Originally 
enacted in 1975, the law essentially prohibited handgu  licensing until the legislation 
was declared unconstitutional in 2008.  Given the high percentage of handgun crimes 
and homicides within Washington, both sides used general trends and research from 
                                                
2 While such an explanation is very easy when Washington, D.C. had homicide rates upwards of 70 per 
100,000 residents during the 1990s, an appeal to stereotypes is more difficult now. The 2011 homicide 
rate in D.C. was 17 per 100,000, which puts the District in the company of Buffalo, NY and 
Richmond, VA rather than Baltimore, Detroit, or New Orleans.  This rate has dropped further in 2012, 
as Washington, D.C. has less than 100 total homicides in a year for the first time since 1963.  While 
still producing a homicide rate about three times the national average, it is interesting to see greate  
change in Washington than in other cities that were once the closest competition below the District’s 
rate; it suggests an interesting puzzle may be afoot for those seeking explanations, both within D.C. 




other jurisdictions to support their respective positi ns – proponents of the law noted 
it would be irresponsible to loosen gun markets in an area prone to gun violence, 
whereas opponents cited studies linking relaxed gun laws to lower crime and noted 
that the D.C. ban did not appear to have significant impact on crime given the high 
gun usage among criminals.3 
 The impact of D.C.’s handgun ban was often argued through data from other 
regions or older D.C.-based studies – the common prblem for both sides was limited 
data availability.  While Washington, D.C. has consistently reported aggregate data to 
the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), the data is of limited use when trying to explain 
factors contributing to trends or differences within geography.  In contrast, data in the 
Supplemental Homicide Reports (SHR) is of greater use for trend analysis 
considering the detail given for homicide incidents – however, the District had not 
reported to the F.B.I. between 1997 and 2010.  The results reported later in this work 
represent the first time such data have been examined, due to a collection process 
recounted in Chapter 3.  
Neighborhood Studies 
Exploration of differential crime and homicide trends across geography can be 
traced to A. Quetelet’s work in France during the 1830s and 1840s.  A century later, 
                                                
3 While specific arguments for both sides often appeled to hyperbole and ideology lightly-masked in 
facts, it is worthy to note that the predicted/alluded to increase in gun crime due to removing the ban 
has not taken place, at least in the short term.  In 2009, the first year without the 1975 handgun ban in 
effect, homicides dropped 23%, assaults with a firearm dropped 9%, and total violent crime fell 4% 
citywide.  These drops have generally continued or been maintained through 2012.  While far from 
proof that relaxing gun laws causes a crime drop, these short-term crime declines on their face may 
raise some doubts in the “Proven Correlation between th  Availability of Handguns and Incidents of 
Violence” (see amici curiae of Professors of Criminal Justice In Support of the Petitioners, in District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 2008).  Of course, much of this issue touches on the nature of the gun markets 
in D.C., especially the potential strength and robustness of the secondary illegal market.  Certainly, this 




C. Shaw and H. McKay conceptualized “social disorganiz tion,” rooted in prior 
positivist work of the Chicago School.  Their work later fell out of favor, only to be 
revitalized through a theoretical re-conceptualization by R. Kornhauser (1978) as a 
social control theory; additionally, growing interest in communities and crime was 
marked by a 1986 Crime & Justice dedicated to the topic.  Studies examining 
differences in homicide trends between neighborhoods have generally remained 
within the social disorganization framework, providing ample predictions but also 
recurring limitations.  Discussing these gaps, often a result of limited data at the 
neighborhood-level, will yield some insight as to the direction of the current study. 
 Neighborhood-level research provides a rich ground to both test theory and 
improve upon prior research, yet there remain two important limitations which this 
current work seeks to address.  One limitation was highlighted by C. Kubrin and R. 
Weitzer (2003) – most important from a data perspectiv 4 are the lack of longitudinal 
data, use of non-dynamic predictors, and limited measures of formal social controls.  
Given that a great deal of neighborhood-level study ses U.S. Census data to research 
social disorganization-based theories, these limitations should not be surprising.  
Census periods are cross-sectional at ten-year increments, and researchers often carry 
the same value for variables over multiple years.  Additionally, Census data provides 
sufficient variables to examine tenants related to inf rmal social control (poverty, 
residential mobility, disadvantage), but lacks formal control measures.  The current 
study will examine consecutive years of data (1998-2006) with local dynamic 
                                                
4 This is in contrast to a methodological perspectiv, for example the recommendation to use 
techniques addressing spatial autocorrelation and interdependence.  While certainly important and 
incorporated within this study later, such limitations in previous work are less a function of the current 




predictors of informal control and measures formal social control drawing from 
police research and deterrence theory.   
Dynamic Factors 
Neighborhood studies often take demographic data from the U.S. Census.  
The Census provides a wide array of variables that serve as reliable measures given 
the sampling frame.  This data are widely available for any region of the U.S. that one 
wishes to study.  Of course, the drawback is that te benefits of range and stability 
stem in part from the lack of frequency in collecting them.  When data are collected 
every ten years, one can allocate sufficient resources for a large undertaking.  If these 
Census variables were collected in all regions on ayearly basis, the costs would rise 
and potentially the measures themselves would suffer du  to respondent fatigue.  Yet, 
one of the limitations to neighborhood-level studies is the lack of dynamic factors, 
and a measure captured once a decade is emblematic of th s limitation. 
 This dilemma suggests that it is worthwhile to explore other options, even if 
they are less ideal or more difficult to obtain.  A tacit assumption of using Census 
data, especially in studies that span across more than a decade, is that a federal 
government apparatus will yield the best measure of any locality and the non-
dynamic variables are worth the drawbacks because nothing else could be as reliable.  
However, local jurisdictions and major cities do collect their own data for planning 
purposes in-between decennial population counts.  This is done not through surveys, 
but rather through rates of use for local government r sources.  Such resources can 
vary, from federally-funded but locally administered programs (e.g. Temporary 




use of birth facilities at local hospitals by specific groups (such as teen mothers or 
low birth-weight infants).  These types of data are important to local jurisdictions, as 
planning and resource allocation is often done on ayearly basis corresponding with 
budget resolutions.  As such, these local variables can possibly prove useful in 
longitudinal testing of neighborhood-level theories.  For this study, local data have 
been obtained through various government offices within Washington, D.C. in order 
to test a reliable and dynamic set of neighborhood-level variables. 
Formal Social Control and Deterrence 
Another limitation in neighborhood-level studies is a lack of formal social 
control measures.  While resource deprivation and population factors are theorized to 
work informally where poverty and residential turnover reduce control among 
residents and families, the role of formal controls ha  been less explored.  Certainly, 
researchers have considered the impact of formal controls within communities, from a 
theoretical social disorganization perspective (seeBursik & Grasmick, 1993) to 
considerations of factors ignored in previous theory (see Rose & Clear, 1998).  
However, many gaps remain as formal control is not often considered at the 
neighborhood-level.  While acknowledged that formal controls play a role, it is 
unclear what formal controls influence crime and how much these controls impact 
criminal activity.   
In light of this, deterrence theory provides formal control variables with 
testable predictions at the neighborhood-level of analysis.  Deterrence at the 
aggregate-level is likely to foster theoretical doubts among many researchers based 




inter-related issues which suggest deterrence could play a role in formal social control 
at an aggregate unit of analysis – first, positive results within the policing literature 
based on deterrence principals and second, the lack of celerity testing. 
The evaluation of police tactics in recent years has demonstrated ample 
evidence for the impact of deterrence-based law enforcement action.  Through 
experimental designs, researchers have found significa t reductions of crime due to 
techniques like hot-spots policing and pulling-levers.  Such tactics represent A. 
Vollmer’s perspective of police action to prevent crime through deterrence – hot spots 
and pulling-levers are simply methods for police to deter crime through highly-
targeted and precise action; it is the targeting and identification of geography which 
make these tactics different than generic and ineffici nt “flood the zone” techniques 
seen previously in policing.  It is difficult to theorize that such interventions work in 
reducing crime through decreasing poverty or altering cultures.  The possibility that 
the tactics work because crime is deterred within very specific geographies which 
have specific crime problems at an aggregate-level cannot be rejected out of hand.  In 
fact, one can argue this may be the most probable cusal mechanism, based on the 
research to date.  The results are demonstrative that aggregate police action can 
impact crime at the aggregate/neighborhood-level without working towards the 
underlying “causes of crime,” which is consistent with the “prevention through 
deterrence” model. 
 While deterrence theory is comprised of three main f ctors, only two have 
been examined in the literature.  Severity and certainty have yielded mixed results 




have attempted to measure swiftness.  Testing of celerity has two main problems: first 
is definitional, and the second is operational.  What period of time should be 
measured in determining swiftness?  Is it the time until adjudication of a crime, as 
seen in most of the limited attempts to gauge celerity?  This definition issue ties into 
an operational problem, in that data are hard to come by for any other potential 
measure of swiftness.  The speed at which courts proceed is an easier variable to 
obtain than other potential formulations, particularly variables at which police solve 
crimes.  Additionally, examining criminal homicide has an advantage in this case.  
From a theoretical perspective, one can argue that police closure speed is likely as 
good, if not better, determinate of “swift punishment” than court speed, as those 
arrested for murder generally lose their freedom in a noticeable way within a 
community when police catch the suspect.  If deterrnce is predicted to work, one has 
to imagine that the knowledge of swift arrests of offenders within a neighborhood 
would deter similar crimes in the same area in the future. 
 To address these deterrence-based issues just described, this study will test 
deterrence through aggregate measures of clearance (certainty) and time to closure 
(celerity) for homicides within neighborhoods.5  The assumption is that police work 
can impact crime, not by changing root causes but through deterrence.  An added 
                                                
5 Severity is not examined directly in this study.  Following my measures of celerity and certainty, the 
most thematically consistent measure of severity would be either conviction rate or sentence length.  
Given that the crime being studied is criminal homicide, there is limited variability in potential 
sentences under Washington, D.C.’s sentencing guidelines (enacted by the Sentencing Reform Act of 
2000).  No codified source of data currently exists for either the adjudication of the specific homicides 
studied here or for average sentence lengths for homicide across the time period in Washington, D.C.  
The District produces annual sentencing reports, in which the average sentence length is given for 
violent crimes in the aggregate – homicide had the highest averages and was quite constant over time.  
As such, any general measures of severity which could be gleaned would be imprecise to homicide 
specifically but also essentially constant at the “maximum” sentence length, and are therefore omitted 




benefit of using homicide data for this purpose is that homicide incidents and 
subsequent closures can be assumed to be better known throughout a neighborhood 
(in contrast to hearing about a single theft or an arrest for simple assault).  Towards 
that point, it is useful to now discuss how other factors, more specific to the study of 
homicide, provide additional ground to explore in this work. 
 
Homicide Studies 
Examining homicide trends as an outcome is not a new phenomenon in 
criminology, yet there remain a number of data issue  and answered questions which 
leave gaps in the body of knowledge.  Numerous studies have looked at national, 
regional, and city-specific trends in homicides using official data.  Overall since 
1960, homicide trends have seen a number of peaks and valleys.  Using national UCR 
data, the general trend peaked in 1974, then dropped, s iked in 1980 followed by a 
rapid drop until 1985, then a rapid increase until 1991, followed by a decrease that 
now finds homicide at near record lows (within the ime period covered in the 
available data).6 
                                                
6 In both the popular imagination and within criminology, there seems to be a tendency to describe 
crime trends, and especially those for homicide, in absolute terms.  The starting period for accurate 
national trend data in the U.S. is roughly 1960 (see O’Brien, 2003), so to say that crime is 
comparatively high or low only uses about 50 years of data.  For all we know, the crime/homicide 
epidemic in the late 1980s may be seen as more “normal” if we had better measures going back over 
centuries, or our current lows may actually be higher t an even the highs of past eras.  Using limited 
data on deaths and court cases, selected periods of time going back to the Middle Ages may have seen 
far greater crime rates then we have experienced in our lives (see Brown, Esbensen, & Geis, 2009).  
While all our data is compared to the lows of the 1960s (which thus leads to the conclusion that crime 
has spiked during our generations albeit to fall again), it could be possible that the 1960 levels of crime 
were a low ebb and that rising crime was somewhat inevitable and a revision towards the true mean.  
The “Hurricane Neddy” episode of The Simpsons provides a useful insight when Homer does not 
believe a hurricane is hitting Springfield, as there is no record of such an event happening; at this ime, 
his daughter notes that weather records only go back to 1978 when “the Hall of Records was 




 Yet, such general patterns are common for many other crimes during this 
period.  What makes homicide specifically worthy of study?  There are practical and 
policy reasons for examining homicide.  Practically, homicide has a high reporting 
rate in official data and limited dark figure of crime, in contrast to even other serious 
violence (Brown et al., 2009).  This means conclusion  can be reasonably generalized 
to all homicides within the scope of the data, as there is unlikely to be a large missing 
component.  In contrast, with other crimes as a dependent variable, there may be 
reasonable doubt that independent variables only impact the incidents within the data 
rather than all such incidents.  Also in contrast with other crimes, homicide has strong 
reliability in definitions across jurisdictions and strong validity in crime classification, 
making it a robust benchmark for measuring neighboro d effects.  This likely 
explains the heavy use of homicide rates as outcomes across studies of 
neighborhoods, particularly in research from the Project on Human Development in 
Chicago Neighborhoods (see Browning, 2009; Morenoff, Sampson, & Raudenbush, 
2001; Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997).7 
From a policy standpoint, homicide is unique in terms of severity, perceptions, 
and (potentially) police effort.  While homicide is a rare outcome across potentially 
lethal encounters (Block & Block, 1993) and in some ways can be argued to be 
simply an outcome of any other crime type (see Flewe ling & Williams, 1999) or as a 
special circumstance of aggravated assault (see Pillman & Handy, 1964), the 
difference in degree to other classifications provided by a corpse is considerable, 
independent of whether the difference in kind exists.  Any factors determined to 
                                                
7 It should be noted that often, homicide is used as a proxy for “violent crime” generally (see Morenoff 
et al., 2001 as a example).  For purposes of this research, however, this generalization is not made 




decrease homicides specifically, and subsequently seized on, could go a long way in 
improving perceptions of crime among the public.  For this reason, police effort in 
homicide investigations tends to be greater than in other crime investigations (see 
Greenwood, Chaiken, & Petersillia, 1975).  In fact, much of the research into best 
practices for crime clearance have focused on homicide, in part due to the relative 
wealth of potential data about investigations (see Al xander, 2012).  Given that this 
study is particularly interested in the impact of plice action through deterrence, 
homicide is likely the best crime type to examine since maximum police effort will 
apply in such cases.   
 
Data Issues 
Both the UCR and SHR provide data to study large-scale trends, in that the 
UCR data provide basic counts and rates at various levels of analysis, while the SHR 
provide more detail about individual homicide incidents within reporting 
jurisdictions.  Additional studies have been able to obtain city-specific data (or in 
some cases county-specific when homicide counts are low within a city), as seen in 
research using collections from major cities like Chicago, New York, and St. Louis.   
Yet, these data sources often lack various measures that prevent a fuller 
understanding of the “nuts and bolts” behind homicide.  Discussing the 
national/regional data first, UCR data are limited o counts and SHR lacks clear 
motive measures, has reporting problems, and is mising important factors at the 




designed in part to address some of the weaknesses in the UCR and SHR’s data, this 
system is not widely used among large urban areas.8   
The SHR has a limited “circumstances” measure which attempts to glean both 
a context and motive in one variable.  All circumstances are grouped as either being 
“felony-type,” “suspected felony type,” “other than felony type,” or “unknown.” 
While possibly useful in principle, the coding yields “unknown” as the modal 
category, with individual circumstances such as “other arguments,” “other-not 
specified,” and self-evident felonies like “robbery” making up the bulk of remaining 
cases.  While there are circumstances covering gangand drug-related homicides, 
there are no measures for theoretically important motives such as domestic or 
retaliatory killings.  Considering the importance of disaggregation within the 
homicide literature, such a weakness in the SHR may be particularly counter-
productive to studying trends. 
SHR data also suffers from a lack of reporting.  Jurisdictions in Florida have 
failed to report SHR data over large periods, along with other major areas and cities.  
Washington, D.C. did not reported SHR data to the F.B.I for over a decade, resulting 
in any SHR analysis involving the past twelve years as missing data from a high-rate 
jurisdiction. As noted, the desire to transition to NIBRS and greater number of 
variables has been plagued with further non-participation from the largest urban 
areas, though the NIBRS system has been approved for use since the late 1980s. 
                                                
8 To be fair, NIBRS is not widely used among suburban or rural areas either.  The lengthy reporting 
processes result in a considerable increase in workload for agencies, and as a result NIBRS has limited 
compliance.  The agencies who participate in NIBRS only cover about 20-30% of the U.S. population.  




While the SHR collects more incident-level details than the UCR does for 
homicide, there is still a lack of location/geography and closure variables.  Geography 
of incidents is limited to the jurisdiction reporting, so one has no indication of the 
specific location within the reporting area.  Given homicide and other crimes are not 
generally randomly distributed within a geographic space, such a limitation in the 
data precludes any significant analysis of neighboro d characteristics, either within 
or between jurisdictions.  Variables related to case closure/clearance are also missing 
at the incident-level – while aggregate percentages for clearance rate are reported to 
the UCR by each jurisdiction,9 the outcome of individual cases is unknown.  Other 
than a case being closed, there are other related fctors of theoretical and practical 
interest, such as time to closure and type of clearance (i.e. whether by arrest or other 
administrative means).  NIBRS has incorporated some f these closure variables; 
however, as I noted, regions with the most homicides g nerally do not report to 
NIBRS at all. 
Studies of specific areas, in contrast to national/regional measures, often have 
many of the same problems regarding data.  Motives and closure information may be 
limited, though these often city-specific datasets have far better geographic data for 
                                                
9 Even this figure is somewhat suspect.  Rules dictating how a clearance rate is computed and reported 
to the F.B.I. have been interpreted as taking the total number of cleared homicides in the current year 
(including homicides from previous years which were solved in the current year) and dividing by the 
total current year homicides.  While producing a stable rate that takes into account continuous work on 
older cases and which does not require revision year-to-year since both numerator and denominator 
reflect snapshots from the current year, mathematically it seems quite ridiculous.  The numerator and 
denominator reflect different pools of cases, where the numerator pool includes all current year cases 
in addition to all non-closed cases in the jurisdiction’s history while the denominator is limited to 
current year cases.  Based on this formulation, it is theoretically possible to have a clearance rate over
100%, which should be a serious indication that the calculation is faulty and, more importantly, biased 
towards having a higher clearance rate.  Given that the clearance “rate” is not expressed as a traditional 
rate (x number of unit 1 per unit 2) but rather as a dimensionless percentage, an argument could be 
made that it is especially important to assure the units/populations are the same throughout this 




the incident location.  Obviously, the counts for these limited-jurisdiction data are far 
lower than the number of cases when comparing natiol r regional trends.  While 
the SHR and more specific datasets cover basic demographic information, there is 




Coupled with these data issues, there are also unanswered questions regarding 
homicide trends.  Blumstein and Rosenfeld (1998) described homicide trend 
forecasting is an “academic pastime,” with wild predictions over the past twenty-five 
years about the role of juveniles, shifting population demographics, concentrated 
poverty, incarceration effects, drug markets, abortion, and the inevitable rise of super-
predators which failed to materialize, just to name a f w.  More specific questions are 
directly linked to the previous discussion of gaps in the social disorganization 
literature, as many explanations of homicide trends have drawn from neighborhood 
research; as such, questions of dynamic predictors, formal control variables, and a 
lack of diverse longitudinal data sources for testing heory are issues at the 
neighborhood-level for any type of crime.  The lack of dynamic structural predictors 
has been an issue for neighborhood-level homicide res arch.  Questions as to 
operationalizing structural covariates when studying homicide rates have been 
acknowledged, with methods using factor scores or indices showing a greater link 
between neighborhood traits and homicide than other measures (Land et al., 1990).  
Still, these factors have been comprised of static variables, often Census measures.  




applicable to studies of growth and change.  Kubrin and Herting (2005) attempted to 
address a dynamic prediction model for homicide trends but were limited to using 
static structural predictors.  Their study was not al ne, but rather was among the most 
sophisticated treatments of the issue.  That fact is telling as to the necessity to address 
truly dynamic predictors of homicide trends in order to further advance research. 
More so than other neighborhood-level research, homicide studies have found 
some ways to incorporate a limited measure of formal control.  Such studies often 
examine the drop in crime/homicide in New York City since the early 1990s, and 
formal control is captured by a measure of police ativity such as arrests.  The 
purpose of these formal control variables is generally to create a proxy for “broken 
windows policing” (a concept in which the definition itself can vary from study to 
study).  The assumption is that some degree of formal social control can impact 
homicide, and help explain the significant decreases in homicides over the past 
twenty years.  As previously discussed, the idea that police can impact crime through 
their activity has been supported in the experimental design literature with hot-spots 
and pulling-levers.  However, broken windows proxies are often crude measures of 
police action (or related, measures of crude police actions such as unstructured 
flooding of areas or limited discretion) and experimental interventions conceptualize 
formal controls as a targeted specific policy change.  In both, measures of formal 
control have not been conceptualized using normal police action within investigation 
of crime.  The proxies and experiments may address whether police interventions 




whether routine action (such as solving homicide cases within a prompt timeframe) 
impacts homicide trends.  
Additional questions explore how and why disaggregat d homicide trends 
differ from both overall trends and from other disaggregated typologies.  Recent 
literature has noted the importance of disaggregatin  by circumstances or motive as 
homicide trends are not uniform across categories.  Findings across studies of the 
homicide drop in New York City, juvenile trends, and links between cultural 
explanations and disaggregated motive all point significant differences between 
various types of homicide.  As noted, SHR data are only marginally helpful in 
establishing the circumstances of a homicide once a distribution of the 
“circumstances” variable is examined.  While some researchers feel that homicide 
motive is not useful or even misleading in certain co texts (see Puckett & Lundman, 
2003), disaggregating homicide has rapidly caught on during the past decade and 
generated new puzzles regarding why differences exist between motives and how 
predictors may impact types of homicide differently.   
This study will incorporate new sources of data andnew predictors to help 
explain differences in homicide rates as well as address prior limitations within 
homicide research.  Homicide data from Washington, D.C. have not compiled 
previously either for SHR/NIBRS or for a stand-alone city-based dataset.  The only 
previous report of this data had been as a raw count t  the UCR.  Most importantly, 
the data for this study have variables for motive, geography, and closure in addition to 




 The purpose of this study is to explain differences in homicide rates using data 
from 1998-2006 in a major U.S. city, Washington, D.C., at the neighborhood-level.  
Using the neighborhood-level of analysis is important given that homicide rates are 
not evenly distributed across a geographic area.  Research into neighborhoods has 
been rooted in the social disorganization framework first made famous by Shaw and 
McKay.  Over time, a significant body of research has developed but not without 
limitations, particularly in regards to data availab ity.  Central among these 
limitations are the lack of dynamic factors, lack of formal controls, and lack of data 
sources.  Given that research into homicide trends across neighborhoods have relied 
on this theoretical perspective, it is not surprising to note similar limitations in 
homicide research.   
With the goal to explain homicide trends and these limitations in mind, the 
major questions of this study focus on two aggregat considerations – one is a social 
disorganization perspective concerning structural/informal social control within 
neighborhoods; a second is a deterrence perspective concerning formal social control 
within neighborhoods.  Structural factors will be masured by dynamic population 
and resource deprivation variables, while formal control factors will be measured by 
closure rates and time to closure in homicide cases.  By including dynamic predictors 
for my time period and using previously unstudied homicide data for address these 
aggregate considerations, a two fundamental research questions can be asked: 





- Does aggregate deterrence influence homicide rates acro s 
neighborhoods? 
This work will confront an “undiscovered country” of unanswered questions within 
an under-studied region.  Other explanations of homicide trends have focused on the 
same sets of ills that plague neighborhoods, rarely daring to incorporate other factors 
that remain yet uncovered.  The excitement of the undiscovered country is that one 
cannot know what to expect – while one may plan and hypothesize, the truth is 
unknowable until a light shines in the surrounding dark.  It is my hope that this work 








Chapter 2: Literature Review 
  
Before embarking into the “undiscovered country,” one must examine and 
understand what has been previously discovered.  The goals of this chapter are to 
establish a foundation for the current research and to clarify how this current work 
builds on the body of knowledge in the literature.  Two theoretical frameworks, 
namely communities and crime and deterrence, are each broken into two components 
– first, a theoretical discussion following the course of thought in the topic, then a 
summary of the empirical findings.  Following this review, it will be clear how this 
work expands the literature, particularly in the aras of dynamic conceptions of 
neighborhoods and the impact of formal social controls. 
Communities and Crime 
“Behold with what companions I walked the streets of Babylon! …And, drawing me 
more closely to the very center of that city, my invisible enemy trod me down and 
seduced me, for I was easy to seduce. My [morally reformed] mother had already fled 
out of the midst of Babylon and was progressing, albeit slowly, toward its outskirts.” 
- Augustine, The Confessions Book II 
 
At the heart of any discussion regarding communities and crime is the belief 
that social facts have regularity and contain an objective aspect which impacts human 
behavior independent of individual motivation (Morris, 1958).  This connection 
between crime and place can be found throughout the Western intellectual tradition 
wherever the nature of society is considered, such as t e discussion of Sodom and 
Gomorrah in Genesis 18-19, works of the early Greek philosophers, or later European 




the nature of the tyrant/criminal in Book IX.  The characters acknowledge “the whole 
city gives assistance to each individual,” and then reason that a criminal’s behavior 
would change if the gods “were to lift him and his wife and children out of the city 
and put him down” in other locations that would nottolerate his actions (pgs. 264-5).  
However, many of these discussions of crime and place focused on the individual 
foremost, so it would not be until the dawn of modern sociology when the geographic 
element of crime would be explored in depth. 
Due to both the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment in Europe, new 
tools and motivations were seized upon in an attemp to measure and change elements 
of society.  The early 19th century saw the development of sociological positivi m 
among a cohort of researchers.  At first, the concept of “sociological positivism” may 
seem like a contradiction, as positivism is generally associated with an individual unit 
of analysis due in part to the influence of biological positivism (associated with 
names like C. Lombroso, E. Hooton, and W. Sheldon).  However, the sociological 
manifestation came first in history and applied know  positivist suppositions at a 
macro-level.  The causal mechanism of crime10 was the inherent differences between 
criminal and non-criminal regions/populations, and there was assumed to be an 
element of determinism through outside factors (poverty, education, and population 
density11) working beyond individual choice in creating criminal places.   
                                                
10 For positivists, the definition of crime is generally a legal distinction and is reflective of deviance 
outside of society’s norms. 
11 It should be noted that these factors were seen to not always work in the predicted ways.  In fact, A.-
M. Guerry tested these factors directly with mixed r sults.  Though the methods and techniques lack 
sophistication from our modern statistical perspectiv , his results made him and later researchers of 
this period keenly aware of opportunity – when finding that a very rich area had high property crime 
while a very poor had low property crime, he concluded that the availability of items to steal can 




The work of three individuals serves to highlight te initial advances of 
sociological positivism in Europe.  A. Guerry produced a work in 1829 mapping 
education and crime statistics within France.  He built on this with an 1833 
publication featuring a larger variety and detail in the maps (see Gurrey, 2012 
[1833]).  Data were included for crime counts, demographics (gender and age), 
variations in crime rates, and various other social ills such as lack of education, 
illegitimate births, and suicide counts.  This work was unique in the usage of density 
maps for comparison, but also in the fact that previous governmental data collections 
had not been compiled or analyzed.  Guerry found that crime was not distributed 
equally across places and that there was regularity to the uneven distribution – in 
other words, certain areas would routinely have more crime than other places across 
multiple years.   
Closely following Guerry, the Belgian mathematician A. Quetelet introduced 
more rigorous statistics to the problem of crime.  While Guerry relied on numerous 
cross-tabulations to compare the extensive trove of data, Quetelet sought to 
incorporate more formal statistics from the physical s iences into social research.  His 
work through the 1830s and 1840s served to lay the early foundation of statistical 
examination for sociological problems; this effort was not fully appreciated by some 
sociologists, notably A. Comte (see Morris, 1958).  However, Quetelet continued 
with Guerry’s cartographic techniques to display crime data and differences across 
space.  Combining these methods, Quetelet confirmed any of Guerry’s general 




In England, H. Mayhew continued the crime mapping comparisons seen in the 
works of Guerry and Quetelet.  While Mayhew did notadvance understanding 
through statistics or any formal hypothesis testing (Morris, 1958), he did add a unique 
qualitative component to his examinations of crime and place.  Much of his data were 
generated from interviews and walking the streets of London, though he did use 
official police data to examine the distribution of arrests for various crimes.  Like 
other sociological positivists, he concluded that crime was social in nature and 
directly impacted by social milieus found concentrated in certain geographic areas, 
such as poverty, illness, and dilapidated housing.  His use of narrative work is a 
technique seen in later work by the Chicago School, particularly C. Shaw’s life 
histories. 
These three figures added unique elements to sociological positivism while 
still maintaining a common ground regarding the study of crime and place.  Place 
matters in crime, and Guerry’s mapping, Quetelet’s statistics, and Mayhew’s 
ethnographies supported that idea.  While their work was briefly eclipsed by the 
biological positivists and the advent of the medical model for treating individual 
criminals, the foundation built by these sociological researchers was seized upon to 
develop the modern conceptualizations of communities n crime during the early 20th 
century. 
 
The First Revival: The Chicago School and Social Disorganization 
 Multiple factors led to the revival of sociological positivism following 
a half-century infatuation with Lobrosian ideas of crime.  First, biological positivists 




disguised racial treatises which would later advocate eugenic solutions to crime and 
other social ills.12  City pathologists had suggested that the urban environment itself 
generates social dysfunction uniformly, which was poorly received by social 
scientists who generally worked, lived, and studied in these urban areas.  Social 
researchers had developed more cognizant causal theories than seen in the 
classification-focused early sociological positivists, and coupled with new sources of 
data, such studies promised to determine the causes of ocial unrest and ills.  Finally, 
immigration to the United States had produced a unique opportunity to study the 
impact of place on crime – there was an inherent public interest and believe in the 
criminality of immigrants, often immigrants lived in highly concentrated places, and 
these immigrants would often change places over time as they and future generations 
assimilated into American society.  This last factor produced a shift in theory 
development from Europe to the United States, as American urban researchers had 
the desire and opportunity to move the study of place nd crime forward.13 
                                                
12 The eugenics element, clearly seen in the biological positivism by the 1930s (see Hooton, 1939), 
would become a larger stigma as World War II concluded, given the Nazi philosophy and atrocities.  
13 The passing of the torch from European to American social scientists during the early 20th century is 
emblematic of the state of much criminological and social research today.  As J.Q. Wilson (2009) 
noted, the United States has studied itself more than any other country, which is not surprising given 
that few else have the data, freedom, and variability to study social problems (Wilson mentions race 
and class as specific examples of “problems”).  There are at least two potential consequences to this 
phenomenon.  First, researchers may assume other nations re more tolerant and less punitive/violent, 
since many other nations are not willing or able to accurately examine themselves in such a way as 
found in America.  The example of Andrei Chikatilo, a Russian serial killer during the 1970s and 80s 
comes to mind.  Though it was clear a serial killer was at work given the proclivity, similarity of crime 
characteristics, and very close geographic proximity of discovered victims, Soviet officials refused to 
acknowledge that such a murderer could exist in the U.S.S.R. since serial killings were considered a 
feature of the West, which itself was due to Western governments willing to recognize such criminals 
as existing.   It took five years for the Soviet government to publically link the murders to a single 
offender, and another three years to consult a forensic psychologist.  During this time, the government 
used the murders as an excuse to round up “undesirables,” such as homosexuals and the mentally ill, 
regardless of whether they could be linked to one or multiple victims.  Chikatilo was arrested for 
murder in late 1990 and eventually tried publically following the fall of the Soviet Union. After being 
convicted of over 50 murders, he was executed by a single gunshot to the head.  The second potential 




At the fore of this revival was the Chicago school f sociology.  The Second 
City provided ample opportunities to study the natur l development of areas due to 
waves of immigration and extensive public records.  The core of the Chicago 
perspective was human ecology – taken from concepts found in plant research, these 
sociologists theorized that locations develop based on waves of invasion and 
succession (Park, 1936).  During the 1910s and 20s, the primary method of 
succession was immigration.  Numerous researchers pursued different theoretical 
avenues to explain crime in communities.  W.I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki (1918-20) 
studied Polish immigrants as they developed communities in Chicago.  Thomas and 
Znaniecki noted that most immigrants came from areas in Poland that were rural but 
also had high social organization.  Upon coming to America, much of this 
organizational ability was lost, as many immigrants left Poland due to being outcasts 
already (hence, not inherently part of the high social organization), often forgot how 
they were organized in their homeland, or found that rural mechanisms for 
organization were not applicable in urban environmets.  However, Thomas and 
Znaniecki found that perpetual disorganization was not the destiny for all such 
immigrants, as many would reorganize and develop informal community controls 
over time. 
R.E. Park and E.W. Burgess, two key figures in the initial development of the 
Chicago school, produced a central work for human ecology and crime in 1925 called 
The City.  Many of the classical features of the Chicago school, such as concentric 
zoning, the central business district (CBD), and zones of transition, were described in 
                                                                                                                                 
generalizable, much in the same way it is possible Chicago-based theories of communities and crime 




great detail.  They theorized, based on available data, that cities were structured such 
that high crime would be in the CBD and crime would decline as one progresses out 
of the center.  Zones of transition were critical to understanding immigration and the 
importance of place in crime.  These regions would be populated by poor new 
immigrants, but there would also be high turnover as more established immigrants 
would leave for better zones.  Park and Burgess noticed hat crime did not follow the 
immigrants out of the zone, suggesting that it was the place that led to crime rather 
than the individuals. 
F.M. Thrasher (1963 [1927]) focused on the causes and development of 
delinquent gangs in Chicago.  Like other Chicago school theorists, Thrasher proposed 
a social explanation for crime.  Through interviews ith youth, he suggested that 
gangs formed due to a failure of controlling institutions and a common source of 
conflict.  Youth did not obtain the necessary relationships and nurturing through 
family and schools, and yet a degree of social solidarity was needed for protection as 
there is greater strength in numbers.  In essence, gangs and the related delinquency 
were often protection mechanisms in areas where social expectations were unclear 
and potential threats existed.  Like the disorganiztion of Polish immigrants and the 
zones of transition, gangs were seen as non-permanent social features that most 
would grow or develop away from, though Thrasher noted the existence of highly 
distinct social groups which had participation among the non-immigrant, non-poor 
and non-youth populations. 
While important and insightful, the previous Chicago school works do not 




of C. Shaw and H. McKay (1942).  This work could be considered a book that 
launched a thousand studies, to paraphrase Homer’s description of Helen of Troy.  It 
was the logical product of earlier efforts to use cartography combined with more 
extensive data and sophisticated research methods, infu ed with the findings of the 
Chicago school and the passion of Mayhew’s examinatio  of deviance.  An earlier 
work by Shaw, The Jack-Roller (1974 [1930]), is itself a qualitative masterpiece 
written with the hope of spurring social reform.  These factors combined to produce 
Shaw and McKay’s theoretical capstone, social disorganization. 
For Shaw and McKay, social disorganization explains how differences 
between neighborhoods impact their character, despite ethnic changes,.  Specifically, 
the theory suggests that the four factors of urbanization/industrialization, poverty, 
residential mobility, and ethnic heterogeneity cause social disorganization.  This 
social disorganization erodes informal/formal social ontrol and causes crime and 
other social ills.14  Their theory can be read as having both a macro- and micro-level 
of causation.  At the macro-level, crime is caused due to a lack of control in the zones 
of transition.  The four structural factors prevent solidification and agreement on 
norms in the neighborhood.  They suggest that as re-organization progresses, it is 
possible to establish organization and thus have an area change.  However, the four 
structural factors work against re-organization – idustrialization and poverty 
undermine the informal controls of the family, while mobility and heterogeneity 
undermine the informal controls of the community.  Additionally, the micro-level 
                                                
14 Like Guerry and others, Shaw and McKay noticed that crime often does not stand alone, but rather 
comes as a package with other social problems.  D.PMoynihan (1965) famously referred to this 
general phenomenon as a “tangle of pathology.”  This reality suggests that preventing crime may also 
have positive effects in other social areas, but also suggests that techniques to combat crime may not 




component of the theory works against re-organization.  At this level, crime and 
social ills are perpetuated as a result of cultural and learning processes.  Even if 
immigration stops, Shaw and McKay theorized that the stability of the delinquent 
tradition and strong peer influences could keep disorganization in place.15 
Social disorganization theory sought to show how place, rather than specific 
classes of people, causes crime.  The influence of Shaw’s earlier work can be seen as 
this theory holds a positive view of human nature in the assumption that delinquents 
would find satisfaction in other activities if the s tting/place where better.  Shaw and 
McKay suggest that slum boys (female delinquency was not a central topic because 
there was little official female delinquency) become delinquent not due to inherent 
evils or illness, but rather though a lack of conventional controls/values (structure) 
and exposure to delinquent subcultures (culture); both of these causes are inherent to 
neighborhoods, not individuals. 
Numerous problematic issues arose which led to a marginalization of Shaw 
and McKay’s grand theory of communities and crime.  Their theory largely assumed 
that neighborhoods had stable natural development, as did most all ecological 
theories.  There was difficulty in defining social disorganization apart from the 
consequences of crime and social ills – there was no independent measure of 
“organization,” only the reasoning that if there is crime, then there must be 
                                                
15 It can be argued that the micro-level theory is unnecessary or even tautological when linked to the 
macro-level formulation (see Kornhauser, 1978).  In forming this portion of their theory, there was 
likely some influence from another Chicago school sociologist, namely E.H. Sutherland.  Modern 
social disorganization essentially remains cleaved along the lines of a macro control theory and a 
micro cultural theory (this point is discussed and supported in greater detail later in this chapter).  The 
inclusion of the micro-level component was not necessary to the functioning of the theory 
(Kornhauser, 1978) but could explain the high levels of crime within areas with large black 
populations.  Shaw and McKay noted such areas were difficult to explain through their four macro-
level structural factors (pg. 389), and this difficulty would lead to later empirical challenges in testing 




disorganization.  While Shaw and McKay had access to more data than previous 
researchers, much of it was official police and juvenile court data and further 
developments in obtaining self-report data suggested that delinquency was not 
isolated in “disorganized” neighborhoods.16  This survey finding would later help 
spur a resurgence of individual-level theories.  Another feature of sociological 
positivism, namely determinism, worked against Shaw and McKay as they could not 
provide a solid explanation for why most youth are not delinquent even in the most 
disorganized areas; in other words, if the structural/cultural factors in a neighborhood 
impact all residents, why do most desist from crime?  Finally, the theory was 
undercut by the failure of the Chicago Area Project (founded by Shaw) to reduce 
delinquency.  It would take decades until interest in communities and crime would 
return to the front burner of criminology. 
 
The Second Revival: Kornhauser and the Informal Social Control of Communities 
 As the macro-level explanation of deviance seen in social 
disorganization waned, other micro-level theories rose to the top of criminology by 
the 1950s.  In particular, two perspectives saw their heyday – differential association 
theory and strain theory.  Neither theory was new to criminology, as their concepts 
and structure stretched back into prior decades, with E.H. Sutherland and R.L. Merton 
working on their respective theories during the 1930s.  The time was right for micro-
level cultural explanations of deviance, so these two theories gathered interest and 
                                                
16 As previously noted, Thrasher found evidence of “gangs” among higher-class youths.  Often the 




advancement in the literature (see Brown et al., 2009).17  These theories would be 
refined, retooled, and in one case renamed through the 1960s.  This era of research 
contained a number of important developments, such as t e acknowledged influence 
of R. Cloward and L. Ohlin’s on presidential social initiatives and the rehabilitation 
of psychological perspectives in part through R. Akers’s linking learning concepts to 
differential association.18  Interest in these micro-level perspectives continued to 
grow. 
Yet, a funny thing happened on the way to micro-level dominance.  Though 
the theories were popular, influential, and applied in public policy, crime began to 
rise.  Public disorder, often concentrated in specific neighborhoods, also increased.  
Initiatives such as the War of Poverty seemed to atbes  do nothing for crime, and at 
worst were correlated with spikes of all types of criminal activity.  Looking at trends 
                                                
17 If micro-level cultural explanations were the z itgeist, then why did researchers not advance Shaw 
and McKay’s cultural component?   While an open question, one can speculate as to reason why 
history unfolded as it did here.  First, the cultural argument was not as well-defined as the macro-level 
disorganization argument (Kornhauser, 1978), and thus would make testing difficult on its face; this 
point is highlighted by the fact that the macro-level component was also difficult to test even with 
greater detail (Bursik, 1982).  Second, if one sought to fill in the gaps of their theory which predicts 
continued delinquency among individuals who differentially associate with delinquent peers, then one 
would already have a different Chicago school theory t  use courtesy of Sutherland. 
18 The irony that Sutherland’s differential association required a heavy psychological component for 
operationalization seems lost on some.  In his 1934 text, Sutherland rejected multi-factor groups (a 
popular psychological construct once embraced by Sutherland) as leading to bad science.  This 
rethinking was likely in part a reaction of the Michael-Adler report that poorly evaluated the science i  
criminology at the time (see Laub, 2006).  Rather tan multi-factors, Sutherland strongly argued for a 
sociology basis, rejecting both biological and psychological elements.  His macro-level theory has 
cultural conflict as the root of crime, and notes that regions have “differential social organization.”  
The crux of his micro-level differential association is that differential cultural groups provide 
norms/definitions favorable or unfavorable to crime.  Of course, that begs the question of how do 
individuals learn these norms/definitions, which would be a prime psychological issue, especially as 
learning theories developed in the late 1950s and 1960s.  D. Cressey (1960) acknowledges 
Sutherland’s oversight of defining mechanics for the learning process, though he brought it up after 
Sutherland had already passed away.  While some see social learning as the logical successor to 
Sutherland and possibly even believe Sutherland would have supporting this (Akers, 1996), history 
suggests that Sutherland may  have been pushed to a full-throated defense of his sociological-based 
theory and may have developed an ingenious way to measure definitional balance and variation of 
association.  But that is simply speculation given that Sutherland died over a decade before any such 




in UCR homicide data, there was a national increase in homicide rates from 1960 
through 1974.  Couple this crime wave with decreasing trust in government, which 
was likely both a cause and reciprocal effect of the disorder/incivility, and there will 
eventually be people who question the conventional wisdom.19   
By the late 1970s, coherent responses and alternatives to micro-level cultural 
theories could be found scattered in the literature among a sea of critical criminology 
pieces.  However, the focus remained primarily on the individual, such as Hirschi’s 
control theory, the comparisons self-reported delinquency/victimization to official 
records, rational choice theories, and even deterrence research.  That focus shifted 
with R. Kornhauser’s Social Sources of Delinquency (1978).  While some researchers 
note that the “resurgence of interest in ecological ch nge and the ramifications for 
crime” was embodied by later work during the 1980s (Kirk & Laub, 2010), the fact 
remains that such work may have been mostly unread if not for Kornhauser.  
Therefore, one must understand how her work set the stage and truly marks the 
revival point of community and crime research. 
In short, Kornhauser made it theoretically acceptable nd justifiable to study 
communities as a unit of analysis within criminology once again.  This was done in 
two steps – first, Shaw and McKay’s problematic issues in social disorganization 
were re-conceptualized in light of recent control theory, and second, the 
cultural/strain theories were laid bare as unacceptable alternatives.  Kornhauser 
                                                
19 This period is also very important for the revival of deterrence research, which had been mothballed 
since the rise of positivism in the early 1800s.  The link between the social disorganization and 
deterrence concurrent revivals may be in the rise of control perspectives, given the theories similar 
assumptions towards human nature.  Obviously, T. Hirsch ’s seminal work (1969) and its subsequent 
influence speak to this point, but it is worth notig that control theories were not wholly new in 1969 
and could easily be traced (even by Hirschi himself) to E. Durkheim.  Rather, this seems to be another 




recognized the need to explore the intervening variables/mechanisms between 
neighborhood conditions and delinquency, a critical problem for Shaw and McKay as 
“social disorganization” was never defined beyond the outcomes.  The division 
between a structural model and a cultural transmission model were problematic 
towards that goal, given the logical inconsistency and redundancy of such a mixed 
model; she focused on how the two theories could stand alone.  The structural model 
was conceptualized as a pure control model, enhanced by recent research into control 
theories and bonding.  Social disorganization was envisioned as a social control 
process and thus measurable independent from the oucomes of crime.  This idea 
would form the backbone of the dominant communities and crime theories through 
the present day.20 
This rehabilitation of Shaw and McKay, which allowed for theoretical 
predictions and provided a framework for testability, was not enough to alone bring 
macro-level perspectives as serious avenues of interest.  Both differential association 
(by this time, social learning) and strain theories had usurped macro-level 
explanations previously.  While history had turned on these cultural perspectives by 
the late 1970s, these were still potent theoretical forces which had risen in response to 
weaknesses in macro-level explanations.  The fact th t Kornhauser did not fully reject 
Shaw and McKay’s cultural theory suggests that even a harsh critic can see the value 
and appeal of cultural perspectives.  Making the structural model more sound made 
                                                
20 As for the cultural model, Kornhauser suggests that most problems could be remedied by looking at 
culture as attenuation, where values are not rejected but not disused.  Similar ideas had been found 
previously in D. Matza’s Delinquency and Drift (1964).  To date, some cultural researchers may give 
the idea lip service but then often address cultural explanations with the same problems of determinism 
that Kornhauser and Matza decried (see Kubrin, 2003); others simply resort to tautology to explain 





Shaw and McKay’s work relevant and theoretically competitive once again, but what 
made the new perspective even more appealing was cutting the knees out from under 
the main competition.  Thus, the second half of Kornhauser’s work was dedicated to 
the theoretical annihilation of the two cultural explanations which bested social 
disorganization decades prior.   
The assault on learning and strain theories was focused on their perceived lack 
of logical soundness and testability, which was likely designed to contrast with 
control theory’s argued strengths on those criteria.  Kornhauser did not pull any 
punches - differential association and social learning were hammered on their 
inherent assumptions for perfect socialization, the problems in defining a subculture 
given that assumption, and the “embarrassment of riches” that would exist if the 
theories were true; strain theories were dissected on the inherent economic and 
universal cultural goal assumptions, the deviation fr m Durkheim (a powerful 
criticism given that strain theories saw themselves directly descendent from 
Durkheimian anomie), and were eventually labeled th product of “deadpan 
sociology” in that strain researchers themselves did not have faith in cultural strain 
and thus added numerous contradictory components.   
The true power of Kornhauser’s critique is seen in the results.  Strain theory, 
as it had been known at the time, was effectively wiped off the map and would only 
regain relevance in a wholly re-conceptualized manifestation by R. Agnew (1992).  
Of course, there is irony in that Agnew’s General Strain Theory was made possible 
by Kornhauser’s observations eliminating “old strain” from the research agenda, only 




criticism, particularly regarding the weakness of strain to stand alone in explaining 
criminal action (see the notable inclusion of contrl-based variables in Agnew, 2008). 
Social learning theory survived, though it is telling that debate raged on 
regarding Kornhauser’s observations for decades (see Ak rs, 1996; Hirschi, 1996; 
Matsueda, 1988 as examples), and that Akers (1998) partially reinvented social 
learning in an attempt to reduce its apparent determinism and create a life course and 
macro-level component. Like Agnew’s GST, Akers has added considerable elements 
of social control to his theoretical formulation.  While Akers claims that “all theories 
are social learning theories” (pg. 37, 1998), it isunclear how adding control elements 
makes a theory more social learning based, given the different assumptions regarding 
human nature that control and learning theories are e ch rooted in.  It is also unclear 
whether the incorporation of control elements is a permanent feature for 
criminological theories, or simply reflective of the continuing pro-control zeitgeist 
seen currently.   
Most importantly for this study, communities and crime was reignited as a valid and 
theoretically sound topic up through the present day over three decades later.  As 
noted by Kirk and Laub (2010), the true coming out f community perspectives was a 
1986 Crime and Justice volume (Reiss & Tonry, 1986).  Numerous authors discus ed 
a wide array of still-relevant ecological topics, such as the assumption of stable 
neighborhood development (Bursik, 1986) and the impact of gentrification 
(McDonald, 1986).  The tone was set in the volume’s introduction by A. Reiss 
(1986), who stressed the importance of studying neihborhoods in understanding 




Subsequent research would cover new theoretical ground, proposing mechanisms not 
previously considered in criminology.  Yet, the most influential developments would 
continue in part down the path suggested by Kornhauser – models in which the 
informal social controls of neighborhoods mediate th  impact of structure on crime.  
Three particular formations warrant a brief theoretical discussion in this work: the 
systemic model, the disorder model, and the collectiv  efficacy model. 
 
Systemic Model 
 The systemic model conceptualized social disorganization as a lack or 
weakness in social ties/networks (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Warner & Roundtree, 
1997).  A neighborhood is seen as a “complex system of friendship and kinship 
networks” in which ties are “rooted in family life and [an] ongoing socialization 
process” (Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974).  The classic structural factors, such as 
heterogeneity and mobility in neighborhoods, influenc  social ties/networks.  
Problematic ecological factors are positively associated with crime because such 
factors will impede network development and socialization.   
Bursik and Grasmick (1993) developed one of the most prominent 
specifications of the systemic model which emphasized the role of networks and 
social capital.  Social disorganization was defined as weak, non-dense networks; 
networks were built through ties, which themselves w re considered as interaction 
opportunities within the neighborhood.  These ties/n tworks would yield social 
capital, or an ability to affect change/stability in a community.  Social capital impacts 




needed to generate control.21  In this system, there are three kinds of control – private 
(family), parochial (neighborhood institutions, such as schools or churches), and 
public (outside agencies, such as government and police).  The public controls were a 
new addition to social disorganization, and could be considered a fresh consideration 
of formal social control, which to date has not been fully explored. 
 
Disorder Model 
 The disorder model took a different approach to the mediating factors 
by defining social disorganization as ugliness and crime (representative of physical 
and social disorder).  As such, it is similar to Shaw and McKay’s assessment of 
disorganization through the outcomes, namely crime and social ills.  Disorder is both 
a cause and symptom of reduced controls and increased fear within communities 
(Skogan, 1990).  In contrast to the systemic model, th re is no need for specific social 
ties or networks within a disorder model – the mere presence of visible “disorder” in 
a neighborhood is sufficient to break down community controls, independent of any 
bonds or networks in place. 
Two major theoretical works highlight the disorder p rspective.  First, J.Q. 
Wilson and G. Kelling (1982) advanced the broken widows hypothesis, in which the 
combating of physical disorder can lead to a reduction of crime and fear within a 
community.  This idea is significant since it suggests crime can be impacted 
independent of addressing “root causes,” such as poverty; this would be especially 
good news to police departments, who have little control over socio-demographic 
                                                
21 It should be noted that “control” in the neighborhod context means the capacity of the community 
to regulate itself towards collective (not forced) goals, and the underlying assumption is that a 




factors but can help regulate disorderly violations f law.  For Wilson and Kelling, a 
broken window left unfixed is both suggestive of a lack of care in the neighborhood 
and will engender further acts of disorder.  Second, W. Skogan (1990) examined 
neighborhoods with community policing and postulated that since most areas are 
afraid of the same problems independent of demographics, then the main theoretical 
mechanism increased disorder.  He suggested that disorder leads to further population 
shifts, which has an impact on the number of “good” versus “bad” people in a 
neighborhood; further disorder attracts those who will capitalize on the lack of 
controls by committing crime.  The lack of controls increases fear among residents, 
which also serves to increase crime, according to Skogan.  Like the broken windows 
hypothesis, this work tends to highlight the potential role of police (as a formal social 
control) in helping reduce crime within communities. 
 
Collective Efficacy Model 
 The collective efficacy model developed in partial response to the 
systemic and disorder models.  According to this model, the key concept for 
understanding social disorganization is “collective efficacy,” which is a “task-specific 
construct related to shared expectations and mutual engagement… reflected in 
process of activating social capital towards an end” (Sampson, Morenoff, & Earls, 
1999).  The heart of collective efficacy is social ohesion and trust for a common 
good within a neighborhood.  Like Shaw and McKay, structural concerns matter, but 
the role of human agency is preserved by noting that this efficacy must itself be 




this in part remedies the problems of determinism and embarrassment of riches 
suggested by purely positivist theories.   
Much of the work theorizing collective efficacy has been done by R. Sampson 
and colleagues using data from the Project on Human Development in Chicago 
Neighborhoods.  For these researchers, collective efficacy is measured by the 
capacity for informal social control and social cohesion, focused on observable acts 
within a community (Sampson, Morenoff, & Gannon-Rowley, 2002).  Social ties are 
useful in building collective efficacy, but are not critical as areas can have weak or 
loose ties yet still have high cohesion and mutual tr st.  Additionally, the collective 
efficacy perspective sees disorder as an outcome and concurrent condition rather than 
a cause of crime; since elements of disorder are themselves crimes, it can be argued 
that low social control (reflected in a measure of collective efficacy) can be a cause 
for both disorder and other criminal activity in a community. 
 
Theoretical Problems 
 While these three perspectives build on the work of Shaw and McKay, 
and each unpack social disorganization, they also share some theoretical problems.  
First is definitional, as the mediating factors suggested are themselves concepts which 
require unpacking.  There is no consensus on what constitutes functional social ties or 
networks, or whether said ties/networks have uniform, positive effects.  As for 
disorder, it draws closest to Shaw and McKay’s problem of defining disorganization 
as the outcomes; many types of physical or social disor er are themselves criminal 
acts, meaning that “crime” and “disorder” may be concurrent rather than distinct.  




acknowledges that “observable acts” should be key to the measurement (Sampson & 
Raudenbush, 1999), yet the theoretical constructs are fundamentally perception-based 
attitudinal factors (e.g. perceived cohesion, mutual tr st).22  Additionally, collective 
efficacy rests on two poorly defined theoretical principles in the literature, namely 
social capital and human agency; while both topics have received attention and are 
part of numerous high-profile theories, the fact remains that the theoretical 
mechanisms for both are nebulous at this time.  While seeking a mediating 
mechanism may useful, there are drawbacks when the mechanism itself reduces the 
clarity of how structural factors impact crime. 
Second, while the systemic, disorder, and efficacy models rely on a macro-
level social control mechanism, limited reason has been given as to why control 
theory is inherent to these formulations.  While thre is no fault for a theory to rely on 
assumptions (so long as said assumptions are made clear), there is a theoretical 
weakness when one’s mechanism cannot be conceptualized independent of other 
theories; when such weakness exists, it may suggest that the theoretical justifications 
have not been fully unpacked (see my first criticism) or that there is a lack of 
confidence in the proposed mechanism (such as Kornhauser’s example of deadpan 
sociology and strain).  Disorder theories are especially poor in this regard, as a macro-
level control theory may not even be the best theoretical alternative given the theory’s 
reliance on “good” and “bad” people, thus confusing whether the main effect is a 
                                                
22 This point will be expanded on during the review of empirical findings, where central measures of 
collective efficacy are based on survey responses to questions regarding perceived cohesion and 
attitudinal trust.  While measures are also taken of objective community factors to link with collective 
efficacy, such as community involvement in local activities, the fact remains that the concepts of 
cohesion and trust are often only in the eye of the beholder and possibly fluid in the short term, even if 
stable in the long term (like the stock market’s volatile daily ups and downs versus a typically 




place or individual level and begging for a cultural t nsmission/social learning micro 
explanation.  Ideally, these macro theories need to establish clear differences between 
control and other assumptions, while also theoretically defending the role of control 
theory in the formulations. 
Third, these perspectives have issues regarding causal ordering.  As the thrust 
of these approaches is to uncover a mediating mechanism between structure and 
crime which is distinct of crime and other social ills, there are theoretical concerns 
that the mechanism may be too correlated to the outcome.  This is particularly 
apparent in disorder perspectives, which themselves oft n argue for a theoretical 
feedback loop as disorder causing crime directly is not sufficient (Skogan, 1990), 
while efficacy approaches have yet to rule out the causal order and impact of crime 
on efficacy (Lowenkamp, Cullen, & Pratt, 2003).  Additionally, when considering 
crime and neighborhoods, there are causal issues created by the spatial distribution of 
crime itself.  These raise questions of how different communities can impact one 
another independent of the mechanisms working solely within a fixed space.23  It is 
possible that the added complexity of looking for independent mechanisms may be 
the chief impediment to establishing proper causal order in these theories,24 which 
then compounds with causal inference issues presentd by the nature of geography 
and distribution of crime rates. 
                                                
23 Never mind the inherent problem with defining a “neighborhood” in order to determine if effects are 
from the same or truly different community.  Definitions of neighborhoods will be discussed further 
during the empirical review that follows the present theoretical review. 
24 This is not to imply that looking for and testing mediating mechanisms is a quixotic pursuit which 
should be abandoned.  Rather, it highlights the difficulty in determining the mechanisms and the 
central definitional problems discussed previously.  Solutions could be to refine the mechanisms 
further through theory/testing, or possibly to abandon parts of these constructs and seek something 
simpler or wholly different to explain the impact of structural factors on crime.  In part, the later can be 
seen in the revival of cultural disorganization elements in the literature, though of course definitioal 






 This section reviews the empirical findings within the social 
disorganization literature since the second revival post-Kornhauser.  The pathway 
first cover the initial reformulations of Shaw and McKay’s work, then elaborate on 
the specific findings in relation to the systemic, disorder, and collective efficacy 
approaches, respectively.  At the conclusion of this section, there is a focus on the 
overall weaknesses in the literature in the context of what will be addressed in this 
study.   
 
Revisiting Shaw and McKay 
 The initial revival of Shaw and McKay’s work centered on the 
ecological stability assumption.  The empirical research led by R. Bursik was 
instrumental in highlighting the limitations of Shaw nd McKay and providing 
explanations to their initial findings while setting the path of undiscovered questions.  
Though a number of studies (e.g. Bursik & Webb, 1982; Bursik, 1986; 1988; 
Heitgerd & Bursik, 1987), Bursik and colleagues provided support that Shaw and 
McKay’s results were a historical artifact.  Changing demographics had not impacted 
Chicago’s delinquency rates up through the 1940s; thi  finding was central to the 
Chicago school perspective that focused on places rather than people.  While Shaw 
and McKay could explain their era of European migrat on, later changes during the 
1950s ran contrary to their predictions in part because the post-war era yielded a 
fundamentally different migration.  Following 1950, there was a large influx of blacks 




change occurred, the shifting demographics were seen to impact neighborhood 
delinquency. As noted in Shaw and McKay’s original work, they had difficultly 
explaining the few areas populated mostly by blacks (pg. 389, 1942).  As a result, it 
should be no surprise that a massive increase in black population, particularly into 
areas previously labeled as zones of transition for immigrants, produced poor results 
for the ecological stability assumptions. The examination of the population and 
delinquency records helped establish that communities still influenced crime, but just 
not under the same assumptions as seen with Shaw and McKay. 
A different tenant of Shaw and McKay’s work, namely the impact of 
structural factors on neighborhood crime, was establi hed to be far sounder than 
ecological stability.  Numerous studies have provided strong support for the role of 
structural covariates on neighborhood crime, often in the context of homicide.  Land, 
McCall, and Cohen (1990) demonstrated the use of factor scores among independent 
variables in studying neighborhood homicide.  The benefit of creating factor scores 
when examining structural factors and homicide rates is that using individual 
covariates can create model instability due to high collinearity among regressors.  
Given that Shaw and McKay relied on bivariate, non-regression analysis and 
correlations, Land et al.’s finding was critical in assessing the true impact of structure 
on crime, even if the exact mechanism was still to be determined.   
R. Peterson and L. Krivo provided empirical support f  structural factors (see 
Krivo & Peterson, 1996; Peterson & Krivo, 1993) using data from Columbus, OH.  In 
Columbus, there were both black and white neighborho ds with comparable poverty, 




across neighborhoods.  This is critical as it is a rare occurrence within the same 
general geographic region.  Due to the uneven distribution of violence, poverty, and 
race within urban settings, it is typically very difficult to untangle the true effect of 
race versus disadvantage (see Morenoff, Sampson, & Raudenbush, 2001; Sampson & 
Lauristen, 1994).  Thus, having local areas with comparable poverty across race is a 
unique opportunity to potentially separate those eff cts. 
Support for structural covariates on neighborhood hmicide was also found in 
Morenoff et al. (2001), where structural variables were operationalized as weighted z-
scores rather than factor scores.  That study, which w ll be discussed later in relation 
to collective efficacy, suggested that both weighted and factor score approaches 
produce robust confirmation that structure impacts crime, though they argue through 
the mediating construct of collective efficacy. 
 
Systemic Model 
 Social disorganization was initially conceptualized as a function of 
social ties in the systemic model.  Though Bursik and Grasmick (1993) assumed that 
strong ties of multiple typologies were critical to repulsing social disorganization 
within a community, the findings regarding social tes are mixed and somewhat 
contradictory to theorizing.  Sampson and Groves (1989) found support for less 
formal social ties, such as local friendships and peer groups, as being a significant 
predictor of neighborhood delinquency using the British Crime Survey data from 
1982 and 1984; these results have been further confirmed through reanalysis and 
replication (Lowenkamp et al., 2003; Veysey & Messner, 1999).   Bellair (1997) 




only strong ties could lead to controls.  While frequ nt interaction among neighbors 
was important, the best mediating factor on crime (burglary, auto theft, and robbery) 
was an interaction term between frequent and infrequent contacts.  This supported the 
importance of informal ties in that the weak ties may link small groups of frequently 
interacting individuals within a single neighborhood. 
Warner and Roundtree (1997) used Census data and the results of community 
surveys in Seattle, WA to question the systemic assumption that social ties have 
uniform impact across neighborhoods.  While they found support for structural 
factors impacting social ties, two other findings mitigated the role of ties – first, 
structural factors retained a significant, independent impact on crime (assaults and 
burglaries), and second, the ties were only effectiv  in reducing assault in white 
neighborhoods as opposed to minority or mixed communities.  Subsequent work by 
the same researchers using much of the same data (Roundtree & Warner, 1999) found 
non-uniform social ties across gender.  While both males and females have similar 
experience of social ties (in other words, both genders had generally the same amount 
of meaningful ties), the ties for males were not impacted significantly by 
neighborhood factors.  Given the nature of crime and especially violence, the finding 
that social ties for men were not impacted by structural covariates carried heavy 
implications for the use and measurement of the systemic model. 
Empirical research into the role of public social control within the systemic 
perspective has been limited, though often in directions opposite to general 
assumptions.  Rose and Clear (1998) questioned whether increased public ties and 




neighborhood controls and thus lead to increased crime.  They categorized the uneven 
distribution of incarceration as representing a “coer ive mobility” which would 
undercut community controls.  While their 1998 work was theoretical, a later 
empirical work (Clear, Rose, Waring, & Scully, 2003) supported an explanation that 
excessive formal social control can have a negative impact. The authors seem to 
argue that the “coercive mobility” itself reduces social capital and removes sources of 
neighborhood-level controls (such as the private and parochial controls seen in the 
system model of Bursik and Grasmick).  While they examine a “negative impact” of 
social control, in that increased control leads to increased crime, they still rely on the 
standard assumption regarding mobility.  It seems there are problems with this 
explanation as it relates to the “mobility” of jail time, and their findings suggest a 
disconnect between assumption and conclusion.  Shaw and McKay, among many 
other researchers, note that residential mobility impacts crime through the mechanism 
that controls are unable to form without a constant presence of norms in a 
neighborhood.  This is why the theory relies on “place” rather than “people,” as the 
assumption is that “people” with pro-social norms can be in a disorganized, high-
crime neighborhood; if they do not have a chance to impact the community (or are in 
constant flux or conflict with other norms), then the structural lack of norms 
undercuts control.  Therefore, more stability would lead to less crime, because the 
norm structure would be stable and likely pro-social.  However, when it comes to 
removing those convicted of crimes (independent of the charge, these individuals 
were likely involved in activities that stemmed from low social controls), it is hard to 




less crime, as the assumption would suggest.  Many of these “coercive mobilizations” 
are likely among populations that do not embody conventional controls or role 
models, and there may be benefits to social control by their removal.  In fact, Clear et 
al. (2003) find their strongest effect on increased crime came from reentry, and 
argued there was an incarceration “tipping point” since crime was lower initially.  
Another interpretation of this is that the traditional mobility mechanism/assumption 
does not hold, as “mobility” led to less crime until those removed returned to the 
same neighborhoods.  Such an interpretation would be more consistent with the 
findings of Lynch and Sabol (2004), who found positive effects of incarceration on 
neighborhood collective efficacy (see also Kennedy, 1997 for a theoretical and 
historical discussion of removing criminals from minority neighborhoods). 
Velez (2001) found that public controls are important f ctors in reducing 
perceptions of victimization in high risk neighborhods, and the findings suggested 
that neighborhoods need to find ways to mobilize the public sphere (police, 
government) to take note of problems and provide resources.25  Warner (2007) shifted 
the definition of public controls to mean indirect and informal control among 
neighbors, as opposed to private and parochial controls being direct in nature.  The 
public controls here are initiated by residents thems lves.  Using a survey of sixty-six 
neighborhoods within a southern city, the findings indicated that social ties had a 
significant effect on direct controls but no effect on the indirect/public controls; the 
                                                
25 Of course, there is likely a catch-22 with this advice.  It is argued that low social control 
neighborhoods need to coordinate action and mobilize in order to direct public attention/resources; 
however, if said neighborhood could coordinate action and mobilize in this way, it’s likely not a “low 




public controls were positively impacted by social ohesion and trust (a collective 
efficacy proxy) and negatively impacted by residential mobility. 
 
Disorder Model 
 Given the general findings that social ties are not all-important in 
generating control, further research on disorder and collective efficacy is useful since 
neither perspective rests solely on ties or networks within communities.  The 
empirical literature on disorder has been somewhat dis ppointing and plagued by 
logical and measurement issues26, though there have been success in regards to 
disorder policing which will be important for the current work.  The work of W. 
Skogan, particularly his 1990 book, directly examines the role of disorder.  While his 
work is linked to policing strategies inspired in part by Wilson and Kelling, Skogan’s 
1990 work sought to measure fear of crime and theoretically link it to actual crime 
outcomes.  Using survey research from various cities that implemented forms of 
community policing, he found that all neighborhoods feared the same things – 
disorder issues, ugliness, perceived lack of norms/controls).  From this, the empirical 
work suggested a strong disorder and crime link in that disorder is both a cause and 
                                                
26 In response to this disappointment, K. Keizer, S. Lindenberg, and L. Steg (2008) set out to conduct a 
number of controlled field experiments to assess whether a conflict of norms (for example, graffiti 
sprayed in a zone clearly prohibiting graffiti) would lead to increases in other disorder, such as littering 
or theft.  Their argument was if given uniform opportunity (and in the experiments, paper flyers were 
put on parked bikes/cars in locations where individuals were going to leave with their vehicle), areas 
with clear disorder/disregard for rules will be undermined by more hedonistic goals such as the ease of 
littering, even when the rules were manifest and well-known.  Keizer et al. observed multiple areas in a 
clean state, and then in a disorderly state, with the “disorder” created by the researchers.  The design 
controlled for weather, time of day, and other factors.  The results suggested that there were significa t 
differences in whether people added to disorder betwe n the two states, with littering (and in one case, 
theft) being considerably higher when other disorder existed.  This finding held even for non-legal 
rules, such as the request of a supermarket to put back shopping carts.  In that case, the researchers 
placed stray shopping carts throughout a parking garage.  To deter people from putting those carts 
back, and thus requiring researchers to go out and replace the stray carts, Vaseline was spread on the 




symptom of reduced controls and fear within a neighbor ood; the continued 
breakdown of any such neighborhood would then force “good” residents to flee and 
“bad” residents would stay or move into the neighbor o d.27  However, there have 
been studies which called Skogan’s empirical findings into question.  Harcourt (1998) 
reanalyzed Skogan’s data and through slight changes to the operationalization of 
disorder found no disorder-crime link.  Another analysis by J. Eck and E. Maguire 
(2000) suggested that the city locations had a number of outliers regarding key 
variables.  The empirical results were drastically different without the outliers, which 
is indicative that Skogan’s data were sensitive to outliers and “not a sound basis for 
policy.”  R. Taylor (1999) noted that the processes argued to take place, namely a 
feedback loop where disorder is a cause and symptom, is i possible to determine 
through a cross-sectional design.  Support for this feedback loop was found by Bellair 
(2000), though that study was also cross-sectional in nature; in contrast, Markowitz et 
al. (2001) found no significant evidence of disorder in a feedback loop while using 
three waves of British Crime Survey data. 
The issue of defining disorder apart from crime has been another problem 
addressed in the empirical literature.  Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) noted that 
many types of disorder are crimes, and their research in Chicago found no direct links 
between disorder and crime.  They argued that disorer can create a “matrix of risk” 
                                                
27 Of the numerous theoretical problems previously noted, this issue of “bad” people may be most 
problematic to any place-based theory as multiple units of analysis are treated as equivalent.  Skogan’s 
main argument at first is to establish that all peopl  and neighborhoods, independent of demographics, 
are afraid of the same things.  This makes sense and serves the theoretical position of disorder well.  
However, once the theory becomes a slippery slope of ople versus place, a whole class of people 
(bad residents) are created that are not afraid of everything that everyone else is scared of at the start of 
the discussion.  Skogan starts with an objective concept of disorder, and then ends with either a 
subjective/cultural one or a concept that, while objective, has exceptions in regards to how people are 
impacted.  Obviously, this transformation has an impact on the theory and the empirical 




within a community, but there are no discernible causal mechanisms in which 
disorder affects crime.  This finding was central to the later work of M. Gau and J. 
Pratt (2008), in which they sought to determine if residents could differentiate 
between disorder and crime.  The results suggested that perceptions tend to blur 
disorder and crime within communities, though there are some problematic issues 
with the study which could question the generalizability of the findings.28  Skogan 
(2008) responded that even if disorder and crime fit the same perceptual structure, it 
is unlikely the fixes are one and the same.  Many disor ers are outside of police 
jurisdiction, as opposed to crimes which can be dirctly responded to by law 
enforcement, yet police can still help non-crime problems indirectly.  However, as 
Kubrin (2008) noted, this contribution serves to highlight the problem in defining and 
measuring disorder as independent from crime. 
More positive results have been found in the policing l terature regarding the 
impact of policing disorder and reducing crime.  Atthe heart of this is the broken 
windows paradigm29 which suggests that police action can have an impact on crime.  
                                                
28 The authors used survey data with only a 32% response rate, and their sample was from a fairly rural 
area which is unlikely to have the degree or variety of manifest disorder seen in urban environments.  
Also, the authors conducted a factor analysis to deermine whether variables loaded on a one or two 
factor solution.  While they concluded that the onefactor solution was better, consistent with the 
inability to separate disorder and crime, it should be noted that a two factor solution would have been 
acceptable based on the fit indices and the pattern of loading variables presented a reasonable 
theoretical divide consistent with distinct disorder and crime.  The two factor solution was instead 
rejected due to the high correlation among the variables, which begs the question as to why conduct a 
factor analysis at all.  As a final note, the authors advanced a policy suggestion that police target the 
common cause of disorder and crime, such as collective efficacy.  It is unclear how police can be 
tasked with building social cohesion and trust among neighbors, especially given the problems many 
police departments have with communities distrusting law enforcement in general. 
29 Many researchers seek to test “broken windows theory,” usually with the suggestion that the 
“theory” says disorder causes crime (see Gau & Pratt, 2008 as a recent example).  It is difficult to read 
the work of Wilson and Kelling accurately and get that impression.  “Broken windows” does not have 
any theoretical constructs or testable hypotheses in regards to the causes of crime.  The paradigm 
focuses on reducing crime independent of the cause.  A  such, the causes of crime could be any 
mechanism.  Wilson and Kelling (1982) are very clear about not seeking the root causes of crime, and 




In terms of disorder, the primary relationship suggested is that disorder can lead to 
fear; police can reduce fear by targeting incivilities, but may not be able to target 
disorder itself (Hinkle & Weisburd, 2008; Kelling &Coles, 1996; Wilson & Kelling, 
1982).  Much of the empirical research directly examining order-maintenance 
policing have taken place in New York City, which had been the high-profile location 
for the initial broken windows implementation and sub equent crime drops in the 
early 1990s.  Targeting disorder in the form of minor crimes/misdemeanor arrests was 
seen to decrease violent crime (Kelling & Sousa, 2001), though later studies 
highlighted more specific findings that these arrests impacted robbery (Rosenfeld, 
Fornango, & Rengifo, 2007) and homicide, either overall (Rosenfeld et al., 2007) or 
only gun-related killings (Messner et al., 2007).  However, this line of research has 
less to do with disorder than with deterrence (Kelling & Sousa, 2001).  It is important 
to emphasize that the police link to communities and crime stems from multiple 
perspectives, though more expansive discussion of policing research within this work 
is found in the sections focused on deterrence theory. 
 
Collective Efficacy Model 
 The empirical research on collective efficacy has generally been 
positive, though most studies come from the same locati n and dataset.  The initial 
theoretical unpacking of collective efficacy was coupled with an empirical 
examination using data from the Project on Human Development in Chicago 
Neighborhoods, or PHDCN (Sampson, Morenoff, & Earls, 1997).  These data 
                                                                                                                                 
deterrence and not other prevention domains.  The goal is to treat and manage crime, not cure 




incorporated survey information taken in 1994-5 across 342 neighborhoods in 
Chicago.  These neighborhoods were formed based on ge graphy and local 
knowledge rather than census tracts.  In the initial work, the authors examined factors 
which impact collective efficacy regarding the contr l of children within 
neighborhoods.  Concentrated disadvantage, a structural measure of poverty, was 
found to be a major predictor in the shared expectation of control only, suggesting 
that this shared expectation is a significant mediating factor.  The authors also 
discovered spatial interdependence in that the level of collective efficacy within a 
neighborhood was directly impacted by the levels in urrounding regions, 
independent of individual neighborhood characteristics.  Sampson and Raudenbush 
(1999) continued this theme by examining collective efficacy as a mediating 
mechanism in contrast to disorder perspectives.  While using the PHDCN data to 
measure efficacy, the researchers used systemic social observation to observe, 
witness, and code disorder within 23,000 face blocks.30  They found that collective 
efficacy, measured though survey questions relating to mutual trust and perceived 
cohesion among a small sample of residents in each neig borhood,31 was a better 
mechanism to predict disorder and crime.  In the work of Morenoff, Sampson, and 
                                                
30 While highly-spoken of in various works of R. Sampson and colleagues, the system social 
observation technique has some serious obstacles.  Taking the method in Sampson and Raudenbush, 
observers drove slowly down blocks during the day in order to record disorder.  There may be 
reactions to alter behavior/social disorder if those bserved witness large vehicles with unknown 
persons driving very slowly down the roadway.  While physical disorder is easily seen during the day, 
other physical and social disorder will likely be missed if not observed during the night (e.g. whether 
street lights work/work effectively, vice crimes popular at night).  Though the technique can obviously 
be useful as a qualitative component within quantittive neighborhood studies, it is unclear whether t 
potentially limited scope of benefit is outweighed by the considerable time and cost necessary.  It is 
also worth noting that the authors used the technique as a way to measure disorder independently from 
perceived notions of disorder by residents, as perceived notions were possibly biased in the face of 
independent observation; ironically, the measure of collective efficacy is based on perception surveys. 
31 While each neighborhood had approximately 8,000 residents and the overall response rate for all 
surveys was 75%, the specific community-level surveys with “collective efficacy” questions were 




Raudenbush (2001), homicide rates were prospectively pr dicted in part by collective 
efficacy.  Using the PHDCN data, homicide data from two sources, and 1990 census 
measures, they found that collective efficacy had an independent effect on homicide 
rates whereas social ties/networks did not.  Like the original work on collective 
efficacy, spatial dynamics played a role in the results; homicide rates were highly 
spatially dependent and influenced by the proximity to neighborhoods with high or 
low collective efficacy.  One study which found evidence of collective efficacy 
outside of Chicago was seen in Simons et al. (2005), which used data from two waves 
of a community health study among minority families in Georgia and Iowa.  Looking 
at how collective efficacy impacts parenting, they found that authoritative parenting 
was amplified by high efficacy in the community and mitigated by low collective 
efficacy. 
 
Common Empirical Issues 
 In general, there are recurring empirical issues which have limited the 
study of communities and crime.  First is the difficulty of measuring key factors.  
When looking at mediating factors, often formal social ontrols are left out of the 
picture.  When formal controls are considered, the eff cts are hypothesized to be 
negative, though there is a substantial stable of rsearch findings suggesting that 
police can have a positive impact and take action to reduce crime in neighborhoods.  
Even more broadly, definitions for social ties/networks or disorder are hard to agree 
on, let along measure.  Collective efficacy, the best defined measure, is also the 
hardest to capture as it generally requires specific att tudinal data though it maintains 




There are additional problems in defining a neighbor o d itself.  Again, the 
best solution may be seen in the collective efficacy literature, but it is also the most 
complicated in that it uses geography and local knowledge with the same end product 
of semi-arbitrarily dividing geography into units.  One key element for a 
neighborhood is shared territory or proximity (see Kirk & Laub, 2010).  This does not 
require social ties or an element of community, which is consistent with the 
previously discussed literature on ties.  Rather than share common, strong bonds, 
neighborhoods share a space and the circumstances which come with it (Bursik & 
Grasmick, 1993), which likely leads to common experiences and interactions with the 
outside world.  In this way, the idea of a neighborhood may fall in line with a fixed 
geographic space that has a potential to activate coll ctive efficacy. 
Work by J. Hipp (2007) highlighted many potential issues with defining 
neighborhoods.  Using the American Housing Survey, h  examined perceived 
disorder and crime at a variety of geographic levels.  Depending on the aggregation 
used to define a “neighborhood,” different structural effects were seen.  Certain 
structural factors, like heterogeneity, were only significant at larger units of 
aggregation whereas economic resources had a highly localized impact at the block 
level and not at larger aggregations.   
Second, there have been data limitations.  Most of the studies reviewed have 
cross-sectional or limited wave data, which is problematic when researching issues 
that develop and constantly change such as neighborhood (Kirk & Laub, 2010).  
Given the definitional issues, there are few datasets with the necessary measures for 




factors such as Census measures.  Most structural factors have been measured this 
way.  However, such data are often out of date proxies being used to examine 
neighborhoods, especially when the crime/other dataused is longitudinal.  Given that 
research has shown the importance of spatial factors and dynamic models for 
understanding crime, attempts to operationalize structu al factors in a more fluid way 
to capture change over time should be pursued.  Some may argue that the Census 
variables provide the ideal measures, but that idealism may not be worth the price of 
the data being unresponsive to known changes.  Theories f communities and crime 
are, at their core, theories that speculate and rely on change (Kirk & Laub, 2010).  
Dynamic modeling of variables is needed as there are new data demands which 
require a shift to longitudinal datasets (Kubrin, 2003). 
This study will help fill in these gaps in the communities and crime literature 
in a number of ways.  First, the research considers the role of formal social control by 
measuring police action.  Second, the data are longitudinal rather than cross-sectional, 
which allows a consideration of dynamic factors.  Lastly, towards that end, the data 
incorporate dynamic variables for social measures in addition to Census data, which 
allows both for a test of dynamic factors and a direct comparison in performance to 









“Just when you think you have all the answers, I change the questions.” 
- Roderick G. Toombs 
 
Deterrence theory is primarily interested in preventing crime through 
punishment.  The role of punishment is especially important since the theory assumes 
that crime reflects a choice and that crime can be det rred if the costs of illegal 
activity outweigh the benefits.  Similar to ideas involving communities and crime, 
principles of deterrence are found throughout the Western intellectual tradition.  The 
Book of Deuteronomy contains one of the many references to punishment in the 
Judeo-Christian framework by declaring that “those which remain shall hear, and 
fear, and shall henceforth commit no more any such evil among you.  And thine eye 
shall not pity; but life shall go for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot 
for foot” (XIX, v.20-21)32.  This conception of punishment and deterrence can itself 
be traced back to Hammurabi’s Code from the ancient Babylonian Empire, though 
one could argue that Babylonian law as recorded had more nuance than generally 
                                                
32 One may argue this speaks more towards retribution rather than deterrence. Many of these ancient 
laws seek justice through punishment, but given the public nature of punishments and public 
proclamations of potential punishments, there is undo btedly a general deterrence element at work.  To 
codify punishments within the society’s sacred scriptu e serves to warn all as to the exact costs of 
crime.  Of course, such costly physical punishments also can serve a specific deterrent to the criminal, 




accredited to it.33  In Plato’s Protagorus, Socrates and another character discuss the 
nature of virtue and how it can be transmitted to others through education; one 
component is punishment, as “he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not 
retaliate for a past wrong which cannot be undone; he has regard to the future, and is 
desirous that the man who is punished, and he who sees him punished, may be 
deterred from doing wrong again. He punishes for the sake of prevention….”  While 
the ideas seem straightforward both then and now, theorizing on these basic concepts 
has produced multiple re-conceptualizations and reveal d numerous undiscovered 
regions.  One such region, celerity, is a central tenant to deterrence and yet remains 
mostly unanswered.  This section will review the thoretical development of 
deterrence then discuss the empirical literature to da e, both with an eye towards 
celerity. 
Classical Deterrence 
While having a rich intellectual pedigree, deterrence theory as we 
conceptualize it was put forth during the Enlightenment period in Europe.  A key 
component of the Enlightenment’s philosophical tradi ion was to question the nature 
of society, how order is maintained, the social contract, and the role of government.  
While this “Hobbsian question of order” (Ellis, 1971) is ultimately central to all 
                                                
33 While “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, etc.” is popularly linked to Hammurabi’s Code, those 
phrases never actually appear in the law (as opposed t  the Old Testament, which uses those exact 
phrases in the King James translation).  In the Code, Law 196 states, “If a man put out the eye of 
another man, his eye shall be put out.”  Clearly, this can be seen as “an eye for an eye,” however the 
full law is conditional.  The assumption in Law 196 is that the two men are equal social ranks, and 
subsequent laws demonstrate how the punishment changes depending on the nature of the victim.  Law 
198 reads, “If he put out the eye of a freed man [former slave], or break the bone of a freed man, he 
shall pay one gold mina,” and Law 199 is, “If he put o t the eye of a man's slave, or break the bone of 
a man's slave, he shall pay one-half of its value.”  This pattern is seen in the “tooth for a tooth” portion, 
in that the overarching law is, “If a man knock outthe teeth of his equal, his teeth shall be knocked 
out,” while subsequent laws condition the statement based on victim.  According to ancient Babylon, 
knocking out the tooth of a former slave costs one-third the price of putting out the eye, while simply 




theories of crime and punishment, the first systemaic answers were produced by the 
classical school and rooted in deterrence.34  M. Gottfredson and T. Hirschi (1990) 
suggested that classical thinkers generally saw crime as the use of force or fraud in 
the pursuit of self-interest; in this, the crime is a violation of the social contract, and 
human nature is seen as hedonistic yet rooted in a utility function, or in other words, 
humanity is both animalistic and rational.   
One of the best expressions of this utility function can be seen in the work of 
J. Bentham.  In his remarkable text, Principles of Morals and Legislation 
(1907[1789]), Bentham suggested that utility is the universal calculus of the pleasure-
pain principle.  Even those who oppose a utility function to describe how decisions 
are made in human life, such as moral or religious aesthetics, act in accordance with 
the principle, according to Bentham.  For example, moralists seek a different type of 
pleasure than most others and religionists seek to avoid afterlife pain.  In this 
framework, there are four sources/sanctions of pleasure and pain – physical, political, 
moral (public/popular opinion), and religious.  Each can provide a basis for law, and 
physical sources are the grounding for the others.  Bentham also advanced ideas on 
how to measure pleasure-pain, namely through intensity, duration, certainty, and 
swiftness.  This final component was likely influenc d by the reformist work of an 
earlier Continental commentator on government and punishment, C. Beccaria. 
Beccaria’s seminal work, An Essay on Crime and Punishments, was published 
in 1764 with the hope that “enlightened” governments (generally, some form of 
                                                
34 It is worth noting that T. Hobbes himself gave an answer to the question in Leviathan (1651) by 
suggesting that the government must be coercive to compel people to obey laws, and that order is kept 




despotism in Europe at the time) would reform their systems of punishment.35  He 
covered a wide array of topics and explored numerous types of punishments, but the 
main contribution which formed the backbone of deterr nce theory was that sanctions 
from society should be sufficiently severe,36 certain, and swift following the offense 
in order to appeal to humanity’s duel nature (animal and rational) and thus maintain 
order.37  Beccaria also sought to have logical and easy to understand laws as a hedge 
against unrest and crime, noting that, “happy the natio , where knowledge of the law 
is not a science” (p. 40, 1983[1764]). 
Following the upheavals of the Enlightenment, the classical school of thought 
was gradually replaced with a more empirical and computational mode of thinking, 
namely positivism.  Whereas the classical school was a philosophical child of the 
Enlightenment, the positivist school was a materialistic/empirical child of the 
Scientific Revolution – this point is important because it is the development and rise 
of the positivist school’s methods which allowed classical theories to be carried from 
                                                
35 While there is certainly concern for the plight of the masses in Beccaria’s work (see his comment on 
punishing nobles and others alike based on the injury done to society), it is equally hard to deny that 
Beccaria was looking to make himself useful and appe l to the self-interest of governments.  Much of 
the essay reads as a “how-to” manual of how to avoid rebellion/crime through the proper use of formal 
control/ deterrence principles.  For example, while it is generally accepted that Beccaria opposed 
capital punishment, his two caveats to this opposition are less discussed – first, capital punishment is 
actually necessary when a criminal “though deprived of his liberty, has such power and connection as 
may endanger the security of the nation; when his existence may produce dangerous revolution of the 
established form of government,” and second, “perpetual slavery, then, has in it all that is necessary to 
deter the most hardened and determined, as much as the punishment of death” (pgs. 65-66, 1983 
[1764]). 
36 By this, classical scholars often described proportionality rather than maximum severity.  As 
Beccaria (1983 [1764]) noted, “punishments... ought to be chosen, as will make the strongest and most 
lasting impressions on the minds of others, with the least torment to the body of the criminal” (p. 37)
and “if punishments be very severe, men are naturally led to the perpetration of other crimes, to avoid 
the punishment due to the first” (p. 62).   Maximum severity is counter-intuitive to deterrence theory 
when properly read.  Deterrence theory as classically onceived is more nuanced than popularly 
portrayed or given credit for (see Tonry, 2008), even if subsequent research has not always 
operationalized these nuances. 
37 Though often treated as three equal components conributing to a deterrent effect, it should be noted 
that Beccaria suggested that “crimes are more effectually prevented by the certainty, then the severity 




pure conceptualization into operationalization and scientific testing.  As previously 
discussed, sociological positivism arose first and li ked the uneven distribution of 
crime statistics to place; biological positivism would follow, drawing conclusions 
about hereditary influences and the uneven distribution of crime.  This shift came 
with a change in how humanity was viewed – whereas cl ssical theorists saw people 
as inherently hedonistic, positivist thinkers viewed humans through the lens of 
evolution and thus concluded that criminals could be changed/reformed into a better 
citizen.  This later view of human nature would continue to be the dominant bedrock 
of theorizing until the 1960s. 
 
Revival: Deterrence as Objective 
 Deterrence theory returned to the research agenda during a historical 
period in the 1960s which was similar to what spurred Beccaria to write two centuries 
prior; at both times, social unrest was evident and there was open questioning into the 
role of government and its legitimacy to enforce law.  Positivist explanations and 
remedies for crime and disorder were seen as failures, especially cultural and strain 
perspectives, and people became interested in the impact of government action given 
that massive social engineering policies correlated with increased disorder.  While 
many of the positivist principals fell out of favor through the 1960s as issues arose 
regarding the role of the state in maintaining and creating social order, the 
methodologies for testing ideas remained strong.  Classical ideas filled the vacuum by 
addressing the state’s role in punishment as well as providing theoretical explanations 




Likely a part of deterrence theory’s appeal, in light of social research which 
sought to quantify and test hypotheses, is in the apparent simplicity and parsimony in 
Beccaria’s work – increased severity, certainty, and swiftness of punishment should 
result is decreased crime.38  Initially, the theoretical research centered on aggregate 
deterrence and government sanctions.  In the spirit of Beccaria, objective deterrence 
and theorizing at the state-level was imagined as the best way to conceptualize 
punishment and measure deterrent effects.  Given the theory’s link to punishment 
severity and questioning government, often theorizing turned into debates regarding 
the morality of capital punishment (Chambliss, 1966).39  However, little interest was 
taken in the theoretical use of celerity.  Given the focus on objective, aggregate trends 
and the use of official data, swiftness took a backseat to certainty and severity.  While 
this will be discussed in greater detail in the empirical review, the lack of celerity 
theorizing is critical to note as this oversight would generally carry through the 
numerous reconceptualizations of deterrence theory. 
 
Reconceptualization of Punishment: Deterrence as Perceptual 
 As deterrence was theorized to the aggregate level of punishment, additional 
questions arose as to whether the theory could be applied at the individual level as 
                                                
38 With critical emphasis on “apparent” in this description.  See the previous two footnotes as the 
launching point for future theoretical misunderstandings. 
39 Of course, this revival coincided with the various legal challenges to the death penalty which would 
culminate in Furman v. Georgia (1972) and the temporary halt to capital punishment in the United 
States. In Furman, the Supreme Court found that the death penalty as applied by the states was “so 
wantonly and so freakishly imposed” as to violate th  8th and 14h Amendments.  However, this case is 
far more complicated than even a typical 5-4 decision, as each justice wrote an opinion and no opinion 
alone garnered a full majority.  In fact, three of the four dissents obtained more stand alone support 
than any concurring opinion.  The crux of the argument seeking to end or limit the death penalty was 
that a racial disparity showing blacks more often given a death sentence constituted discrimination.  
While Justice P. Stewart rightfully noted that discrimination was not proven, later research has 
suggested that it is the victim’s race, rather than the defendant’s, that significantly increases the c ance 




well.  Given the lukewarm findings for aggregate deterrence, researchers pursued the 
concept of perceptual deterrence.  This line of theorizing suggested that an 
individual’s perception of punishment would dictate th  deterrent effect, in that those 
who believed (rightly or wrongly) that there would be no proper sanction would not 
be deterred from deviance or crime.  Perceptual theorizing differed from the first 
conceptualization of punishment, in that initially theory focused on the objective 
nature of the deterrent rather than perceptions; additionally, while objective 
deterrence focused on legal sanctions, perceptual deterrence expanded into informal 
sanctioning.  Some researchers who had started with examinations of objective 
deterrence shifted gears to perceptual deterrence as p rceptual perspectives would 
come to prominence starting in the 1970s (see Chiricos & Waldo, 1970; Waldo & 
Chiricos, 1972).   
 Perceptual deterrence allowed for a wider range of studies and theorizing 
because it was not limited to official records and ggregate computations.  Much of 
the perceptual research has been directly collected using survey instruments.  Initial 
studies asked about the respondents’ (often college classes, where the researchers 
worked as professors) current perceptions of punishment along with any prior 
criminal behavior/deviance.  As more research was conducted, the questions asked 
were demonstrated to pose a serious theoretical prob em – one’s prior crime and 
punishment/lack of punishment may itself impact current perceptions, thus a serious 
issue to potential time ordering of the key casual relationship (Saltzman, Paternoster, 
Waldo, & Chiricos, 1982).  Later studies applied hypothetical vignettes to measure 




test perceptions in a way that properly established causal order.  During this phase, 
little attention was given to celerity as a theoretical concept in testing or imagining 
deterrence. 
 
Reconceptualization of Utility: Deterrence and Rational Choice 
 Another shift from objective deterrence and its focus on legal definitions 
resulted in a distinct conceptualization from the perceptual theorizing.  Rational 
choice theory revised the utility function to include moral/social/physical costs as 
well as formal sanctions.40  This perspective linked to the perceptive literatu e in that 
rational choice explored how perceptions were formed and the role of a subjectiv , 
expected utility function (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996).  The scope of offending 
increased, and considerations were made for both time-stable and dynamic factors; 
this theory incorporated factors that were theorized to vary greatly at different stages 
of decision making and among different crimes (Cornish & Clarke, 1987).  Here, the 
utility function could be impacted by individual propensity, environmental 
considerations, and the interaction of criminality and opportunity.  Much of the later 
work on situational crime prevention is rooted in this perspective. 
 While a useful revival of Bentham in that numerous interesting and previously 
unexplored questions came about, there are theoretical problems with this rational 
choice perspective.  Foremost is the lack of parsimony given that there is no clear 
method or limit to how factors in the utility function are selected.  Since that an initial 
appeal of deterrence theory was its parsimony, it is ironic that a reconceptualization 
                                                
40 This reconceptualization is much closer to the spirit of Bentham’s work than initial utility functions 
which only considered the role of formal sanctions, so in a way this reconceptualization is more of a 




goes in the opposite direction.  In this way, it could be argued that rational choice 
theory suffers from some of the worst excesses of positivism, another irony given 
deterrence’s classical roots – the utility function can be prone to over quantification 
and excessive categorization with potential for different models for certain situations 
or crimes.  Yet with this potential over over-specification, little attention was given to 
celerity outside of a limited sphere in behavioral economics. 
 
Reconceptualization of Deterrence: Role of Avoided Punishment 
 Yet another spinoff within deterrence theory sought to ask questions regarding 
how the deterrent effect may be more nuanced that previously speculated.  Towards 
this end, Stafford and Warr (1993) noted that the common division of specific and 
general deterrence had major theoretical holes – primarily, it ignores the idea of 
avoided punishment; as defined, specific and general d terrence cannot act on a 
person at the same time; finally, this division was not compatible with other 
advancements in social learning and rational choice theories, specifically the roles of 
vicarious and experiential learning and the need for expanded utility functions.  
Under this new model, there was no need for distinct heories of specific and general 
deterrence, but rather deterrent effects were seen through direct and indirect 
experiences.  The experience of punishment would lea  to increased perceived risk 
and decrease crime, whereas the experience of avoiding punishment would lead to 
decreased perceived risk and increasing crime. 
 While this reconceptualization sought to change the theoretical basis for 
deterrence, nothing has been pursued down this path regarding celerity.  There is a 




but to date only severity and certainty are considere .  Also, Stafford and Warr’s 
reconceptualization did emphasize how perceived legal sanction threats are formed by 
information – this will be further discussed in using deterrence in this study as well.   
 
Reconceptualization of Aggregate Deterrence: Policing 
 The final reconceptualization of deterrence theory varies from the previous 
pathways.  In policing, much of the focus has always been on deterrence even before 
the theory’s aforementioned revival in the 1960s within the literature.  The work of A. 
Vollmer, one of the central figures in the history f policing and criminology, made 
this emphasis on deterrence clear.  In a 1933 piece on developing professionalism 
with law enforcement, Vollmer noted that police action can prevent crime through a 
deterrence mechanism – while police cannot impact the “root causes” of crime, law 
enforcement can arrest criminals and thereby dissuade other citizens from engaging in 
criminal activity; this deterrence-based perspectiv ook hold in the United States as 
the Professional Era in policing.  
 Vollmer’s work was in part a reaction to the Wikersham Report, which 
concluded that the political roots of police power ere the main problem in proper 
law enforcement.  Politics led to corruption, disorganization, and lack of 
standardization within policing, per the Report, and the solutions were to make police 
autonomous enforcers of a uniform law and reduce responsibilities to crime control.  
Vollmer agreed for the most part, though he noted that crime prevention should be a 
main (rather than only) focus of police (1933).  Hhe argued police could not impact 
the social causes of crime while still championing for educating law enforcement on 




purpose.  While the Professional Era heeded Vollmer’s advice when it came to a 
standardized police force and “prevention through deterrence” model, the time period 
by and large ignored Vollmer’s push to understand the mechanics of social causes 
and problems.  As social disorder helped bring down the Professional Era, the 
subsequent era in policing would be the true child of Vollmer is more ways – a mix of 
prevention through deterrence with an emphasis on community knowledge and 
involvement of social mechanics. 
Interestingly, the Professional Era met its end at the same time that both 
community and deterrence theories of crime were revived in the research literature – 
this is not a coincidence, but rather outcomes of the same forces throughout society at 
the time.  During the late 1960s and early 1970s, social disorder and crime rose while 
police were seen as increasingly detached from communities, a trend highlighted in 
the President’s Crime Commission Report of 1967.  This report detailed policing 
problems, such as lack of legitimacy within minority areas, detachment from the 
environment, over-emphasis on reaction to crime, and issues of selective 
enforcement.  Police were seen as an arm of government, and government was less 
trusted to make decisions during this time period (see LaFree, 1994).  Studies were 
done examining the effectiveness of two key policing metrics, preventative patrol and 
rapid response, with findings suggesting neither tactic as practiced made any 
difference on crime or citizen perceptions (see Spelman & Brown, 1984; Kelling & 
Moore, 1988; Kelling et al., 1974 for a review).  Others criticized the attempts to 
regulate discretion through bureaucracy, noting that attempts to eliminate officer 




up undermining police authority within communities (see Goldstein, 1979; Wilson, 
1970).   
 Due to this lack of legitimacy in past theories/actions and the specter of 
increasing disorder, some ideas about policing changed rapidly.  Combating disorder 
and problem solving with communities became a central focus in this new policing 
(see Kelling & Moore, 1988).  At the same time, thefunction of prevention through 
deterrence was maintained, as most agreed that the function of law enforcement 
should be to primarily address criminal activity (though the techniques to achieve this 
function changed from the pure reactive and detached policies of the Professional 
Era).  J.Q. Wilson and G. Kelling (1982) suggested a broken windows approach 
where police can impact crime and fear by combating d sorder without having to 
address the root causes, much in the same way as suggested by A. Vollmer decades 
prior.   
 Another avenue of policing that is rooted in deterrence theory is the current 
focus on hot spots (see Sherman & Weisburd, 1995).  As technology advanced, the 
pin maps of Shaw and McKay have been recreated throug  computers and with far 
greater detail to consider change, density, and auto-correlation.  Areas can be 
discovered to have disproportionate criminal activity though a number of techniques 
and the results are labeled as hot spots.  Once identif ed, deterrence theory guides the 
recommended police action – the level of focus and l w enforcement of police 
increases in the spatial area.  While similar to the older “flood the area” deterrence-




that the intervention is focused on the particular type, time, and location of the 
problem. 
 These new techniques based on deterrence theory represent a different way to 
examine the impact of aggregate deterrence.  From a theoretical standpoint, the role 
of aggregate deterrence and punishment focused on the state-level and entire criminal 
justice system.  This would make sense from a reading of Beccaria given that no 
formal policing organization existed in Europe until the 19th century.  Yet in policing, 
the unit of analysis for theorizing is not the indivi ual but rather an aggregate space, 
albeit not generally as large as a state.  This may explain why much of these 
theoretical developments in the policing literature a  not often considered as part of 
the larger deterrence research – policing reflects a middle-ground between a 
previously rejected frame of reference (large aggreat ) and the more popular 
individual-level (perceptions).  In fact, many recent reviews of deterrence theory (see 
Pratt et al, 2006; Tonry, 2008 as examples) fail to fully acknowledge the theoretical 
or empirical results of deterrence-based policing as a potential aggregate assessment 
of deterrence.  As the next section detailing results of deterrence research shows, this 
omission is curious given the apparent successes of deterrence-based policing; yet, 
these successes establish a justification for the further study of deterrence through 
measures of police action, specifically an examinatio  of celerity which is not found 
either in formal deterrence or policing literatures. 
 
Empirical Findings 
 As formal tests of deterrence theory began in the 1960s using the 




only severity and certainty in the main deterrence literature based largely on data 
restrictions.  Initial studies of deterrence looked at objective deterrence with state-
level, aggregate arrest/prison data; while severity and certainty were operationalized, 
swiftness was either ignored as impossible with the giv n data or marginalized as less 
important as the other deterrence components.  Findings showed certainty as robust 
and significant in decreasing crime but severity ofen insignificant, with no empirical 
findings of celerity (see Chiricos & Waldo, 1970; Gibbs, 1968; Logan, 1975; Tittle, 
1969).  In fact, Tonry (2008) noted that the state of conclusions for the deterrent 
effect of criminal punishments, and the overall criminal justice system, has been the 
same since this early research – there is a general d terrent effect, with certainty more 
powerful and severity often spurious at the aggregate-level. 
 
Perceptual Deterrence 
 The reconceptualization of punishment and focus on perceptual 
deterrence moved research away from aggregate measures and towards individual 
crime and survey methodologies.  While an important shift in technique, the primary 
focus remained on severity and certainty, whether in the early surveys (Waldo & 
Chiricos, 1972; Erickson, Gibbs, & Jensen, 1977; Jensen, Erickson, & Gibbs, 1978), 
examinations of experiential effects in survey responses (Paternoster, 1987; Saltzman, 
Paternoster, Waldo, & Chiricos, 1982), or in later hypothetical vignettes to measure 
perception and behavior simultaneously (Bachman, Paternoster, & Ward, 1992; 
Nagin & Paternoster, 1993; 1994).  The results were often the same as with aggregate 




whereas severity often lesser or no effect, though the impact of severity was more 
constant in the hypothetical-based research methods (see Nagin, 1998 for overview). 
Reconceptualizations based on rational choice and direct/indirect punishments 
also centered on certainty and severity, with a more important role assigned to 
certainty.  Piliavin et al. (1986) found there was no difference between serious and 
non-serious offending, suggesting no significant role f r severity, but also found 
support that opportunity had a significant impact on crime; theoretically, opportunity 
is a dichotomous outcome that reflects a reverse coding for certainty of punishment 
(in that recognizing an opportunity often is dependent on the initial certainty of 
success/lack of detection or punishment in the moment).  Paternoster and Piquero 
(1995) examined the differences between direct/indirect perceptions of punishment 
among 10th graders.  While finding that personal and vicarious experiences interacted 
in support of Stafford and Warr’s reconceptualization, the critical result was seen in 
the context of certainty – a potential resetting effect was discovered regarding the 
punishment for drug use, in that the direct experience of punishment decreased 
perceived certainty and thereby increases criminal activity.  Later studies (see Piquero 
& Paternoster, 1998; Piquero & Pogarsky, 2002) found support for these conclusions 
in other populations.  The defiance finding has been d scribed as similar to the 
“gambler’s fallacy” in which a gambler who has been losing assumes s/he’s “due” to 
win as play continues, which only serves to accelerate the pace of participation in 
hopes of hitting the point where luck changes.  Still, even this fallacy remains tied to 




In a recent meta-analysis of thirty years of deterrnce research by Pratt et al. 
(2006), the authors concluded that the effectiveness of deterrence theory as studied 
was minimal, but this conclusion was only based on findings for severity and 
certainty effect sizes – the effect size celerity was not measured or even noted as a 
critical factor in assessing the theory.  While other reviews (e.g. Nagin, 1998; Tonry, 
2008) were more positive regarding the state of deterr nce theory, neither considered 
the role of celerity to date nor as a critical compnent in future research.  This dearth 
of celerity theorizing and testing is major gap in the criminological literature, one 
which is directly addressed in this current study. 
 
Celerity 
 Tests of celerity are few and have been limited in scope and frequency 
to preclude them from the mainstream deterrence literature. W. Bailey (1980) 
examined celerity in relation to deterrent effects of the death penalty, with swiftness 
measured as the time from sentence to execution, and fou d mixed results once other 
covariates were added to celerity.  Research by W. Selke (1983) studied the celerity 
of punishment for burglary, as measured by the timebetween arrest and adjudication, 
at the aggregate-level within a city over seven years, finding modest support for 
swiftness of punishment.  J. Yu (1994) focused on drunk driving recidivism and 
deterrence principles, with swiftness of sanctions measured by the time from arrest to 
fine/license revocation; the author found mixed results for celerity with stronger 
effects on deterring recidivism for less criminal populations.  Recent work by A. 
West (2002) used a pretest/posttest quasi-experimental design to examine the 




rape cases.  Like Selke (1983), celerity is operation l zed as the time from arrest to 
adjudication; unlike Selke’s work, swiftness is nota significant player in study.  The 
few other studies which include measures of celerity are often based in quasi-
experimental designs of individual deterrence (Clark, 1988; Howe & Brandau, 1988), 
in examinations of perceptual deterrence across individuals (Nagin & Pogarsky, 
2001; Yu, Chin, & Perfetti, 2006), or in behavioral economics where swiftness is a 
consideration for formation of discount rates in decision making (Loewenstein, 
1987).41 
With extremely limited examination of celerity, in addition to a limited and 
potentially inapt operationalization among the few studies incorporating celerity, it 
would seem premature of render a verdict on the efficacy of deterrence theory.  The 
problem in studying celerity has been one of data and methods – limited sources of 
quantifiable measures lead to limited approximations.  While celerity has been 
measured as the time from arrest to the end of court processing since such data are 
available, it is hard to see how this time period actu lly captures the swiftness of 
punishment.  As such, there are at least two factors to consider in developing a truer 
operationalization of theoretical celerity.  First, the starting point for any measure of 
celerity should be based on the actual incident for which the sanction is being 
rendered.  As Beccaria (1983 [1764]) stated, “the more immediately after the 
commission of a crime, a punishment is inflicted, the more just and usefl it will be” 
                                                
41 This later work was interesting in that all three deterrence components were considered such that 
certainty and severity (in terms of magnitude of an event) were held constant.  A utility function was 
suggested that incorporated a non-zero value of anticipa ion, which suggests that the swiftest action 
may not be the most desired/most impacting on behavior when an individual actor is given the choice.  
If nothing else, these results show that celerity has both a differential effect across outcomes and that 




(p. 51, emphasis mine).  The time from arrest to court disposition is “case processing 
speed,” which may be a useful measure to extend swiftness research but is not 
consistent with the principles, assumptions, and theoretical works on deterrence 
celerity.  Second, previous measures of swiftness as ume that police have no role in 
deterrence.  By making the starting point of celerity an arrest, the implicit assumption 
is that the police themselves cannot have a deterrent effect – police act simply as the 
funnel into the criminal justice system, where the true deterrent effect is felt.  Police 
speed is irrelevant, and court speed is paramount.  This criticism is not to deny a 
potential deterrent effect of courtroom outcomes, but rather to establish the potential 
deterrent effect of police work in impacting crime.  Such a deterrent effect by police 
action has been suggested by the considerable experimental research into hot-spots 
and pulling-levers policing tactics. 
 
Role of Empirical Policing Literature in Deterrence 
 The transition from aggregate studies to individual/perceptual studies 
of deterrence in criminology, both within the literature at large and within the limited 
pool which addresses celerity, may also be premature.  Aggregate-level deterrence 
studies conducted on criminological topics is often do e by economists focusing on 
crime trends (e.g. Kessler & Levitt, 1999; Levitt, 1996) and concealed gun policy 
(e.g. the line of research started by the work of Lott & Mustard, 1997).  Like their 
criminological cousins, the issue of celerity is not generally a part of the research.  
Still, criminology has criticized such aggregate research on the grounds that the 
economists assume an excessively high value of formal sanctions, as opposed to the 




Tonry, 2008).  In fact, Tonry (2008) goes so far as to ay that “macro-level modeling 
of deterrent effects of changes in sanctions policies by economists and 
econometricians has reached a dead end.”  Tonry recommends further research in 
individual-level studies among different populations to examine layers of deterrence 
beyond formal sanctions.   
Yet, he also notes the growing evidence of deterrence at the police policy 
level, in contrast to the limited evidence of deterrence at the sentencing policy level.  
These studies of police policy are at the aggregate-lev l, though at a localized 
neighborhood-type level rather than larger units of analysis, including studies of hot 
spots (Braga & Bond, 2008; Sherman & Weisburd, 1995; Weisburd & Braga, 2006) 
and pulling levers tactics (Braga, 2008; Braga, Kennedy, Waring, & Piehl, 2001) as 
well as “shallow” problem-oriented policing (Braga & Weisburd, 2006).  Such 
studies represent Vollmer’s (1933) idea of prevention hrough deterrence, in which 
police can have an effect on crime even if not addressing the root causes of 
prevention.  Given that Tonry acknowledges the success of certain aggregate-level 
studies regarding deterrence, and that aggregate-level studies have ignored celerity 
equally as individual-level study, it is justifiable to test a new measure of celerity 
based on police action at the aggregate-level. 
This study will help fill a major gap in the deterrnce literature.  Deterrence 
theory is composed of three components, though only two have been subject to 
rigorous empirical examination.  Celerity has often been ignored, though it is the 
mechanism by which the causal link between crime and punishment is formed (Clark, 




2008).  Additionally, aggregate-level studies of deterrence have been often 
marginalized and criticized within criminology – while much of these criticisms are 
valid, police research has avoided many of the pitfalls and still produced deterrence 
effects.  Tonry (2008) notes that there is “little point in continuing to investigate 
[deterrent effects] in the same old ways for another 30 years,” and I agree with that 
particular sentiment.  Therefore, this research studies celerity using a new 
operationalization and an examination at an aggregate level consistent with the 
successes of recent deterrence-based police research. 
 
 In summary, the current study seeks to explore undiscovered territory, both 
theoretically and empirically.  Using data from 1998-2006, this study will ask two 
main questions: Do structural factors influence homicide rates across neighborhoods?  
Does aggregate deterrence influence homicide rates acro s neighborhoods?  This 
work will extend the communities and crime literature by including dynamic 
structural factors, using longitudinal data, and incorporate formal social control as a 
mechanism predicted to influence homicide rates.  Deterrence theory provides the 
foundation for this element of formal social control, as inspired by the successes of 
aggregate deterrence in policing research and lack of previous study in the swiftness 
of punishment.  This test of celerity in this study is a clear extension that addresses a 
major hole in deterrence research and theory.  
 
 




Chapter 3: Data and Methods 
 
“The standard by which working concepts ought to be judged is usefulness.”  
– Terence Morris 
 
“Never desire that which is impossible.”  
– Spartan axiom 
 
 The two central questions in this study may seem straightforward and easy to 
assess.  However, the simplest questions have a way of becoming more complicated 
when it comes to conceptualization and operationalization.  While no measures or 
techniques are perfect in research, improvements or changes to prior work serve to 
expand on the body of knowledge.  This work advances th  current research by using 
multiple longitudinal data sources, one of which has been recently collected and 
never examined previously, which include dynamic structural factors, neighborhood 
controls, and a new test of celerity to reflect formal neighborhood control.  This 
chapter will detail both the data and methodological choices necessary to address the 
key questions at hand. 
Data 
This study uses two primary data sources:  homicide information collected 
from the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPDC) and structural 
variables compiled by the Urban Institute and the Washington, D.C. Local Initiatives 
Support Corporation.   Combination of these sources allows for an opportunity to 






The homicide data used here are part of a larger data collection effort by this 
author to establish a longitudinal dataset for the MPDC.  More than three years were 
spent on the overall effort and it was partially funded by the Criminal Justice 
Coordinating Council (CJCC) of Washington, D.C. through a grant obtained by this 
author.   A brief description of the data collection process highlights the scope of the 
project and its usefulness in this current work. 
While the author served as a volunteer within the Research and Analysis 
office at MPDC, two data issues directly led to the collection of homicide data.  First, 
MPDC did not have useable datasets which extended before the 21st century.  Due to 
considerable problems in managing data quality and transitions between record 
management systems in years past, limited comprehensive data were archived by the 
department.  Corrective efforts in data cleaning and management were implemented 
in 2007 under a new Chief of Police. These efforts had a primarily prospective focus, 
as there were limited resources to clean large-scale databases retroactively.  This 
reality led to a lack of longitudinal data sources available for MPDC use, both for 
research and for public information requests. 
Second, this author participated in a project seeking to update a report from 
the late 1980s consisting of descriptive statistics for homicide incidents over a three-
year time span; the update would examine homicide cas s from 2005 through 2007.  
During the course of this project, it was learned that MPDC had over a decade of 
homicide incident files stored on-site – additionally, these files had not been entered 




prioritization of other data collection efforts.42  Our project relied on using graduate 
students to collect a wide array of incident data.  However, through my role in 
checking inter-rater reliability, major discrepancies both across individual readers and 
between readers and this author came to light.43  After discovering the depth of the 
problems, the author worked with a team of trained i terns and a full-time staff 
member to revise the dataset with considerably higher reliability.  The final product 
of the collection, which included an examination of numerous trends in homicide, 
demonstrated the usefulness of a longitudinal dataset with considerable incident-
based detail.44 
Subsequently, this author obtained a grant through CJCC as the principal 
investigator for a more ambitious data collection spanning all homicide incidents 
from 1994 through 2004.45  For this effort, the author expanded the variables 
collected from the initial 2005-2007 project based on a review of variables collected 
                                                
42 Previous efforts had been done for meeting the requi ments of the Violent Criminal Apprehension 
Program (ViCAP).  This effort was managed by the F.B.I. with the purpose of linking homicides and 
sexual assaults for investigative purposes.  As such, the database is maintained by the F.B.I. and can be 
queried on individual variables exclusively. 
43 It was later determined that the original coders had limited files to work with, did not keep track of 
who was assigned individual cases, nor received training beyond basic descriptions of how homicide 
case jackets are organized. 
44 As previously noted, no such homicide data existed for MPDC, as reporting to the Supplementary 
Homicide Reports had ceased in 1997.  That said, the collected 2005-2007 data provided far greater 
detail than the SHR could, especially when it came to motive, geographic factors, and victimology 
traits. 
45 The starting point of 1994 was at first a practical m tter, in that the cases from 1990-1993 were in 
boxed storage on-site whereas cases jackets from 1994 onward were on shelves in the Cold Case 
office.  The original intent had been to collect 1994-2004 and then go back to older cases in storage if 
there was time within the grant period.  However, as d ta collection started, this intent proved 
impossible as the number of missing files among early 1990s cases proved to be a large percentage of 
the total.  For example, nearly 13% of all homicide cases from 1994 had missing case jackets.  The 
secondary source for information, a computerized case management system, became functional in 
1995.  This meant that cases prior to 1995 were genrally not logged in the computer system, and any 
missing physical documentation from those cases was effectively lost for purposes of this project.  
Access to data was considerably better moving forward, as from 1995 onward the true missing 
percentage (where a hard copy and computer copy of the documentation was not found) was at most 




in other well-known homicide datasets, particularly those of Chicago and St. Louis, 
and on prior work on the 2005-2007 collection project.  This new dataset included 
variables expanding victim and offender characteristics such as employment, criminal 
histories, last known address, location characteristics, and revised motivational 
factors/descriptions.  Towards the end of the data collection, data from 2005 and 2006 
was revisited to incorporate the new variables included in the 1994-2004 effort.  This 
author did most of the coding for over 3,000 cases, with trained interns46 taking 
random selections of cases and testing for inter-rat r eliability.  The reliability was 
consistently greater than 90% overall, with the limited disagreement centered on the 
free form text portions of the dataset which focused on the details and timeline of 
investigations.  These text-based variables were not used to compile any of the 
variables in this study. 
Data collection relied on multiple sources.  The primary source was the paper 
case jacket stored in the Cold Case office.  Case jackets contained all paper 
documentation produced during an investigation, including victim data, initial crime 
scene reports, running resumes (continuous updates regarding investigative progress 
generally composed by the lead detective), evidence/toxicology reports, interviews, 
and suspect/offender information if available.  Though there was considerable 
variability in terms of organization and specific documentation (for example, 
                                                
46 These interns were trained for a homicide data colle tion project which sought to go forward in time 
(from 2008 onward) independent of my effort to collect backward.  However, these interns had 
additional training on my larger set of variables bfore having them assist in this project.  Incidentally, 
I also trained interns for other data collection efforts, including for one project by the Rand Corp. 
looking at factors impacting cold case solvability (see Davis, Jensen, Burgette, & Burnett, 2014).  For 
both my own training and assisting in training inter s, I am eternally grateful to the Cold Case office 




toxicology reports were uncommon in files before 2001), these case jackets generally 
contained the most detailed information about an incident. 
Another source was the computerized case management system.  This system 
went live in 1995 and most cases from that time forward are logged in with varying 
degrees of documentation.  The system was generally m de up of the running resume 
found in the case jacket, in addition to other important documents such as the main 
incident report and results of interviews.  Rarely did these entries have more 
information overall than the case jacket, yet this computerized system was invaluable 
when the paper case jacket was either missing, incomplete, or unavailable for review. 
Additional information was collected through numerous criminal record 
systems to collect histories on victims and known offenders.  Often case jackets or 
computerized documents would include printouts/information from the Criminal 
Justice Information Services (CJIS) database, Nation l Crime Information Center 
(NCIC), or local DC criminal records (through the Columbo or JUSTIS information 
system); however, when those documents were missing, it would be necessary to 
obtain records from those source databases.  It is pos ible that these records are still 
incomplete regarding the true arrest history of the individuals – as such, any measures 
of criminal histories should be considered conservative estimates. 
The homicide data used in this study spans from 1997 through 2006, with the 
1997 homicides included as a lag variable to predict future homicide (see further 
description in the Variables subsection).  Over this imeframe, there were 2,337 total 
homicides, with 2,311 valid for this analysis.47  Figure 1 provides a representation of 
                                                
47 A case is valid for analysis when it meets two criteria.  First, the case includes substantive data for 




the totals and valid cases by year.  Table 1 shows descriptive proportions for variables 
of general interest across the valid cases by year. Again, since Washington, D.C. did 
not submit data to the SHR during this time period, this table reflects the first 
reporting of such variables.  
Figure 1. Homicide incidents in Washington, D.C. 1997-2006 
 
 
Table 1. Selected Descriptive Variables, Homicide Incidents in Washington, D.C., 
1997-2006 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Valid Incidents 299 257 239 235 224 255 247 191 194 170 
Victimology 
Male 0.87 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.88 0.87 0.90 0.91 0.89 0.91 
Black 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.91 0.93 0.91 0.98 0.93 0.94 
Age (mean) 28.3 30.5 28.9 29.0 29.7 29.0 31.6 29.8 30.1 30.0 
Criminal 
History (y/n) 0.61 0.53 0.60 0.65 0.75 0.71 0.81 0.74 0.66 0.62 
Case 
Characteristics 
Outdoors 0.75 0.72 0.75 0.83 0.79 0.75 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.77 
Handgun 0.77 0.72 0.74 0.77 0.76 0.75 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.76 
Drug Motive 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.08 0.14 
Closure Rate 0.62 0.55 0.53 0.56 0.50 0.55 0.44 0.54 0.52 0.55 
 
                                                                                                                                 
time frame; for example, a homicide where the incident happened in 1994 but was not ruled as a 
homicide until 1997 would not be included, as the incident itself was outside of the time frame.  Cases 





Spatial data in this analysis are from the “Neighbor o dInfo DC” 
collaboration between the Urban Institute and the Washington, D.C. Local Initiatives 
Support Corporation to collect community information from both U.S. Census and 
D.C. data providers.  This dataset has demographic and social welfare variables 
across a wide array of geographic groupings in Washington, D.C.  For the purposes of 
this study, the divisions by census tract are the most relevant.  There are 188 total 
tracts in the District, though only 182 are suitable for analysis.48   
While there are potential pitfalls in using census tracts to approximate 
neighborhoods in criminological research (see Hipp, 2007), the decision to use tracts 
for this analysis is justified in two related ways.  First, there are no formal 
neighborhood divisions and geographic boundaries establi hed by the D.C. Office of 
Planning. 49 While various government outlets acknowledge betwen 120-130 
different neighborhoods in the District, there are no agreed upon demarcations and 
thus no demographic data.  While there are some agencies that track current 
neighborhood change, such as the Washington, D.C. Economic Partnership, no fixed 
boundaries exist in any analysis and most efforts are not retrospective (see WDCEP, 
2014).  
                                                
48 Given the amount of federal land and parks, only 182 census tracts maintain a population over 100 
people. 
49 Additional efforts were made to obtain ACS data at disaggregated level, though this was not 
fruitful for two main reasons: first, no questions ask as to what neighborhood the respondent lives, and 
as such, none of the questions asked would allow for any type of geographic demarcation other than 
the provided census tract or the smaller block group (American Community Survey, 2013); second, 
any such variables would be static in nature rather t an dynamic, and since the level of aggregation 
was at best the census tract, this represented no considerable improvement on the dynamic factors also 




Second, all well-established geographic units used in D.C. city planning (aside 
from census tracts) are large aggregations that hide considerable diversity.  The two 
aggregations closest to representing a “neighborhood” are the neighborhood cluster 
(N=39) and the Police Service Area (N=56)50, whereas all other divisions are even 
larger, such as Advisory Neighborhood Commission (N=37), ward (N=8), and Police 
District (N=7).  As a result, the census tract provides the best approximation of 
neighborhood division and diversity necessary to examine the local impact of 
dynamic change and formal social control over time, though this issue will be 
revisited in the final chapter of this work. 51 
The benefit of this data is the dynamic nature of the variables.  While 
including time-invariant Census measures, the dataset al o includes time-variant 
variables that reflect local planning and resources.  Prior studies have assumed that 
the federal Census variables, though non-dynamic, were the best measures of a 
community.  However, that assumption is an empirical question largely unexplored.  
Even studies that sought to explore dynamic change wer limited to Census measures 
(see Kubrin & Herting, 2005).  The data in this study capture variables important to 
D.C. local government, as planning and resource alloc tion is done on a yearly basis 
corresponding with the budget process.  Such city planning cannot rely on decennial 
                                                
50 Police Services Areas (PSAs) are themselves fluid in that the size, shape, and even count have 
changed over time.  Redistricting, effective January 2012, led to the creation of eleven new PSAs.  
Smaller changes over the past decade have created or collapsed PSAs.  The reason for changes is 
typically to balance workload across and within districts. 
51 As a matter of correlation, the count of census tracts and neighborhoods in the District (182 vs. 120-
130) is considerably more similar than other cities where issues of tracts and neighborhoods have been 
highlighted, such as Chicago (865 vs. 342).  While not a smoking gun, this does suggest that true 





Census figures collected by the national government, and therefore it is possible that 
change over time is best seen in these dynamic factors across neighborhoods. 
The data structure is in a place-year format, meaning that each valid Census 
tract is paired with each year in the data.  This is necessary to capture the dynamic 
nature of many variables in this longitudinal data set.  In this format, the total 




The dependent variable in this analysis is the homicide rate within census 
tracts.  In order to create this variable, the homicides were mapped through a GIS 
(Geographic Information System) by assigning incident location spatial coordinates; 
once mapped, these coordinates were displayed and sp tially joined to another map 
layer, such as census tract.  With the homicide count for each tract determined, the 
rate can be computed.  However, two different denomi ators were used in order to 
account for population changes over the observed time period.  For homicide rates up 
through 2002, the denominator is the 2000 Census population; for homicide rates 
from 2003 onward, the 2005-2009 American Community Survey population estimate 






Independent Variables – Structural 
The communities and crime literature has long found that structural factors are 
significant predictors of crime.  However, few studies have examined dynamic 
structural factors due to limits on data availability and a preference for Census 
variables.  This work considered four time-variant structural factors which are 
important to the local economies, alongside five time-invariant factors taken from the 
2000 Census data, to help determine the predictive power of dynamic structural 
variables.  These relationships to the dependent variable are summarized in Figures 2 
and 3. 
Figure 2. Predicted relationship between dynamic structural variables and homicide 
rate (+ is direct, - as inverse) 
Median borrower 















Figure 3. Predicted relationship between static structural variables and homicide rate 
(+ is direct, - as inverse) 
 
 
 Two variables reflect dynamic residential/housing factors.  First, median 
borrower income (2006 $) captures an average income for those obtaining a home 
loan for each year between 1998 and 2006, with prices standardized in 2006 dollars.  
Increases in this variable would reflect both desirability and potential stability within 
the neighborhood, and thus are predicted to be inversely related to crime.  Second, 
percent subprime loans measures the proportion of housing loans given to high-risk 
borrowers.  Increases in this variable could represent residential instability, as such 
borrowers are at a greater risk of default on loans and are more likely to relocate/be 
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 Dynamic socioeconomic factors are measured through two variables.  Percent 
TANF reports the percentage of the tract population that receives assistance through 
the federally-funded (but locally-administered) Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families program.  Over the time period in this study (1998-2006), the national trend 
saw a steady decrease in recipients such that 2006 counts represented a reduction of 
nearly 50% from the 1998 counts (4.4 million versus 8.3 million, respectively).  The 
average number of recipients across all census tracts in the District during this time, 
however, only saw a sizable drop in average recipients between 1998 and 2000 (313 
versus 248), with values fairly constant since 2000.  The variable in this study 
standardizes the count of TANF recipients by the population in a similar fashion to 
the dependent variable, in the 2000 Census population is used as the denominator for 
all values through 2002 and the 2005-2009 ACS population estimate as the 
denominator for calculations from 2003 onward.  This measure is likely reflective of 
the changes in poverty within an area, such that increases would be predicted to 
contribute to increased crime.  
 The second socioeconomic variable is percent of births to teen mothers.  
Increases in this variable may represent difficulties in both family structure and the 
local economy, and would be predicted to have a direct relationship to any measure of 
crime. 
 The five time-invariant factors taken from 2000 Census data represent 
traditional structural measures found in the communities and crime literature.  These 
variables are included both as controls and as a comparison to the potential predictive 




variant variables, namely residential/housing and socioeconomic considerations.  
Following the guidance first proposed in Land et al. (1990) when examining time-
invariant structural covariates within a regression framework, two measures were by 
creating factor scores for residential/housing and for socioeconomic standing.  The 
benefit of creating factor scores when examining static structural factors and 
homicide rates is that using individual covariates can create model instability due to 
high collinearity across time periods among regressors.52  
 Two variables will contribute to the residential/housing factor score, 
homeowner rate and percent in same home 5 years ago.  High scores should correlate 
to lower levels of crime due to greater residential st bility.  Three variables will 
contribute to the socioeconomic factor score, percent female headed homes with 
children, poverty rate, and percent black.  All are staples in previous communities 
and crime studies, and higher values are linked to higher crime. 
 
Independent Variables – Formal Social Control and Deterrence 
The key explanatory variables in this test of aggreat  deterrence theory and 
formal control are the objective certainty and celerity of punishment.53  These 
variables will be lagged by a year in order to avoid problems of temporal ordering 
found through previous deterrence research.  The relationship to homicide rates is 
summarized in Figure 4.  Certainty is measured by the closure rate within 
neighborhoods from 1997-2005 (as a lagged value with the dependent variable 
                                                
52 This is less likely when using dynamic factors which display both within and between group 
variability.  As seen in the next chapter, no such model instability occurred with the time-variant 
factors, though if it had factor scores could be created for those structural variables as well. 
53 Severity is not examined directly in this study.  Following my measures of celerity and certainty, the 
most thematically consistent measure of severity would likely be sentence length.  Please see Chapter 2 




measured from 1998-2006).  Celerity is measured as the average speed of homicide 
closures within neighborhoods. 54  This value is assessed for the same lagged time 
period as certainty.  Given the potential problems in treating celerity as a continuous 
variable (wide variance and no right censoring for open cases), celerity is measured as 
a dichotomous individual-level measure to indicate whether a case was closed in less 
than 41 days.  Incident-level celerity is given in days, with missing values given to 
cases which were not closed.  However, the range for this measure of celerity is 
greater than 4,600 days.  There is little theoretical guidance on determining what time 
period would be “swift” versus “not swift,” which is unsurprising given the limited 
thought given to celerity in the literature.  It stands to reason, though, that the 
differences among large values is likely small and thus the large range is excessive in 
capturing swiftness of punishment (e.g. once 600 days p sses, it seems likely that 
another 10 days will not have the same impact as the initial 10 days in assessing the 
effect of celerity).  As such, the full rationale for this metric is expounded on as part 
of the descriptive analysis in the following chapter.  These values were aggregated 
and averaged within neighborhoods at each of the tim points, such that the final 
                                                
54 One may ask why this study does not treat celerity/swiftness of closure at the individual level rather 
than the neighborhood level.  First, it is unclear how celerity would work as an individual level effect 
aside from specific deterrence for the individual offender(s).  When considering the general or 
perceptual deterrent of a rapid case investigation and closure, the impact is extending beyond the 
individual and into the community.  Therefore, the examination of an aggregate deterrence is more apt.  
Second, as a measure of formal social control and police impact, the target audience for closing cases 
is greater than the single offender.  When conducting a homicide investigation, police seek both justice 
for the families and to alert the community that murderers will be held accountable for endangering 
other citizens.  Again, the focus here is at a community level, and thus this is a valid level of 




celerity measure was the average proportion of homicide cases closed swiftly as 
opposed to cases either not closed or closed in a period longer than 41 days.55   
Figure 4. Predicted relationship between formal control variables and homicide rate 
(+ is direct, - as inverse) 
 
This measure is an improvement on measuring celerity as ime between arrest 
and adjudication for two reasons: first, punishment does not begin with sentencing, 
especially for cases of homicide in which suspects are often kept in custody from the 
time of arrest through trial due to the seriousness of the crime; and second, the time 
between incident and arrest is a more proximate assssment of the reach of formal 
control within the community as it focuses on the actions of police, whereas the time 
between arrest and sentence is more accurately a measure of case processing speed by 
the courts outside of the community itself.  For both deterrence measures, there will 
be an inverse relationship with homicide rates predict .  As certainty or celerity 
increases, there should be a subsequent decrease in hom cide rates. 
 
                                                
55 Due to the reliance of the celerity measure in part on the certain measure, a correlation matrix was 
run with each variable by year (1997-2006).  The results indicated that same-year measures of certainty 











The controls for this study represent additional potential explanations for the 
homicide rate in a particular neighborhood that may confound or mediate the 
structural or formal control elements.  The general relationships are summarized in 
Figure 5. 
Figure 5. Predicted relationship between control variables and homicide rate (+ is 
direct, - as inverse) 
 
Incident characteristics are often portrayed as driving factors in the national 
drop in homicides following the early 1990s.  Decreas s in both gun homicides 
(Fagan et al., 1998) and in drug-motivated homicides (s e Blumstein & Rosenfeld, 
1998) have been linked to changes in homicide rates.  As such, any potential causal 
mechanism at the community level needs to control for these characteristics.  Percent 
handgun complies the percentage of homicides within the neighborhood where a 

















of homicides in the neighborhood where drugs or elem nts of the drug trade were a 
motivational factor in the homicide. 
The type of closure may play a role in mediating agre ate celerity and are 
thus included as controls.  Percent arrest measures the proportion of the closed cases 
cleared by arrest.  Cases can be closed through administrative means other than arrest; 
for example, if the prime suspect dies during the time of the investigation and there 
would have been sufficient evidence to obtain a warrant if the suspect remained alive, 
the case can be closed administratively.  This factor may impact the aggregate 
deterrence impact within a neighborhood.  D. Black (pg. 3, 1976) noted that an “arrest 
is more law than no arrest” and a smaller percentag of arrest clearances may 
contribute to a smaller deterrent impact. 
 Three additional controls account for additional issues.  Lagged homicide rate 
is included to control for the impact of previous pro ensities of lethal violence within 
neighborhoods.  Year is a set of dummy variables for each year from 1998-2006.  
These variables will be included in the model to identify potential independent time 
effects; in the model, the dummy variables for 1999-2006 will be included with 1998 
left out as the reference category. Population density is calculated using the same 
dual-denominator method as the homicide rate and is included to account for urban 
concentration often correlated with higher rates of crime. 
 
Hypotheses 
The two main questions for this study ask whether 1) structural factors and 2) 




justifications and variables described so far, these questions can be operationalized 
into specific predictions: 
- H1: Structural factors will have a significant relationship with homicide rates, 
all other factors considered.56 
o H1a: Dynamic structural factors will yield better explained variance, 
model fit, and stronger significance than static structural factors. 
- H2: Aggregate deterrence factors will have an inverse, significant relationship 
with homicide rates, all other factors considered. 
Both of the main hypotheses, H1 and H2, are one-tail d predictions since each 
variable is clearly predicted to either have a positive or negative impact on homicide 
rates rather than a general effect.  The subset hypot esis, H1a, will be examined 
through a comparison of fit statistics and results.  This hypothesis is important to 
highlight, as is can give important information on the utility and potential future use 
of dynamic structural factors.  Given the current research generally uses either static 
structural factors or measures of informal social control with limited support and/or 
roots in perception rather than empiricism,57 the potential for dynamic social factors 
                                                
56 Most factors are predicted to have a direct relationship with homicide rates, with the previously 
noted exception of the median borrower income among the dynamic variables and the residential factor 
score among the static variables. See Figures 2 and 3 for specific predicted relationships. 
57 Of course, some from the Chicago School (among others) may object to this characterization in part.  
After all, it was W.I. Thomas who famously said that “if men define situations as real, they are real in 
their consequences.”  However, my point is not to dismiss perceptions entirely, especially given my 
use of deterrence theory and literature to guide my own research.  It is to highlight that some 
conceptions of informal social control, such as collective efficacy, are measured through perception 
data but defined/advertised as mechanisms rooted in observable action.  Yet, momentary perceptions 
are different than action, perceptions are difficult to independently verify, and perceptions may be 
subject to undetected variance within individuals.  Given these potential drawbacks, it seems that not 
all of the oxygen has been sucked from the room of communities and crime by collective efficacy and 
there is still room to explore or even reassess old ground in a new way.  This is where I see dynamic 




to augment future research is significant and needs to be compared to available 
alternatives where possible. 
Method and Analytic Strategy 
The modeling strategy for this study was a zero-inflated Poisson count model.  
The Poisson distribution was selected due to the outcome variable having a nearly 
equal mean and variance, as seen in Table 2.58  Regarding the zero-inflated 
component, there are both statistical and theoretical arguments for selecting that 
model variant.  The purpose of a zero-inflated model is to handle excess zeros by 
predicting zero counts using a logit distribution and predicting non-zero values with a 
























                                                
58 The variance is the standard deviation squared.  In this case, the mean homicide rate was .44 and the 




Table 2: Variable Averages 
 
Citywide (N=1638) 
Mean SD Min Max 
Residential (static) 
Homeowner rate 40.6 23.5 0 100 
% in same home 5 yrs ago 50.4 15.2 1.6 83 
Socioeconomic (static) 
% female-headed homes w/ children 46.2 25.4 0 92 
Poverty rate 21.8 15.5 1.6 90 
% black residents 64.7 36.3 1.4 100 
Residential (dynamic) 
Median borrower income (2006 $, in 
1000s) 89.7 40.4 17.2 316.9 
% subprime loans 9.3 12.1 0 100 
Socioeconomic (dynamic) 
% TANF 9.2 10.1 0 58.9 
% birth to teen mothers 11.4 9.4 0 50 
% Handguns 71.6 37.8 0 100 
% Drug 13.5 27.6 0 100 
% Arrest 42.9 40.1 0 100 
Population (2000 Census) 3142 1353 149 7278 
Population (2005-2009 ACS) 3304 1434 171 7976 
Population Density (1,000 per sq. mi) 15.3 10.7 0.6 56.8 
Homicide Rate (per 1,000) 0.44 0.66 0 6.7 
Formal Control (N=853) 
Clearance Rate 51.7 40.5 0 100 
within 41 days 36.1 43.4 0 100 
 
Given that over 47% of the period-places in the data h ve a zero count in the 
dependent variable, the presence of excess zeros seems clear statistically.  However, 
Long (1997) notes that zero-inflated models are most proper when there is also a 
theoretical backing as to why “certain zeros” (cases where the probability of a zero is 
effectively 1.0) may be part of the overall zero count population.  In this study, 23 of 
the 182 used census tracts had a zero homicide rate ach year from 1997-2006.  With 




“certain zeros” exist in this data whose probability distribution would differ from the 
tracts predicted with a count model. Additional fit tests suggested by Vuong (1989) 
showed that the zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) model was preferred to the standard 
Poisson.  Tests of negative binomial models yielded i ntical results since there was 
no overdispersion in my dependent variable, and therefore the negative binomial 
effectively reverts back to its Poisson lineage (Long, 1997). 
Modeling these certain zeros is a slightly different challenge than simply 
identifying them.  The zero-count model uses a logit PDF, so the asked question 
changes from “what predicts differences among counts?” to “what predicts a zero as 
opposed to a non-zero?”  The goal for the zero-count model is not simply to deal with 
excess zeros, but rather to posit that certain zeros are in some way distinct from non-
zero count outcomes.  In identifying variables for such a model, one has to select 
those which could theoretically predict a zero as a bin ry choice.  Most of my 
independent variables are theorized to predict change long a distribution rather than 
a dichotomous choice, so they are difficult to justify in the zero-count model even if 
they are perfectly acceptable for a full count model.  Scatterplots of the independent 
and dependent variables were examined for any variables with clustering at the zero 
homicide rate value.  Any such variable would arguably be a better predictor of a 
binary zero/non-zero outcome than a variable with a wide distribution.  Lagged 
homicide rate was the main variable that clustered near zero.  Of the 785 total zero 
counts for homicide rate in the period-place data, 550 (70%) had a lagged homicide 
rate of zero.  As a result, lagged homicide rate was the primary predictor for the zero-





 Using longitudinal data from Washington, D.C., dynamic predictors, new 
measures of deterrence/formal control, this study addresses two main questions: 
- Do structural factors influence homicide rates across neighborhoods?   
- Does aggregate deterrence influence homicide rates acro s neighborhoods? 
These questions represent an undiscovered country in the research literature.  This 
research hypothesizes that the dynamic structural factors and aggregate deterrence 
measures will have a significant impact on homicide rat s, all other factors 
considered.  With these previously unexplored datasets, the hope is to build on the 






Chapter 4: Results 
Expect everything and the unexpected never happens. 
- The Phantom Tollbooth 
 
This study’s hypotheses posit that both structural and aggregate deterrence 
factors will significantly impact homicide rate as follows: 
- H1: Structural factors will have a significant relationship with homicide rates, 
all other factors considered. 
o H1a: Dynamic structural factors will yield better explained variance, 
model fit, and stronger significance than static structural factors. 
- H2: Aggregate deterrence factors will have an inverse, significant relationship 
with homicide rates, all other factors considered. 
Additionally, this work presents a test between static, time-invariant structural 
variables and dynamic, time-variant structural variables, with the prediction that 
dynamic variables will provide better predictions of h micide rates across 
neighborhoods over time than static constructs (see H1a).  In order to examine these 
questions, the analysis is presented in two phases.  Fir t, this section reviews a 
descriptive analysis examining the variables citywide and across census tracts.  
Second, the multivariate analysis explains the magnitude and significance of the study 








Table 2 shows the citywide averages of the study’s variables, using census 
tracts as the unit of analysis and structuring the data as a period-place format.  These 
results use the 182 tracts with a population larger than 100 residents, multiplied by 
the number of time periods for an N=1638.  Figure 6 shows all census tracts in 
Washington, D.C.  (N=188) while Figure 7 highlights the six removed tracts in the 
context of the city (N=182).  The areas removed from future analysis represent the 
National Mall, the White House, National Arboretum, and other land used primarily 
by the federal government.59    
                                                
59 While these areas represent about 11% of Washington, D.C. by space at 6.35 square miles combined, 






















The static structural factors suggest that the city faced more residential 
instability and disadvantage as compared to the nation nd urban areas in 2000.60  
While the average homeowner rate in the United States was over 65% and the 
national rate among black adults was near 47%, the D.C. citywide average was just 
over 40% in 2000 (U.S. Census, 2013a).  Poverty rates in the city were nearly double 
the national average (NPC, 2013), and D.C. ranked as the 37th poorest city out of 245 
nationwide with a population over 100,000 (CDF, 2014).  As previously discussed, 
the percentage of black residents is far higher in D.C. both during this time and 
currently as compared to nationally, with D.C. having the 9th highest percentage of 
black residents among cities with greater than 100,000 persons (McKinnon, 2001), 
though it is worth nothing that six of the eight cities with greater black populations 
also had a higher poverty rate.61 Figures 8-12 show the quantiles for each static 
variable as distributed across the city. 62  There is noticeable spatial overlap among 
these variables63 with clear divisions between areas east and west of the river. 
                                                
60 The purpose here is not to draw substantive conclusions about the nature of Washington, D.C., but 
rather to establish a context to better visualize wh re D.C. fits into the snapshot of what was known 
about the nation and urban areas in 2000. 
61 These cities were Gary, IN, Birmingham, AL, Detroit, MI, New Orleans, LA, Atlanta, GA, and 
Jackson, MS. 
62The other two structural variables, as measured, are slightly lower than national averages and similar 
to other urban areas. 



















































Figure 12. Homeowner rate in 2000, Washington, D.C. 
 
The dynamic structural factors were collected specifically for Washington so 
direct national or city-level comparisons are not fully possible; however, some 
comparable data are available to suggest that D.C. may be representative of some 




16 show the trend of yearly averages.  The percentag  of teen births in Washington 
saw a moderate decline over the time period, which is similar to national trends in 
teen birth rates (Hamilton, Martin, & Ventura, 2013). The sharp drop and relative 
stabilization of the percent of residents receiving TANF benefits compares to the 
national trend of a sharp decrease in caseload in the la e 1990s and subsequent 
smaller reductions after 2000 (HHS, 2013).  In terms of dynamic residential factors, 
the patterns in both median borrower income and percent subprime loans for the city 
reflect national trends.  Income increases are not surprising given the boom in 
housing prices as well as improving economic conditions, particularly after 2003.  
According to national estimates, the median home price jumped from $152,200 in 
1998 to $246,500 in 2006, with the single largest prcent increase between 2003 and 
2004 at 13% (U.S. Census, 2013b).  National subprime loan rates also jumped 
dramatically after 2003 in the lead up to the US housing bubble seen in 2006 (Smith 
& Hevener, 2010).  This trend is mirrored in D.C.’s local data, as seen in Figure 16. 
 





























Regarding formal controls, there are two sets of descriptive statistics to 
consider.  Table 3 reports descriptive statistics based on all valid homicide cases 
(N=2,311) to show clearance and time to closure. While t is study focuses on the 
neighborhood level, it was important to explore the individual case level for two key 
reasons.  First, it gives a snapshot of homicide that is easily compared to some 
national trends.  Second, the distribution of celerity was a critical step in computing 
rates at the census tract level.  It would be impossible to glean what may potentially 





Table 3: Formal Control 1997-2006 (N=2,311) 
Proportion Cleared 0.53 0.49 0 1 
Celerity (days, of those closed) 268 533 0 4690 
within 2 days 0.21 0.4 0 1 
within 7 days 0.28 0.45 0 1 
within 11 days 0.33 0.47 0 1 
within 14 days 0.36 0.47 0 1 
within 30 days 0.45 0.49 0 1 
within 41 days 0.5 0.49 0 1 
within 60 days 0.55 0.5 0 1 
 
These variables represent two key components of deterrence theory – whether 
a case is closed or not reflects the certainty of punishment, while the speed of closure 
represents the celerity or swiftness of punishment.  Approximately 53% of all cases 
from 1997-2006 were closed.64  According to the UCR, on average 65% of homicides 
nationwide and 58% of homicides among cities with comparable population as 
Washington, D.C. were cleared during this time.  Though there are some potential 
definitional issues regarding the FBI clearance calcul tion (see Chapter 3), the FBI 
numbers could only overestimate the clearance rate.  This fact suggests that D.C. was 
likely comparable with the time period.   
                                                
64This is accurate as of July 2011.  Since I use a computation of yearly clearance rate, this percentage 
increases over time as cold cases are solved.  However, the rate at which cold cases are solved is 
marginal for these purposes.  From July 2011 through November 2013, only eight cases from the 1997-
2006 frame have been closed.  Additionally, any closures would have no impact on the celerity 
function given all cases had the opportunity to be closed “swiftly” in the years between the incident 




Figure 17. Distribution of time to clearance in closed homicide cases, Washington, 
D.C. 1998-2006 (N=1,221) 
 
 
The average time to closure was highly impacted by large outliers, as seen in 
Figure 17.  The celerity measure has a heavy positive skew with the mean (268 days) 
more than six times greater than the median (41 days).  In fact, when divided into 
quartiles, the 75th percentile mark (274 days) is marginally higher than the mean.  
Table 3 shows that over 20% of cases were solved within 2 days.  Table 2 has the 
formal control variable means from the period-place dataset.65  These are the average 
expected values within each period-place and are similar to the values in Table 3, 
                                                
65 N=853, indicating the period-places where there was at least one homicide and thus could have a 
valid clearance rate.  For purposes of descriptive analysis, this gives the best snapshot as to how the 
period-places conform to the typical citywide measure .  However, the values associated with the 
remaining 785 period-places are not “missing” in the ruest sense and are not treated as missing further 
in my analysis.  The role of deterrence and some homicide-based controls (percent handgun, percent 
drug, percent arrest) are accurately reflected as “zero” value even if justifiably missing.  For example, 
the lack of any clearances or swift clearances doesn t provide the protective deterrent effect nor 
establish a control to prevent crime, thus there is no opportunity to form a bond that would dissuade 
future increases in homicide.  Of course, it is an empirical question as to the strength of that process 
and whether it is superseded by other variables – while having no homicide prevents police from 
establishing additional deterrence through case closure, the protective power of positive socioeconomic 
factors or the lack of homicides themselves may reduc  the predicted homicide rate far more than lack 
of opportunity to establish formal controls can increase the prediction.  Without giving too many 




though the values in Table 2 reflect an aggregated rate for each tract per year. The 
average clearance rate for each period-place was nearly 52%, while the average 
percent of cases closed within 41 days in each period-place was about 36%.  Data on 
three homicide-based control variables, percent handgu , percent drug motive, and 
percent arrest, are generally similar across period-place when compared to descriptive 
results using the homicide incident as the unit of analysis. Over 70% of cases 
involved a handgun and on average less than 14% of homicides were drug-related in 
each period-place.  The percent arrest variable is about 10% lower than aggregated 
celerity, which indicates that while most homicide closures were achieved through 
arrest, there is still a sizable minority that were closed through exceptional means.  
 
Population 
Two measures of population were used to reflect the increasing migration to 
Washington, D.C. that started during this time period.  The first population variable 
came from the 2000 Census and computations of all rates up to 2002 use this as the 
denominator.  The second population variable came from the 2005-2009 ASC survey 
and computations of all rates from 2003 onward use this as the denominator.  The 
average census tract population increased by over 5% between the two measures, 
though the tracts at the high and low end tended to see more growth as evidenced by 
the minimum and maximum values – the minimum tract size increased over 14% 
while the maximum tract size increased over 9%.  From these measures and tract size 
information, population density is calculated.  Table 2 shows the average population 




about 15,300 residents per square mile, with a low of only 600 residents per square 
mile and a high of 56,800 residents per square mile. 
 Looking at the population density tables from the 2000 Census provides some 
context for Washington’s density (U.S. Census, 2013c).  With over 15,000/sq. mi., 
D.C. would rank in the top 25 cities in the United States.  Tracts with the lowest 
density in D.C. are comparable to the overall population density of Chesapeake, VA 
(585 / sq. mi.) and the highest tract is comparable to the overall density of Union 
City, NJ (52,980 / sq. mi.).  To further emphasize th  divide between urban areas and 
the rest of the nation, Manhattan had a population density of over 66,000 residents per 
square mile, while the United States overall had a density of less than 80 and five 




Homicide rate is calculated per 1,000 residents.  Of course, this value can be 
easily transformed to the more common “per 100,000” expression and this is useful 
when looking at the city as a whole.  During this time period, Washington, D.C. had 
an average homicide rate of about 44 per 100,000 residents.  Figure 18 shows the 
average homicide rate mapped per census tract whileFigure 19 shows the yearly 
average citywide.  As noted in a previous section, this is more than double the recent 
homicide rates in the city.  Such rates are often computed per 100,000 residents, 
though typically one looks at homicide rates between larger populations such as 
cities.  Since the unit of analysis for this study is smaller than a city, as the average 




a better practical and theoretical consistency in keeping the rate linked to the general 
scale of the population examined in the study.66  As no tract will ever approach the 
scale of 100,000 residents, and most are firmly within he thousands, using the larger 
rate calculation can greatly exaggerate perceptions on the high end.67   
                                                
66 Beyond interpretation of descriptive data, the calcul tion of homicide rate per 1,000 has a practical 
impact on multivariate model selection.  As seen in Table 2, the variance is nearly equal to the mean.   
Count data with equi-dispersion are best modeled with a Poisson or zero-inflated Poisson (Long, 
1997).  If all rates are transformed into “per 100,000”, then the variance becomes far larger than the 
mean.  When there is over-dispersion, Poisson distributions are not as well positioned for the data and
a negative binominal model may prove superior.  In light of this, I did this transformation of homicide 
rate as a sensitivity analysis using negative binomal model variants to replicate this study’s findigs.  
Relative coefficient magnitudes were not meaningfully changed and in all examined cases statistical 
significance was not impacted. 
67 For example, Tract 93.02(near the Brentwood neighborhood, along the north side of Rhode Island 
Avenue in NE D.C.) during 2002 had an average homicide rate of 3.8 per 1,000 residents, or 
transformed 380 per 100,000.  While a violent area, the “per 100,000” rate is simply an unsustainable 
number on its face and strains credibility when applied to such a small geographic space.   There seem 
little reason to believe that if the tract ever reached 100,000 people (and for argument’s sake, expanded 
accordingly to maintain constant population density), the homicide rate would be that extreme.  The 
differences in scale are simply too great to make the larger rate meaningful beyond a general warning 
rather than a useable expectation.  However, it is realistic to expect 3.8 homicides per 1,000 residents 
given Tract 93.02s population is about 1300 and there would be between 1 and 5 homicides per year 





















Before model selection, two potential issues of autocorrelation in the data 
were examined.  First, a correlation matrix was run on the independent variables to 
assess possible sources of multicollinearity.  Correlations were uniformly below .60 
and mostly below .30, with the exception of three dynamic factors (median borrower 
income, percent TANF, and percent teen births) in relation to the static 
socioeconomic factor.  The correlations with the static factor were -.69, .81, and .73, 
respectively.  Since these dynamic factors would ony share a single model with the 
static-based factor, the scope of collinear impact would be limited and did not require 
removal of variables from the analysis.  As a precaution, during the single model 
where dynamic and static-based variables coexisted (Mo el 7 in Table 4), said model 




one with the socioeconomic static factor removed.  Removal of variables did not 
impact the significance of any covariates left in the model or the standard errors of 
the covariates in a meaningful way.   
 
Spatial Autocorrelation 
Spatial autocorrelation is a concern whenever using geographic-rooted data.  
Moran’s I test assesses the magnitude and significace of clustering for an outcome 
variable mapped in space.  The process assigns each g ographic space (in this case, a 
census tract) a value based on the differential from the global mean of a variable 
(homicide rate); then, the test measures the similarity of values from other spaces 
within a fixed radius (Boba, 2010).  The results indicate both statistical significance 
and magnitude similarly to a correlation coefficient.  The magnitude is expressed as a 
range from -1 (dispersed) to +1 (clustered).  The spatial autocorrelation was tested 
both as an overall measure using the full sample and a year-by-year measure.  Given 
the longitudinal nature of the data, it was useful to determine if certain years may 
prove significantly more autocorrelated than others.  The presence of high-magnitude, 
statistically significant autocorrelation may necessitate corrective variables and/or 
additional modeling strategies (Dormann et al., 2007).  For this study, the results of 
Moran’s I found significant but low-magnitude autocorrelation.  The full sample 
measure produced the highest magnitude with +.26, while the yearly tests yielded 
magnitudes between +.10 and +.20 depending on the year.  As interpreted, the results 
suggest a degree of clustering is present, though it is not highly localized in space. 
Figure 18 shows the average homicide rate by quantiles.  While there is clear division 




specific tract or two.  These results were consistent using multiple search radius 
values.  As a result of such weak magnitudes, it is not consistent with general practice 
to add corrective terms to the multivariate model (Dormann et al., 2007).68 
 
Celerity 
The final pre-modeling issue was that of celerity.  However, there is no true 
empirical guidance as to what a “quick” closure would be that represents this 
diminishing return point.  Therefore, the justification for determining a celerity metric 
depends on a number of indirect factors.  First, the homicide literature explores the 
issue of dunkers (cases requiring little to no investigation) and whodunits (cases were 
law enforcement must put pieces together and investigate) – this division is often 
made at 2 days, where more than 2 days reflects an investigative case (Puckett & 
Lundman, 2003).  This was an initial guide, though there are additional reasons to 
believe that a proper celerity marker is later in time.   
Further examination of this time variable was in part adapted from the work of 
Regoeczi, Jarvis, & Riedel (2008), who examined time to closure as a survival 
function with divisions at 2, 7, 14, and 30 days.  It should be noted that using 1998 
NIBRS data, Regoeczi et al. found a far quicker decay function than would be seen in 
Washington, D.C. from 1997-2006 as their median fell within 2-7 days as opposed to 
41 days.  As a guide, this work suggests that a tipping point in the survival curve may 
be the point of diminishing returns. 
                                                
68 I did compute a yearly difference from the mean homicide rate for each period-place as a corrective 
term based on the computation of the Moran’s I test.  The variable was moderately correlated with 
lagged homicide rate and the socioeconomic variables ( oth dynamic and static).  When added to 




Figure 20. Time to closure (in days) by survival rate (percentage), Washington, D.C. 
1998-2006 
 
Figure 20 presents a survival function for time to closure across individual 
cases (N=1,221), similar to that seen in Regoeczi et al.  Examining the blocks of days 
needed to account for 10% change in cases, the number of days increases quickly for 
further 10% reductions up to about 41 days (50%).  While there is no plateau in the 
technical sense, there is a clear shallower slope of the survival function.  This finding 
suggested that my pivot point for the celerity measure may be around the 41 day 
mark.  So while following the general process as in Regoeczi et al., the specific value 
of the tipping point was vastly different.  Herein lays an inherent difficulty in 
attempting to use the data itself to determine the metric rather than a theoretical basis, 
though without a theoretical basis this iterative process is the only option.  If nothing 
else, this situation shows just how nascent the resarch into celerity as little is even 
known from a descriptive perspective, let alone an explanatory factor. 
An additional consideration is that over time, police resources will likely 




can dry up, focus can reduce as new cases occur, and witnesses can turn into dead 
ends.  During the 1998-2006 time period, MPDC instituted periodic reviews at fixed 
intervals up to 60 days.  Beyond that period, reviews were more sporadic if the case 
remained open.  Given this information, the suggestion is that the immediate flurry of 
resources and attention may likely drop off after 60 days.   
As a result, the potential range for celerity appears to be anywhere between 2 
and 60 days with little formal guidance as to where the diminishing return point is 
beyond a tipping point in a survival function.  The purpose here is to find a 
dichotomous measure for celerity.  While it may be possible that celerity may be a 
linear or step function on an individual level, so far the research suggests the 
aggregate level may have a tipping point, though the value of this point may be data-
dependent.  However, this point speaks to why celerity may be better imagined as a 
binary function even from a theoretical viewpoint – even if a linear or step function 
exists, it likely only exists to a point until any further time does not impact the 
outcome calculus.  Since celerity can be a continuous function, and in this data the 
range is from 0 to over 4,000 days, it seems difficult to imagine that any function is 
constant during the period.  In the context of lacking any theoretical guidance, the 
most conservative approach appears to be finding the tipping point dichotomously 
rather than attempting to model an understudied variable.  Of course, as celerity is 
explored in greater detail in the literature, it will be more informative to advance at 
that time to modeling celerity as a continuous function. 
Looking at Figure 20 and celerity measures seen in Table 3, a number of days 




function and model fit within multivariate models.  From the survival function, the 41 
day mark (which was also the median) seemed the best fit.  Along with additional 
time before and after 41 days (e.g. 39, 40, 42, 43 days), each were used as the celerity 
measure into Model 5 in Table 4.  The model log-likelihood was the lowest at 41 
days, with the fit statistics generally declining before and then increasing in 
magnitude following 41 days.  Given these findings, 41 days was used as the celerity 
measure in this study.69 
 
Model Results 
Table 4 presents the results from multiple models.  Models 1 and 2 assess the 
static-based factors, with and without control variables.  Models 3 and 4 use only 
dynamic structural variables, again with and without control variables.  Models 5 and 
6 continue the pattern but with formal control/deterrence measures.  Model 7 is the 
combined model with all independent variables.  Theco fficients presented are from 
the count models and zero-only models70, though R-squared and log-likelihood 
measures represent values for the combined model as a whole. The total N is slightly 
lower in models using dynamic variables due to the removal of 42 period-places 
                                                
69 The decision here is somewhat moot for the purposes f the larger model, as none of the celerity 
measures were statistically significant even in the deterrence standalone model.  However, it is still a 
useful exercise especially in comparison to the work of Recogczi et al.  Their NIBRS data showed far 
quicker times to closure than D.C. did during a partial overlapping time period.  It begs the question as 
to whether there is an absolute, objective measure of c lerity or rather it can/should vary between 
smaller urban areas (as seen in NIBRS) and large urban cities.  This question is picked up again in the 
following chapter. 
70 The count models are the focus of the hypotheses, as they predict a more continuous change rather 
than a binary outcome.  As a result, the primary vaiable in the zero-count model was lagged homicide 
rate.  As seen in Table 3, that variable proved to have a significant, negative impact on homicide rat
that was very consistent across all models.  As a sensitivity test variables from the count model in the
zero-only model as well (i.e. Model 1 would have both factor scores in the count and zero models 
simultaneously) to see if the results were impacted.  Most coefficients were insignificant in the zero-
count model, and the few cases of significance were marginal (p<.10, one-tailed), never robust across 




Table 4: Regression Results 
b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE
Static Residential factor .139** (.039) .064 (.047) .048 (.048)
Socioeconomic factor .833** (.073) .417** (.086) .017 (.105)
Dynamic Median borrower income -.007** (.001) -.003* (.002) -.002 (.002)
% subprime loans .019** (.004) .016** (.005) .015** (.005)
% subprime loans (squared) -.001* (.001) -.001* (.001) -.001* (.001)
% TANF .035** (.003) .022** (.003) .023** (.006)
% birth to teen mothers .025** (.005) .014** (.005) .013** (.004)
Formal Control Lagged Certainty .005** (.001) .001 (.001) .001 (.002)
Lagged Celerity (within 41 days) .001 (.001) -.001 (.001) -.001 (.002)
Model Controls % Handguns .011** (.001) .011** (.001) .014** (.001) .011** (.001)
% Drug .001 (.001) .002** (.001) .002 (.002) .002** (.001)
% Arrest .006** (.001) .005** (.001) .007** (.001) .005** (.001)
Population Density -.009* (.005) -.007* (.004) -.013** (.004) -.006 (.008)
Lagged Homicide Rate .164** (.044) .137** (.045) .264** (.045) .141** (.046)
Y1999 -.119 (.107) -.088 (.103) -.098 (.104) -.084 (.106)
Y2000 -.225* (.116) -.059 (.117) -.196* (.109) -.057 (.121)
Y2001 -.043 (.113) .033 (.119) -.095 (.108) .030 (.127)
Y2002 -.001 (.011) .178 (.142) .002 (.101) .171 (.159)
Y2003 -.004 (.011) .208* (.119) -.003 (.122) .207 (.135)
Y2004 -.325** (.130) -.161 (.124) -.298** (.127) -.167 (.133)
Y2005 -.303** (.149) -.134 (.157) -.245* (.144) -.141 (.185)
Y2006 -.369** (.133) -.259** (.127) -.309** (.139) -.269* (.141)
Constant -1.134** (.068) -1.651** (.143) -1.237** (.142) -1.993** (.206) .966** (.113) -1.708** (.141) -2.023** (.208)
Zero-Count Lagged Homicide Rate -1.444** (.476) -1.260** (.431) -1.453** (.560) -1.317** (.646) -1.450** (.503) -1.487** (.706) -1.416** (.694)
Constant -.251** (.024) -.243** (.018) -.253** (.021) -.245** (.016) -.027** (.007) -.239** (.017) -.249** (.017)
Pseudo R-squared Pseudo R-squared .131 .218 .152 .226 .023 .198 .227
LL LL -1196.973 -1077.68 -1130.627 -1031.373 -1345.603 -1105.121 -1030.704
* p < .05, one-tailed
** p  < .05, two-tailed




where median borrower income data were missing.  Robust standard errors are 
reported. 
Examining the totality of the models, the dynamic structural variables were 
the best predictors of the non-zero count of homicide rate.  Most dynamic variables 
were highly significant and in the predicted directional relationship with homicide 
rate across the model variations.  Only median borrowe  income saw a fade in 
significance as additional variables were included in later models, though its 
predicted direction remained constant.  The static-based factor scores had weaker 
effects as other predictors were added, though the socioeconomic factor was strong in 
Models 1 and 2.71  The formal control models were clearly the weakest, pecially 
when looking at the fit statistics.  The certainty variable was significant only in the 
initial model and became insignificant once additional controls were included.  
Interestingly, most of the deterrence coefficients were in the opposite direction as 
predicted, though not much can be interpreted given th  statistical insignificance.  
The model controls tended to be significant and in the predicted direction, with the 
exception of population density having an inverse relationship with homicide rates.  
The most robust dummy variable years are the last three.  As 1998 is the reference 
year, and also the peak of yearly homicide counts in he data, it is not surprising that 
the dramatic count decrease coupled with population increases would explain 
significant variation while controlling for other factors. 
                                                
71 The large drop off in magnitude and significance in Model 7 is partially a product of the collinearity 
with some dynamic structural variables.  I ran Model 7 without those dynamic variables and the 
socioeconomic factor was stronger and significant (p<.05, one-tailed), but the resulting log-likelihood 
was poorer than seen in Model 4, suggesting that a model missing the dynamic factors was a less ideal 




Model 7 had the best fit statistics though only slightly superior to Model 4.  
Given that the static-based factor scores and formal control variables were 
insignificant, what remained nested in Model 7 was Model 4.  The models with 
dynamic structural factors (3 and 4) yielded better fi  statistics than the comparison 
models with either static or deterrence predictors.  The controls tended to contribute a 
good deal to model fit, though less than the structural factors, as evidenced by boosts 
seen in each model where controls were included.  The contribution to pseudo R-
squared was not limited to a single control, such as lagged homicide rate.  When 
individual significant controls were dropped from the model to assess impact on 
pseudo R-squared, none produced a disproportionate drop as compared to the others. 
Regarding interpretation, there are some differences between the static factor 
scores and the dynamic, continuous measures.  The static factor scores are 
standardized and zero-centered, so as a result the regr ssion coefficients represent the 
change in the dependent variable (homicide rate) per a standard deviation increase in 
the factor score.  While the magnitudes of the factor scores (which combine either 
two or three high-loading static variables each) are initially higher than the dynamic 
factors, they drop precipitously across models as other variables are included 
suggesting an indirect effect of these latent constructs at best.  Given this diminishing 
return on the factor scores, this work puts a greate  emphasis on the stable and 
statistically significant coefficients. 
By interpreting odds ratios computed from the signif cant logits in Model 7, 
quantifiable results are possible.  Starting with the significant dynamic variables, 




descriptive analysis.  However, Figure 16 shows a distinct non-linear curve for 
percent of subprime loans.   As a result, this variable was modeled as a quadratic 
function.72  For a standard deviation increase in percent of subprime loans, the 
homicide rate increases by 1.5%, holding all other variables constant.73 This 
represents the linear component of the curve.  However, the significant negative 
quadratic terms suggests that the positive linear subprime relationship is concave over 
time.  Considering both variables, the overall increase is marginally less than just the 
linear factor would indicate, suggesting a decrease over time consistent with much of 
the trend seen in Figure 16.  
Two other dynamic variables, percent TANF and percent births to teen 
mothers, had a direct positive relationship with homicide rate.  For a 10% increase in 
either variable, the homicide rate increases by 23%and 13%, respectively, holding all 
else constant.74 
Among the lagged control variables, the strongest predictor of homicide rates 
was the previous year’s rate.  As the lagged rate increased by 1 homicide per 1,000 
residents, the homicide rate increased by 15% while ho ding other variables at the 
mean.  In the zero-count model, the lagged homicide rate had the opposite 
relationship – for a 1 unit increase in the lagged rate, the probability of the homicide 
rate being zero decreased by over 76%.  As the percent of homicides by handgun 
                                                
72 A cubic function was also considered based on the nature of the curve in Figure 16.  However, the 
cubic term was insignificant and did not impact the magnitude and significance of the linear and 
quadratic, so it was omitted from the analysis. 
73 The standard deviation is used because the variable was centered at zero through subtracting the 
mean from each value.  Centering was done when adding the quadratic term to prevent 
multicollinearity between the two subprime variables. 
74 The odds ratio for percent TANF is 1.023 and for pe cent birth to teen mothers is 1.013.  Since both 
variables are captured as percentages, a 1 unit change reflects 1%.  The interpretation of a 1% increase 
linked to a 2.3% or 1.3% rise in homicide rate can be extended to a more practical result by 




increased by 10%, the homicide rate increased 11% holding all other variables 
constant.  For a 10% rise in drug-motivated homicides, the homicide rate will 
increase by only 2% once other factors are controlled.  Contrary to expectations, 
arrest rate and homicide rate were positively related as a 10% increase in arrests 
yielded a 5% increase in homicide rate, all else constant. 
 
In summation, the results found support for two of the three hypotheses in this 
study.  Given the three predictions: 
- H1: Structural factors will have a significant relationship with homicide rates, 
all other factors considered. 
o H1a: Dynamic structural factors will yield better explained variance, 
model fit, and stronger significance than static structural factors. 
- H2: Aggregate deterrence factors will have an inverse, significant relationship 
with homicide rates, all other factors considered. 
Hypothesis H1 was generally supported across most structural variables.  Some 
individual variables, such as the static residential factor and the dynamic median 
borrower income, were insignificant in fuller models.  However, the other dynamic 
factors tended to be robustly significant across model specification.  As for H1a, this 
prediction was supported through the comparison of Model 1 to 3 and 2 to 4 where 
the dynamic factors produced better pseudo R-squared values, fit statistics, and more 
consistent significance – the later is also seen in the final Model 7.  Hypothesis H2 




factors were included.75  Additionally, the aggregate deterrence measures did not 
follow the prediction model in that certainly was directly related to homicide rate.  
The following section will attempt to explain these findings and suggest the 
implications and future directions for research considering the quantitative results.
                                                
75 While this may suggest the potential that deterrence has an indirect effect on homicide rates, this 
seems less likely given the overwhelmingly insignificant and low magnitude coefficients.  The reasons 





Chapter 5:  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 
“It is an old maxim of mine that when you have excluded the impossible, whatever 
remains, however improbable, must be the truth.” 
- Sherlock Holmes 
The results provide a glimpse into an undiscovered country that both support 
previous research while also revealing outcomes not predicted by theory.  When 
travelling within unexplored places, it is important to explain why the journey may 
have unfolded as it did, assess the ramifications of the trek, note the limits and 
suggest future paths to explore.  This final chapter will review potential explanations 
for the results, consider the theoretical and policy implications of the findings, mark 
the limitations and suggest future research based on both the results and limits of the 
current study. 
Potential Explanations 
This work examined the impact of structural factors and deterrence factors on 
homicide rates within census tracts.  Given the partial support for the two structural-
based hypotheses and lack of support for the deterrence hypothesis, the potential 
explanation of the former are well-covered in the lit rature review; conversely, the 
explanation for deterrence require considerably more discussion as the results 
deviated from theoretical predictions. 
 
Structural 
Structural results were consistent with predictions that such variables would 




was consistent with hypotheses.  Though not all variables were significant within all 
models, the directionality was as hypothesized and it is apparent structural factors 
were key predictors of homicide rate-based on statistical significance and model fit.  
Socioeconomic factors tended to be significant while the residential heterogeneity 
variables were less robust.  This is generally consistent with the findings in Hipp 
(2007) were economic variables had a more localized impact at smaller aggregations 
like tract and block while heterogeneity factors required larger geographic units to 
detect a significant effect.  The potential advantage of dynamic structural variables 
over static ones had been suggested previously (see Sampson et al., 2002), but that 
these findings were consistent with those untested pr ictions is an important 
empirical glimpse into unexplored ground.   
 
Deterrence 
The results for deterrence are more puzzling, at least from a theoretical point 
of view.  While predicted in the hypotheses as having an inverse, significant 
relationship to homicide rates, the certainly and celerity variables were insignificant 
when controlling for other factors.  While the direction of the certainty variable was 
also opposite to predictions, it is difficult to divine much meaning from such weak 
and generally insignificant findings.  As a result, on the focus for explanations goes 
towards the weakness in general rather than the counter-directionality of a mostly 
insignificant variable contributing next to nothing in explained variance.  Initial 
speculation as to why deterrence/formal social control variables preformed so tepidly 




- Deterrence doesn’t work76 
- Deterrence doesn’t work, for these data 
- Measuring formal social controls doesn’t work 
- Measuring formal social controls doesn’t work, for these data 
 
Explanation #1 
The first explanation is that deterrence is simply not a viable theory at the 
aggregate level.  This is the easiest and certainly most parsimonious rationalization.  
Such a conclusion would not be alone within the resarch literature, as Tonry (2008) 
detailed.  Even reviews by Nagin (1998) and Paternoster (2010) note that even when 
evidence for deterrence exists, it is not particularly strong.  However, the hypothesis 
in this work was rooted in deterrence-based police strategies at the aggregate level, 
such as hot spots or pulling levers, which have produced some successes using 
targeted, high-profile enforcement.  The current study’s findings do not negate prior 
policing works, but then this study also did not examine hot spot policing, which 
leads in part to the second possible explanation. 
 
Explanation #2 
The second explanation is that aggregate deterrence may not work for this 
time, place, and/or crime.  In other words, deterrence may function in a limited 
context but it is not a complete general theory of criminal activity.  Under this 
                                                
76 This phrasing is a reference to the numerous studies of “what works, doesn’t work, and is 
promising” in criminal justice noted by Sherman et al. (1997), which itself was inspired by the 
phrasing of Martinson’s (1974) influential piece on corrections.  Given the findings of this study show 
nothing that either worked or was directly promising regarding deterrence, all explanations will be 




explanation, the lack of results stem from the data representing an anomaly for an 
otherwise functioning deterrence theory.  Regarding time and place, there is no 
theoretical reason to believe that deterrence princi les would be suspended from 
1998-2006 in Washington, D.C.  There is nothing so remarkable about the turn of the 
21st century or this American city to suggest that deterr nce-based prediction should 
not apply.   
As for the issue of crime, the applicability of deterrence for homicide could be 
challenged on two fronts, though neither seems to fully pan out: first, that homicide is 
too rare an event to provoke a deterrent effect; or second, that homicide is a unique 
crime which is cannot be deterred.  Toward the former, it is worth noting that nearly 
half of the period-places had zero homicides which further stress the rarity.  However, 
being a rare event does not negate the high social imp ct of homicide.  Beccaria 
(1983[1764]) noted the importance of people knowing the law and punishments for 
maximum potential deterrence, and homicide is clearly one crime where there can be 
an expectation of wide knowledge regarding legality and potential sanction.  Even if 
offenders are unsure of punishments for other crimes (s e Paternoster, 2010) it seems 
a fair assumption that the potential sanction for ending another person’s life is more 
universally grasped (see also Gibbs, 1968; Tittle, 1969 regarding the impact of 
severity on homicide).  So while an uncommon event, homicide has a social 
weighting that suggests it may be one of the theoretically ideal crimes to test for 
deterrent effects since the possible severe punishment is not unexpected.   
Toward the later, it can be suggested that homicide is a crime type unable to 




Miethe, 1999) could support an argument where homicide is a particular outcome of 
spur of the moment behavior which is independent of potential consequences. Of 
course, this argument could easily be generalized to all criminal activity and some 
notable theories suggest that crime itself reflects impulsive action in favor of 
prospective short-term gains in lieu of long-term punishment (see Gottfredson & 
Hirschi, 1990).  Such theories actually dovetail wel ith deterrence because of 
shared assumptions regarding human nature and since finding ways to remove pains 
and elucidate punishments falls squarely into the realm of Beccaria and Bentham’s 
work.  
Yet, the issue at hand is not whether an assumed impulsive act can be deterred 
in theory, but whether there is a reason why if deterr nce works then homicide would 
be exempt.  It is worth noting that two of the initial deterrence revival studies from 
the 1960s, Gibbs (1968) and Tittle (1969) both showed homicide as the only major 
crime impacted by severity.  While this current work did not examine the implication 
of severity for reasons mentioned earlier, and revival studies used limited aggregate 
measures, it is interesting that the literature suggests that if there is a “homicide 
exemption” for deterrence, it may be that homicide provides better prospects of 
finding a deterrent effect rather than homicide being unable to be deterred. 
Still, if homicide is an exception, then there should be other tacit evidence 
showing how homicide trends diverge from other crime.  Examining UCR data from 
1960-2012, there is a strong, positive correlation (r=.65) between violent crime rates 
and homicide rates; this correlation is considerably stronger (r=.98) when looking 




other crime77, it would certainly undercut the suggestion homicide is impacted 
differently by theory than other crimes.  Additionally, other findings in this study 
suggest that varying homicide rates are impacted by structural factors, guns, and 
drugs just as would be predicted for other types of crime.  It seems unlikely that null 
findings for deterrence are simply due to the selection of homicide itself given the 
other rejected null hypotheses. 
 
Explanation #3 
The third explanation is that measuring formal social ontrols does not work 
due to structural limitations within the criminal justice system itself.  In other words, 
our system may not be well equipped to promptly associate the event with the 
punishment even if the theory, in principle, could work on human beings (Paternoster, 
2010). Therefore, any measurements of formal deterrence are canceled out by the 
inability of the criminal justice system to meet the necessary condition of allowing 
such formal deterrence to be possible.  Deterrence relies on a classical assumption of 
rationality, but the police process of gathering evid nce within a legal framework 
alters the discount rate for both specific and general deterrence since any formal 
punishment is not immediate to the classically-motivated offender.78  If this 
explanation is true, then it is no surprise that deterr nce measures find no significant 
results, as formal aggregate deterrence is effectively negated by the criminal justice 
system itself.  However, to the extent that this is not baked into the cake as an 
                                                
77 Taking the correlations for homicide rate and disaggregated violent crimes, as well as property 
crimes, found consistent results as found between violent crime overall and homicide. 
78 As Paternoster (2010) noted, this is not to say police should abandon process as a policy, but rather 
that the criminal justice system has additional goals (legality, fairness, burden of proof) which can and 




unavoidable consequence of a formal, bureaucratic justice system, there were 
homicide cases where the swiftness is effectively instant.  If deterrence would be 
otherwise viable beyond the constraints of the justice system, there should be some 
significant impact, even if small, among these insta t clearances.  When examining a 
subset of cases with zero days to closure, no significa t deterrent effect was found.79  
This suggests that the reasons behind null results for deterrence may be larger than 
simply the criminal justice system being ill-equipped to leverage human rationality, 
though not so large to be universal as there have been successes in formal aggregate 
deterrence within policing. 
 
Explanation #4 
This leads to the fourth explanation, which is that while deterrence may work, 
the measures themselves are faulty within the study.  For example, this work uses a 
one-year lag for both celerity and certainty.  There a e solid theoretical reasons for 
having a lag in measuring deterrence, as detailed in the experiential effect literature 
(see Saltzman et al., 1982). The year lag is consistent with the use of other lagged 
variables (such as lagged homicide rate) in the literature and is a constraint of having 
other study variables captured on a yearly basis.  That said, it may be possible the null 
results are due to a one year lag being too long, as a deterrent should have maximum 
impact the closer in time it is to the potential for new offending.  While it would be 
difficult to accurately assess a shorter lag, given other structural variables are 
                                                
79 It could be argued that even these cases do not reflect “instant” formal sanction, as a few minutes or 
hours may pass between the incident and the clearance. Still, such a time period reflects the quickest 
range where any sanctions, whether formal or informal, are likely to occur and it reasons there should 
be at least a probabilistic impact of short time spans since deterrence theory is fundamentally non-




measured yearly and due to a likely increase of zeroes in my dependent variable, as a 
separate sensitivity analysis I tested a non-lagged pair of deterrence variables to see 
whether a known faulty and biased measure could yiea positive result.  If 
concurrent measures showed significance while the lagged were insignificant, it may 
be possible there is a pivot point of time between co current (which is known to be a 
bad measure) and one year, even if it could not be tapped into during this study.  
However, the non-lagged deterrence variables were also non-significant in the 
complete model and altered no other covariates.  Therefore, it seems unlikely that any 
other lags would uncover a functioning deterrent impact.  
Conversely, the one year lag may be incorrect because it is too short.  Such a 
finding would strike at the core of deterrence theory, given the crucial belief in swift 
punishment, and with research which seeks to minimize lag under the assumption that 
a more proximate event/measure will have greater impact than the same 
event/measure from further back in time.  Potential mechanisms for a longer lag could 
be that police rest on their laurels when they do a gre t job one year, or that police 
lose considerable legitimacy when clearance/celerity fa l to materialize such that 
subsequent good performances do not contribute to outcomes.  Still, it would seem 
the longer lag is not theoretically supported or expected, and the potential 
mechanisms could alternatively be seen as construct of police fidelity, which itself 
will be discussed shortly. 
Ultimately, none of the four explanations alone are satisfying.  Yet, one 
purpose of fleshing out these potential explanations f r the null deterrence findings is 




each rationalization has an appeal, there also seems a fundamental undercut to each 
account of the null findings.  As a result, it is dfficult to fully explain the deterrence 
results in a linear, pre-packaged way. There are some common lessons which, when 
coupled with prior research, may provide adequate speculation if only by ruling out 
the most immediate reactions.  Through synthesizing these interrelated explanations, 
a plausible fifth reasoning tends to fit the facts better than the previous four 
individually.   
 
Explanation #5 
The starting point for a final explanation is an assumption of fidelity which, if 
relaxed, can provide a working rationalization that keeps prior explanations’ strengths 
without notable undercutting. Fidelity refers to faithfulness between 
conceptualization and operationalization.  The term is often seen in experimental 
criminology where the treatment fidelity must be monit red and verified to maintain 
the strong validity of the experimental design – accurate results are contingent on the 
treatment program being implemented as designed.  In this work, the concept of 
fidelity is linked to whether the assumption of targeted, high-profile police effort for 
all homicide cases holds in the data.  When relaxing this assumption, the 
conceptualization of high priority investigations is not fully operationalized and thus 
fidelity suffers.  While not every homicide case is worked to an idealized 
investigative level, if only because no human system is perfect, there may be a point 
where loss of fidelity undermines the function of frmal social control.  
Fidelity may be critical to understanding why some aggregate action like hot 




other aggregate actions do not (explanation #1).  Such an assumption is generally 
considered reasonable for homicide investigations, given the high-profile nature of 
the crime, policy significance, and resources dedicated which indicate a potential 
maximum effort by police.  However, speculation that this fidelity assumption does 
not hold here could yield results inconsistent with predictions based on the particular 
time/place of this data (explanation #2). The police a tion as measured in this study is 
a wholly post-incident metric which is insufficient to capture the magnitude and 
fidelity of a “targeted” intervention, potentially making the measures theoretically 
valid but ill-suited for the data (explanation #4) when the initial assumption does not 
hold.  The reason why such variables fail to capture deterrence is because the post-
incident metric taps into an output too far removed from the incident due in part to the 
constraints of the criminal justice system (explanation #3), whereas assessing a 
measure of case fidelity could be more proximate than even the closure time.  
Obviously, this issue of fidelity as described is an untested assumption, though prior 
hot spots and experimental policing research emphasize the importance of fidelity 
(Lum, Hibdon, Cave, Koper, & Merola, 2011; Weisburd & Braga, 2008) in yielding 
positive results.   
Theoretical Implications – Structural 
The key finding from this study for the testing of structural/disorganization 
perspective is the use of dynamic variables.  Prior work (see Kubrin & Weitzer 2004; 
Sampson et al. 2002) noted the potential of time-variant structural measures as part of 




evidence that local dynamic variables can be more pwerful than static factors in 
predicting homicide rates.   
There are two theoretical ramifications. First, the dynamic factors further 
bolstered general theoretical predictions regarding the impact of structure on crime.  
As noted, the results were consistent with theoretical predictions for structural 
variables impacting homicide.  Given that there wasv riability in the dynamic 
variables across time within neighborhoods, there was potential the additional 
variability would not predict the varying homicide rate over time.  In other words, 
prior studies used structural variables rooted in measures ten years apart and there 
was potential that previous positive findings were an artifact of the stability of such 
measures. The addition of yearly variation with short-term change, rather than overall 
structural conditions and long-term change, could be a ready-made explanation if 
insignificant or contrary findings came from this study.  However, the use of dynamic 
factors reflected and somewhat exceeded the static-b sed factors.  The fact that both 
sets of structural measures told the same empirical story is a testament to the robust 
impact of structure on crime. 
  The second ramification is that these results validated the potential of using 
differently sourced structural variables.  Such measurement issues strike at the heart 
of empirical theory testing.  Dynamic variables represent an undiscovered country for 
research, as the findings strongly suggest that locl, pre-existing measures can tap 
into classic residential and socioeconomic concepts be ter than static-based measures 
and without the large monetary cost associated with or ginal data collection, like the 




factors by local government can be a rich source to explain local variation in 
homicide.  By including new options for data, there is the potential for new questions 
which serve to build and test theory further; I will note some of these new avenues 
when I discuss future research. 
Related to both ramifications, it is worth noting the performance of the Census 
measures.  While they did not perform as well as the dynamic and required re-
operationalizing as factor scores for use in the models (per Land et al., 1990), the 
Census variables have a remarkable elasticity given th ir weaknesses.  While 
dynamic measures produced models with better pseudo R-squared values and fit 
statistics, the static Census measures were not far behind.  For example, the dynamic-
only regression (Model 3) had a pseudo R-squared of .152.  While the static-only 
Census regression (Model 1) was less at .131, the computations are only about 15% 
different.  Given the low cost, ability to keep variables non-transformed, additional 
options provided by longitudinal measures, and the specific superior performance in 
head-to-head models, it seems worthwhile to use the dynamic variables for especially 
given the extra boost of 15% “explained variance.”  It begs the question as to whether 
an expensive and time-consuming independent data collecti n of structural data 
would be worth the extra 15%, though. 
Theoretical Implications – Deterrence 
For the aggregate deterrence variables, the results yie ded another 
underperformance of theoretical predictions for the deterrence literature.  My earlier 
discussion of explanations touched on numerous issues directly relevant to theory, so 




ramifications: first, the limits of formal social control, and second, the potential for 
lingering and counterproductive theorizing regarding deterrence in criminology. 
The findings here suggest a clear limit to aggregat formal social control.  If 
nothing else, the impact of general deterrence, rooted in police action regarding the 
most serious, high profile crimes, was insignificant o  the future homicide rate. Prior 
research found evidence of deterrent effects based in in irect and vicarious 
experiences at the individual level (see Paternoster & Piquero, 1995; Piquero & 
Paternoster, 1998), but the findings here suggest th  same mechanisms may not work 
within small geographic spaces.  That said there is support for aggregate police-based 
control in the successes of geographic and targeted in rventions,80 so there can be a 
functioning aggregate control impacting crime in theory.  The limit and potential 
space for theoretical differentiation between positive and null results may be rooted in 
fidelity, which I mentioned during the explanation section, as evidenced in more 
positive results among experimental hot spots studies.   
The fidelity of aggregate formal control touches on two key theoretical 
considerations – the immediacy of action which is often missing in the criminal 
justice system, and manifest knowledge of the law and consequences required by 
Beccaria for effective deterrence.81 For successful aggregate deterrence, the targeted 
                                                
80 Of course, these successes also have limits.  Crime reductions from hot spots or pulling levers can be 
short-term or lost without follow up by other services (see Rosenbaum, 2008) and neighborhoods may 
suffer unintended consequences such as decreased police support due to specific tactics (Hinkle & 
Weisburd, 2008; Weisburd & Braga, 2008).  Additionally, crime displacement is a constant concern 
which, while disappointing for the impact of the intervention, ironically gives support for 
deterrence/rational choice theories of offending since rational, motivated actors will avoid increased 
likelihood of punishment by moving outside the intervention area for criminal purposes (Paternoster, 
2010). 
81 Beccaria noted that education would ultimately be a superior preventative to crime/revolution than 
deterrence and punishment.  His section On Education within his 1764 work (1983[1764]), he provides 




“flooding the zone” or the meeting with high risk individuals/groups may provide an 
overt immediacy of action where both specific and general deterrence is theoretically 
maximized when law enforcement suggests nothing will slip through the cracks; the 
manifest knowledge of law and punishment is made as a direct prelude to intervention 
actions (Braga et al., 2001).  As noted, the assumption of fidelity may not hold within 
the data for this study, and if not then null results could be expected.   
The second implication is that deterrence theory marepresent  a vapid, 
unsupported construct in criminology rather than a wholly functional, workable 
theory with regards to formal social controls at the aggregate level.  The criminal 
justice system itself may be ill-equipped to leverage the human rationality required 
for noticeable formal deterrence (see Paternoster 2010).  So even accounting for 
successes with some deterrence- and place-based police tactics, or the potential role 
of fidelity, the search for predictable and significant aggregated formal deterrent 
effects may be more akin to the search for the Northwest Passage during the 
European colonial era.82  The null findings here are consistent with a more pessimistic 
view of the theory, and while it cannot be concluded terrence is to be buried based 
                                                                                                                                 
connected with the nature of government, that it will always remain a barren spot, cultivated only by a 
few wise men” (pg. 97).  One interpretation of this could be that Beccaria is referring to education 
about government and policies rather than a general education/schooling as modern ears may hear.  
This is supported by his commentary far earlier and foremost within the chapter On the Obscurity of 
Laws where he writes, “crimes will be less frequent, in proportion as the code of laws is more 
universally read, and understood” (pg. 25).  The lesson seems to be that education in the laws 
specifically (and implied only a general education sufficient to understanding the law) will reduce 
crime and disorder.  
82 Numerous European explorers sought out the Northwest Passage, an elusive sea trade route to Asia, 
over the centuries.  I link the quest of a social science theory to this obscure historical reference du  to 
the following: while none found or navigated it until the famous explorer R. Amundsen did at the start 
of the 20th century, it is important to note that numerous other discoveries were made during or because 
of previous failed expeditions by other explorers.  The search for the Passage was worthwhile in that it 
led to other unexpected lands in the New World and led to alternative routes for circumnavigating and 
mapping the globe.  If nothing else, null findings can yield new starting points for future adventures in 




solely on the results here, the theoretical implication of insignificant, weak findings is 
not positive.   Alternative explanations and future av nues still exist, but as those run 
out and if null findings continue, at least part of deterrence theory marches closer to 
the realm of a theory which retains a known frame but has no lifeblood properly 
coursing through the veins.  
Policy-Related Findings 
The selection of the dependent variable was in large part a matter of policy 
importance.  Homicide is a high-profile measure for b th communities and police.  
The findings presented in this study interact with policy considerations and may even 
impact the potential reduction of homicides within neighborhoods.  One linkage is 
that encouragement of economic development, particularly some factors reflecting 
“root causes” outside of the criminal justice system, will yield significant results in 
curtailing homicide.  Another policy-related outcome is that, while formal social 
control variables did not demonstrate an impact, police action can still have an 
important role reducing homicide by targeting drug/gun use. 
One key policy lesson centers on support for structu al economic 
development, with one potential outcome as providing a reduction in homicide.  
While this general finding is certainly not new given that the relationship was 
hypothesized and it seems redundant that any city would need to be sold on 
improving the structural characteristics of neighborho ds, the implications of 
addressing “root causes” manifests in two related ways based on this study.  First, the 
success of dynamic structural factors suggests that even year-to-year change can 




somewhat with prior work noting potential short-term crime increases as 
neighborhoods see more economic success (Bowes, 2007; McDonald, 1986) though 
those studies found most increases among property crime and additionally find 
evidence that a different mechanism may exist for vi lent crime (see also Taylor & 
Covington, 1988).  Even incremental change to structu al factors may yield relatively 
quick dividends in the homicide rate.  Such results held significance even while 
controlling for year within the models.  Though not directly tested in this study, the 
more recent anecdotal history of economic development and homicide in 
Washington, D.C. supports this policy assertion.  As the city has increased with more 
affluent population (US Census, 2013a) and previously high disadvantage/homicide 
neighborhoods are developed (such as Barracks Row, C lumbia Heights, the H St NE 
corridor, and the Waterfront as recent examples), the overall frequency of homicide 
dropped to generational lows.  Of course, there are ce tainly other factors at play but 
the anecdotal evidence is consistent with the findings that yearly change in structural 
factors could impact homicide rates. 
The second policy finding focuses on the nature of the dynamic variables used 
to assess structure.  The significant measures (percent subprime, percent TANF, and 
percent births to teen mothers) represent local factors touched by government 
assistance, and the findings suggest that decreased dependence on formal means of 
socioeconomic help at the neighborhood level can also decrease the homicide rate, 
holding other factors constant.  This may seem counterintuitive, as government 
assistance is interpreted as a safety net within disadvantaged communities and that a 




homicide within neighborhoods.  The policy suggestion here is not to simply cut such 
assistance,83 but rather find ways to reduce the necessity.  In following with the 
general lessons of hot spots policing, government involvement in solutions may have 
the most impact when locally tailored and limited to the problem.  Such ways may not 
involve the government primarily or even directly, whether it is by private sector job 
creation, strengthening of informal social control or networks, or education in fiscally 
responsible lending and borrowing.  Ultimately, independent of the particular 
temporal or causal mechanism, the study’s findings give some support that less 
government assistance will predict less homicide at the neighborhood level, so policy 
efforts should target reducing the need at the veryleast.  If nothing else, efforts to 
reduce dependence could manifest as local, tailored programs of limited scope that 
aim to create private sector job creation while also promoting values to combat 
feelings of nihilism often seen in disadvantaged communities (Anderson, 1999).  Of 
                                                
83 The potential for unintended consequences of large social programs should not be ignored, nor 
should the possibility that decreasing the magnitude or ease of funding may also see some benefits.  
Like the War on Drugs, the War on Poverty can be int rpreted as an ill-guided failure, albeit well-
meaning at times, given the durable nature and concentration of disadvantage found by scholars such 
as R. Sampson and W.J. Wilson (1987; see also Sampson & Wilson, 1994) following increased social 
spending and programs.  In theory, a successful anti-poverty program would see continued reductions 
of poverty or at least a complete turnover of population assisted, as the purpose of such spending is to 
assist those individuals and neighborhoods out of disadvantage and the tangle of pathologies.  Towards 
that point, the national poverty rate has remained fairly stable between 10-15% since the War on 
Poverty and associated spending started (NPC, 2013).  Additionally, as noted in Wilson (1987), 
disadvantaged communities in minority areas tend to be more static following the 1960s than before, as 
those only held back in society due to codified racial prejudices subsequently left when possible, 
further weakening communities by depriving those left b hind of examples of success and the local 
economic engine (see also Anderson, 1999).  Rather than help, it may be possible that this government 
spending contributes to the stagnant nature of disadvantaged communities by providing enough 
assistance to make conditions more tolerable, discouraging pro-social risk, but not enough to truly 
transform a community (Murray, 1984; Sowell, 1995). Though a full treatment of this topic would 
likely require a second dissertation in another department, it would seem increased government 
spending on poverty may not have a grand impact at the aggregate level, and that cuts or restructuring 
of said spending could undo some current unintended consequences.  From the policy side, a similar 
restructuring was central to the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, which itself authorized the creation of TANF, and is temporally correlated with increased 




course, such conjecture is easier said than done as evidenced by decades of anti-
poverty programs yielding concentrated poverty. 
In addition to the importance of root causes, this study suggests that police 
action can still have an impact on homicide.  Given the controls for root causes in the 
models, there is also support for Vollmer’s (1933) belief that police can impact crime 
even if socioeconomic factors remain constant.  While t e deterrence variables of 
certainty and celerity were not significant in reducing overall homicide rates84, other 
variables within the police purview did significantly impact homicide.  Two controls, 
percent handguns and percent drugs, had direct, posi ive relationships with the 
homicide rate.  Police action that can target those variables and reduce their values 
may have a benefit of decreasing the homicide rate within neighborhoods, even after 
controlling for other variables.  The pulling levers approach and recent 
implementations of Operation Ceasefire have roots in he Boston Gun Project, which 
sought to address gun conflict through targeted, deterrence-based enforcement (Braga 
et al., 2001).  The current findings from Washington, D.C. lend support consistent 
with the general philosophy behind these programs.  
One concern, however, is found in the direct relationship between percent 
arrest for homicide and homicide rate.  This may be an instance of unintended 
consequences of police work (Hinkle & Weisburd, 2008), a reflection of lack of 
police legitimacy (Anderson, 1999), or simply self-selection in that neighborhoods 
with more prior arrests are the more dangerous neighborhoods where an increase in 
                                                
84 There are other reasons for police to close homicides, and close them quickly, independent of any 
potential reduction in future homicides.  General public safety, a sense of justice and psychological 
closure for survivors, community satisfaction, and  positive media perception/reporting come to mind 




arrests may signify an underlying increase to violence (e.g. building crew conflicts or 
new drug markets).  If nothing else, the finding here may reflect the limits of formal 
control in that “more law,” to paraphrase D. Black, is significantly linked to more 
homicide.  While this finding could normally be an rgument for greater police 
discretion and handling crimes without making arrests, it may present a challenge 
since this study’s outcome was homicide, a crime whre there generally is not an 
option for discretion, at least not without considerable public and media backlash. 
Given the limited option in dealing with homicide suspects, the direct effect of 
percent arrested may be a necessary cost in combating homicide. Yet, it still suggests 
an opportunity to take procedure justice or legitimacy issues to heart in that if formal 
control needs to be established, some costs may be mitigated by a better quality of 
justice in communities.  
Limitations 
Like all research, there were limitations to this study.  First, it was not 
possible to define and delineate exact named neighborhoods within Washington, 
D.C., and as a result the census tract was the geographic unit of analysis.  
Neighborhoods represent a geographic space where people share territory and the 
circumstances which come with it (see Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Kirk & Laub, 
2010).  Ideally, known divisions with known data would exist to capture the spatial 
and social element of neighborhoods, and thereby determine how the nature of 
common space impacts homicide.  A great deal of effrt and work went into such a 
task for the PHDCN, reducing 865 census tracts into 342 distinct neighborhoods in 




Washington, D.C.  Neither local officials nor the U.S. Census had sufficient 
information on precise neighborhood boundaries, which led to a lack of aggregated 
structural data cut to that level of measurement.85  While census tracts are arguably a 
good proxy within Washington, D.C. given their count compared to the estimated 
number of neighborhoods, as noted previously, the tracts are a proxy none the less 
and likely miss a degree of specificity along with potential shared values.   
Second, the measures of formal social control focused on police outcomes 
rather than the fidelity of investigation.  The issue of fidelity may be an important 
factor for deterrence and an assumption which cannot be made in the data without 
giving up some potential explanatory power. Related, he models have limited 
“explained variance” which suggests there is ample room for influential missing 
variables.  While the concept of R-squared is more of an approximation with non-
linear models as opposed to explained variance with OLS (Long, 1997), it is still 
useful for model comparison by assisting in the determination of best fit.  Given the 
low values, it seems clear there would be room to grow even if the precise variation 
in homicide rate by the independent variables cannot be definitively quantified as in a 
linear regression.86 
                                                
85 In part, this confusion is likely linked to the same confusion among D.C. residents and other 
partners.  In a conversation with MPDC officials unrelated to this study, the topic of neighborhoods 
came up when discussing citizen requests for crime data in the “Hillcrest” community, a well-known 
neighborhood along the Maryland border in Southeast Washington.  Three different ideas for the 
boundaries existed – citizens believed the neighborhood was roughly the size of a PSA (approximately 
the area covered by census tracts 76.3, 76.4, 99.1, and 99.2 in Figure 6), D.C. Office of Planning 
roughly defined it as about half the citizen-recommended size (about tracts 76.3 and 76.4), and police 
suggested the size to be about one-third the PSA size (most of tract 76.3 and some of 76.4). 
86 In this study, I used the McFadden’s pseudo R-squared calculation.  While there is no consensus on 
which calculation is best, the McFadden’s has a number of favorable qualities which make it a 
reasonable approximation of a true R-squared (Menard, 2000) and does not require additional 




Finally, the specific research findings are limited in generalizability to the 
time and place of my data.  Even if there is nothing u ique about this period and this 
city, it still stands to reason that my sampling frame does not allow a universal, 
national conclusion without further samples from beyond this time and place.  Of 
course, this limitation does not mean the general lssons, such as the viability of 
dynamic factors or weakness of deterrence, cannot be moved forward into the 
literature base.  Rather, it stresses the need for replication among other samples in the 
future. 
Future Research 
There are a number of avenues for future research based on this study.  First, 
the search for and use of dynamic structural variables can be expanded and further 
tested against Census measures, as this study demonstrated at least a proof of concept 
for the viability of dynamic factors.  Related to this, the introduction of functioning, 
reliable dynamic measures of structure allows for a g eater range of longitudinal and 
growth studies to assess the impact of structure on homicide rates without relying on 
static Census measures (Wadsworth & Kubrin, 2004).   
Second, further study of deterrence can expand on celerity as it remains under 
examined in the literature.  Given that celerity is stressed highly by Beccaria and may 
be a key factor in any potential deterrent impact of the criminal justice system at 
large, it seems worthwhile to flesh out the concept enough to catch up with certainty 
and severity.  In the descriptive analysis here, th time to plateau in the survival 
function for clearance was far greater for Washingto , D.C. than in the NIBRS 




difficult what to make of this difference.  The primary distinction between the study 
samples is that NIBRS reflects smaller sized agencies than MPDC.  While certainty 
can be universally measured through a dichotomous clearance measure, and severity 
is consistent across jurisdictions regarding homicide, the findings here may suggest 
that there may be more subjectivity to the idea of celerity.  What is “expected” 
celerity and how will it matter depend on agency size?  The literature gives little 
guidance, and the results here only muddy the water somewhat as there seems no 
universal metric for celerity – of course, part of that reason is that the measure was 
insignificant at any value.  Still, it seems worthwhile to further explore the issue of 
celerity if only to confirm that this measure does not impact the rate of homicide in a 
community. 
However, such measures may be consigned to failure if some 
conceptualization and operationalization checks of fidelity are not also applied.  
Given that fidelity seems to be a key difference betwe n successful and unsuccessful 
tests of aggregate formal control, future research which takes fidelity into account 
may be better positioned to yield either significant results for deterrence theory or 
more conclusive evidence of deterrence theory’s inability to impact homicide.  This 
could be done through greater data collection to no simply include case reviews but 
interviews with detectives and key personnel to asses  the difference between what 
should be done and what is done during investigations (see Wellford, Bond, & 
Goodison, 2011).  Examples of potentially useful metrics for investigating fidelity 
would reflect overt action that shows the homicide being “worked” by investigators.  




investigations (see Carter, 2013; IACP, 2013; Wellford & Cronin, 1999).  From this 
research, such investigative practices are intertwined with this fidelity assumption, 
such as breath/scope of witness interviews, neighborhood outreach efforts (creation of 
posters, canvassing, media campaigns), or subsequent increases in other police 
activity within the area after the homicide.  Even if i significant, controlling for 
fidelity can be an important step in reducing explanations for the underperformance 
of deterrence, thereby leading to a more accurate ass ssment of deterrence theory in 
practice. 
Third, given that homicide data often have a rich individual-level component, 
further examinations should explore the multi-level n sted linkages between incidents 
and neighborhoods; any such research could easily dovetail into a gap into the 
disorganization literature as well (see Wikstrom & Loeber, 2000).  While this study 
and others have provided evidence that structure impacts homicide rates, it is still 
unclear as to how strong neighborhood effects would be when properly considering 
individual factors or conversely how strong individual risk variables would prove 
when nested within neighborhoods.  When imagining fidelity as measured by 
investigation, it may be better assessed at an individual level, thus giving more 
motivation for future use of multi-level models in deterrence research.  The inclusion 
of investigative characteristics which tap into fidel ty or a richer array of individual-
level variables, such as arrest records or even convi tion history, could provide a 





Finally, there is a potential that there are differential effects based on 
disaggregated homicide.  While this work used a limited measure of disaggregated 
homicide to create the drug-motive homicide measure, the outcome variable was an 
aggregated homicide rate.  Future studies, particularly those incorporating a multi-
level model to leverage the maximum use of individual-level disaggregation, can 
examine whether the effect of structural and deterrnce factors varies across homicide 
type.  One can imagine how felony-related homicides (e.g. drug or robbery) or 
retaliation-based homicides may be susceptible to formal social controls, as opposed 
to argument or domestic homicides.   Disaggregated homicide is considered to impact 
the general clearance rate, as the recent drop in overall homicide closures is partially 
attributed to the transition to more stranger rather an domestic cases (see Wellford 
and Cronin, 1999).  In this way, disaggregation may also influence celerity, albeit 
limited to the full context of the homicide.   
Conclusion 
The purpose of this research was to explore an undiscovered country of how 
dynamic structural factors and deterrence impacted homicide rates.  Using 
Washington, D.C. data from 1998-2006, findings suggest that dynamic structural 
variables perform better than decennial Census variables and that these dynamic 
variables predicted homicide rates significantly.  However, measures of deterrence 
were not successful in predicting homicide rates, suggesting that the impact of case 
closure as police-dependent formal social control was minimal within neighborhoods.  
While structural variables performed according to predictions, the lack of significance 




police/deterrence successes in research.  Beyond theoretical implications, the results 
suggested important directions for policy, such as the ability for police to reduce 
homicide without addressing root causes of crime even if not through celerity or 
certainty.  While not without limitations, this study posits that future research can 
further explore the unknown and clarify what has been glimpsed here. For that is the 
purpose of science, to incrementally build upon the body of knowledge towards 
greater understanding.  Ideally, the research here as helped reveal at least a small 
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